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Preface
If it is true that critics are closet autobiographers, that whatever they write
about someone else’s work inevitably bears the impression o f their own lives and
selves, then readers should be forewarned; you are undertaking an exploration
into my own life.
I first became aware of Walker Percy some time during my years at St.
Joseph Seminary College, a small liberal arts college in Covington, Louisiana.
This is the same school where Percy taught one year and where he delivered the
commencement address in 1983. He was an acquaintance of the rector-president
o f the college—a "priest-sociologist"—and I saw them from time to time walking
around the campus. I was not an avid reader during those years, so when I
learned that Percy wrote novels, I did not rush out to get one of his books. I did
have the occasion, however, to buy Love in the Ruins tor a friend o f mine during
the summer o f 1979. I bought the book from The Kumquat, the bookstore in
Covington owned by Percy’s daughter, Anne Moores. Mrs. Percy happened to be
working in the store when I went in. After I paid for the book, she said, "Walker
is working upstairs. He’ll be down in a few minutes if you’d like to talk to him."
Being somewhat like Will Barrett of The Last Gentleman, an affable, albeit
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"addled young man," I declined. W hat was I going to say to this man? Why
should I want to talk to him? So I took the book, wrote a note to my friend, a
large part of which I copied from the dust cover—something about the
"apocalyptic" nature of the work—and delivered it. Later on, I bought a
paperback copy of the book for myself, read it, and became even more addled. I
enjoyed the story, what I could make of it, enjoyed the descriptions o f the "Love
Clinic" and Tom M ore’s lapsometer, but I had no idea o f what Percy was up to.
All the same, I sensed that he was "onto something," a favorite phrase of his. So I
read it again. Soon, I was hooked. I had to read his other works.
I gradually realized that this man was writing about me! It was not an
altogether pleasant realization, for, if you know Percy’s characters, you know that
they are a rather wounded lot. How could he know me so well? How could he
show me my own wounds?
Thirteen years and one graduate degree later, I seek an answer to those
questions in this study. I return, then, to the place I began. I think it is accurate
for me to say that it was through reading Walker Percy that I ever came to do
graduate work in English. I would like this study, the culmination of that work,
which is also a beginning, to be seen as a tribute to him whose work has opened
new possibilities for me. I can only hope that it is a fitting tribute.
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Abstract
While many critics have explored some connections between Walker Percy’s work
and the philosophies of Soren Kierkegaard and M artin Heidegger, none has
examined that link in terms of autobiography and autobiographical theory. This
study looks at both Percy’s fiction and nonfiction in light of the category of
repetition and its relation to autobiography. Following largely the work of
William Spanos, the first chapter establishes a reading of autobiography as
repetition—understood as inter esse, "being between" and concerned in time. It
then discloses a link between such a view of autobiography and Percy’s diagnostic
use o f the novel. The remainder of the study examines Percy’s works in light o f
repetition and the three component parts of the word "autobiography"— autos,

bios, and graphein. Chapter Two investigates Percy’s semiotics of the self,
especially with regard to the self s "unformulability" and "dislocation" as those
themes are displayed in Lost in the Cosmos, The Moviegoer, and The Last

Gentleman. Chapter Three explores Percy’s criticism of a gnostic culture as it is
framed in "The Loss of the Creature" and "The Message in the Bottle," and it
explores references to the Nazi Holocaust (taken as the most extreme expression of
gnosticism in this century) throughout his novels, but especially in The Thanatos

Syndrome. Chapter Four examines the reflexive nature of Percy’s writing—the
ix

interpenetration of repetition as a theme and repetition as narrative technique—
with reference to the "blue-dollar hawk" story as it is told in "M etaphor as
Mistake" and The Second Coming. Chapter Five recapitulates much o f the
dissertation but with regard to Percy the man. In a large part of his life and work,
Percy seems to have absorbed and been absorbed with the category of repetition.
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Introduction
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
—T. S. Eliot
"Little Gidding"
The search is what anyone would undertake
if he were not sunk in the everydayness of his own life.
—Binx Bolling

The M o viegoer

During an interview in 1981, J. Gerald Kennedy asked W alker Percy,
"When your biography is written, are we going to see your novels in those terms?"
Percy replied candidly:
"Oh, I guess some of it, but not in the current sense of a
rom an a clef. N ot because I think there is anything wrong
with it, but I mean the American vogue o f writing a rom an a
clef to me is a big bore. It’s no fun. The fun comes in
transforming experience, taking something that’s happened
to you, something you might imagine that happened—or I ’m
talking to you and I could imagine something that might
have happened to you—and putting the pieces all together;
that’s where the fun is."1
At first glance, Percy’s comment does not seem altogether significant. F o r what he
admits must undoubtedly transpire in almost every writer. W riters transform
experience—lived or imagined—into art. But what does it mean to transform

1

2
experience? Transform comes from the Latin prefix trans, "across, implying
change," and formare, "to form." Experience has its roots in experientia, which
means "a trial or a test." To transform experience, then, would be "to change
across the form of a trial," or better, "to change the form of a trial."2
Although Percy uses "experience" in this interview to signify the more or
less "ordinary" understanding of the word, that is, "an actual living through an
event or events," his comment gains significance when placed in the context of the
existentialist philosophy which he found so illuminating.3 For, as he states time
and again in both his essays and his novels, experience, the actual living through
events, has returned to its original sense and has itself become a trial: "How does
one live through an ordinary Wednesday afternoon?" This ostensibly innocent
question provides much of the impetus for Percy’s writing.
Following his existentialist progenitors, Percy wonders whether one
actually "lives" through events anymore. It seems, on the contrary, that a
pervasive sense of death prevails. The "gas of malaise," "ravening particles," and
"death-in-life" becloud and bombard attempts at ordinary living and pit his
characters against the seductions of death. As Binx Bolling reflects in The

Moviegoer, "for some time now the impression has been growing on me that
everyone is dead" (86). And the older Will Barrett asks in The Second Coming,
"Am I killed and until this moment did not know it" (135)? Or again, "Is it

possible for people to miss their lives in the same way one misses a plane" (113)?
And Percy’s last novel even has death in its title: The Thanatos Syndrome. He
speaks for himself (and more directly) in his essay "Notes for a Novel about the
End o f the World": "The hero of the postmodern novel is a m an who has
forgotten his bad memories and conquered his present ills and who finds himself in
the victorious secular city. His only problem now is to keep from blowing his
brains out" {MB 112).4
While Percy’s heroes have not necessarily forgotten their bad
memories—Binx ponders his father’s death, Will Barrett confronts his father’s
suicide both in The Last Gentleman and more powerfully in The Second Coming,
Tom M ore remembers his daughter’s ugly death, and L ancelots built on the
recovering memory of Lancelot Lamar—they nevertheless struggle constantly with
the task o f "living" through ordinary experience.
But as Kennedy’s question and Percy’s response suggest, Percy himself
often found experience a trial, and the "fun" of writing his novels came about in
changing the form of that trial. In a general sense this transformation, o f course,
is the autobiographical movement. Commenting on what by now must be
considered the "classic" work in the field of autobiography, M etaphors o f Self,
James Olney writes about his own work:

4
When I began (in about 1966) to write what eventually
became Metaphors o f S elf it never occurred to me to look
for critical works on autobiography for the simple reason
that I did not think of what I was doing as a study of
autobiography; I thought of it as a study of the way
experience is transformed into literature (which I suppose
could be another way of describing autobiography)—as a
study of the creative process, a humanistic study o f the ways
of men and the forms taken by human consciousness.5
The uncanny similarity between Percy’s comment and the words I have italicized
in Olney’s passage opens the door (as if it needed opening) to an understanding of
Percy’s works in an autobiographical context.
O f course, readers familiar with the extensive criticism that Percy’s writing
has generated know that that metaphorical door has already been opened.
William Rodney Allen’s Walker Percy: A Southern Wayfarer approaches Percy’s
fiction in light of his struggle with "fathers"—literal, adoptive, and literary.6
Following closely the insight of Richard King’s A Southern Renaissance who in
turn acknowledges debt to Harold Bloom’s The A nxiety o f Influence, Alien argues
convincingly that "Percy’s fiction is in a very real sense his response to his father’s
suicide" (xvii). But Allen maintains that Percy had more than one father to
contend with:
I will suggest that Percy had an inordinate number of
"fathers" to defeat in order to, in Bloom’s words, "clear
imaginative space" for himself: his literal suicidal father; his
stoical, melancholy adopted father; Freud (against whom he
struggled in three years of psychoanalysis); Faulkner, whose

influence he has too insistently denied; and finally, American
literary precursors like Twain, Warren, and Hemingway.
(xviii)
Allen’s readings of the particular novels are solid and insightful. He is at his best
when he mines the rich layers of Percy’s literary allusions. Yet, I find it odd that in
this "autobiographical study" he neglects the ever-growing body o f material on
autobiography as a field of critical inquiry. Thus, while he implicitly traces the
change in form of Percy’s trials, especially that of his father’s suicide, he does not
explicitly place the works in a broader theoretical concept of autobiography. That
is, he seems to presuppose a transformation of experience without exploring
connections between Percy’s work, autobiographical theory, and actual
autobiographies. I hope to cast light in this direction by means of this study.
Thus, while Allen’s work in some measure unlocks the mysteries o f Percy’s
fiction with the keys of his personal experience, I will explore the "fun" o f
transforming experience at a more general level. I will look at Percy’s works
(fiction and nonfiction) to discern their relation to the autos, bios, and graphein of
autobiography, and I will do so, furthermore, in light o f what I take to be one the
central movements of both his life and his work: Kierkegaard’s category of
repetition, the movement in which "everything is returned double."7 I hope to
show first, then, that autobiography—the type of work that presents itself as the
story of its author’s life, written by himself—follows this same movement. That is

to say there is a sense in which autobiographers recover, regain, or, as we shall see,
"repeat" their experience (as do Percy’s characters) so that they are able once again
to inhabit, to live in, that experience. They thus attain a type o f reconciliation and
redemption. I will then go on to show the relation between repetition and autos,

bios, and graphein, respectively, in light of Percy’s works and theories of
autobiography.

It is interesting to note and entirely germane to my argument that
autobiography is a relatively recent entrant in the many fields of critical inquiry.
Almost every critic of autobiography with whom I am familiar has commented on
this fact.8 Yet it is Olney who offers lucid insights as to why this might be.
According to Olney autobiography has found its place in this cultural moment for
three reasons, the first related to genre and the second two to criticism:
First, there is the dual, paradoxical fact that autobiography
is often something considerably less than literature and that
it is always something rather more than literature. . . . It
refuses, simply to be a literary genre like any other.
("Cultural Moment" 24)
James Cox seems to say something similar when he writes that autobiography as a
genre exists somewhere between the self-enclosed and self-referential literature of
imagination and the purely referential literature of fact (Cox 8). Autobiography,
then, defies any facile generic classification.
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Olney continues: "A second, related reason . . . is that critics o f twenty-five
years ago insisted that for satisfying aesthetic apprehension a work m ust display
(in Stephen Dedalus’s phrase) 'wholeness, harmony, and radiance’" (25). While
some autobiographers may strive for the latter two of Dedalus’s triad, the first, in
the sense of a completed and closed work is for autobiography an impossibility:
"The end of the story cannot be told. . . . The narrative is never finished, nor ever
can be, within the covers of a book" (25).
Here, Olney implicitly refers to what might be called the "revolution" that
has occurred in literary studies during the last few decades. That is, he refers to
the shift in allegiance from the New Critical (modernist) paradigm—a model that,
as William V. Spanos and others have shown, takes its credo directly from Joyce’s

A Portrait o f the Artist as a Young Man and which holds "timelessness" in priority
to time—to the deconstructive or destructive (postmodern) criticism which has its
origins in existential philosophy and which places a priority on time.9 I will treat
this shift in perspective in more detail in chapter one—especially the relation
between autobiography and time, for as Olney says in another context, the
autobiographer’s prime motive is to "redeem the time."10 But it is enough to say
now that autobiography, based on these first two reasons alone, can be viewed as
the postmodern form par excellence, inasmuch as postmodernism has a form.

8
The third reason for autobiography’s delay in entering the circles o f critical
inquiry has to do with its self-reflexive nature (in spite of Cox’s claim above, or
maybe in addition to that claim, since he places it in the middle, which would
mean, o f course, that it is self-reflexive to a degree). As Olney phrases it,
autobiography is a self-reflexive, a self-critical act, and
consequently the criticism of autobiography exists within the
literature instead of alongside it. The autobiographer can
discuss and analyze the autobiographical act as he performs
it. (25, his emphasis)
From Augustine’s reflections on time and memory in his Confessions to M ary
M cCarthy’s italicized, complementary sections in Memories o f a Catholic

Girlhood, to Ronald Fraser’s fascinating blend of subjective and objective history
(psychoanalysis and interviews) in his In Search o f a Past, autobiographers
theorize about their work even as they enact it.
Percy, of course, never wrote what is commonly considered an
autobiography. His forms of choice were the essay and the novel. While he never
completely abandoned the essay form, I agree with Patricia Lewis Poteat who
maintains that it is the novel that is best suited to Percy’s aims as a writer. She
argues that "Percy’s conceptual vision becomes progressively more blurred as his
style and vocabulary become progressively less anecdotal or narrative and more
analytical and abstract—hence, ever more tenuously anchored in the concrete
particulars of persons in predicaments."11 Those essays which incorporate

anecdote and narrative (persons in predicaments)—essays which might be called
"novelistic," such as "The Man on the Train," "The Loss of the Creature," and
"The Message in the Bottle"—she claims, are clearer and more persuasive than the
technical and more abstract essays which comprise the other pieces in The

Message in the Bottle. Percy himself was aware of this problem: tired o f "getting
paid in reprints," interested in the French novel of writers such as Jean-Paul Sartre
and Albert Camus, writers who "see nothing wrong with writing novels that
address what they consider the deepest philosophical issues," and eager to reach a
broader audience than his essays allowed, Percy turned to novel-writing during the
1950’s ( Con 183, and Coles 137).
His first two efforts—"The Charterhouse," and "The Gramercy
Winner"—were, by his own admission, terrible: "[I wrote] two bad novels which
I’m glad were not published" ( Con 89).12 He made his breakthrough with The

Moviegoer, published in 1961 and the winner of the 1962 National Book Award.
The rest, as the saying goes, "is history." His writing career spanned the next
thirty years of his life: The Last Gentleman (1966), Lo ve in the Ruins (1971), The

Message in the Bottle (197'5), Lancelot (1977), The Second Coining (\9ttQ), Lost in
the Cosmos {\9^Z), The Thanatos Syndrome (1987), and Signposts in a Strange
Land(\99\), the posthumously published collection of essays, edited by Patrick
Samway, S.J., Percy’s "authorized" biographer.13
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But this brief foray into the chronology of his works steers me away from
my principal concern with his novels and his view of the novel. For, as I will claim
in the first chapter of this study, Percy’s view of the novel and the characteristics o f
autobiography already outlined above share much in common and thus further
signal the aptness of an autobiographical approach to his works. Percy’s
comments in essays and interviews about the novel being a "mess" or having been
"always in trouble," for example, correspond not only to the "oppositional poetics"
W alter Reed discusses in An Exemplary History o f the Novel, but also to the
generic instability that Olney sees in autobiography.14 Furthermore, Percy’s view
o f the novel as "diagnostic" and ultimately therapeutic, what Michael McKeon
calls its "problem-solving mode,"15 seems to correspond to the autobiographer’s
attem pt to name himself by writing his life. Although naming a problem is the
first step to solving it, giving a name entails a fall of sorts, a misname, for Percy.
And since the self, as I will show in chapter two, is semiotically adrift, and since, as
Percy writes in "M etaphor as Mistake," we can only know "one thing through the
lens o f another" (MB 82), it is precisely through the attempt to name that a subject
opens itself to the possibility o f being a self. Of course, this striving after a name
presupposes that the self is problematical in the first place; otherwise, why try to
name it? The self cannot be so readily named as other things because it is not a
thing among other things, but a nothing. Thus, and this relates Percy’s novel-

11
writing to autobiography all the more firmly, the attempt to name is life-long and
hence without closure.
Furthermore, Percy sees the novel as the perfect medium for depicting what
Marcel called homo viator; man the wayfarer or pilgrim (Con 231). Such a
wayfarer, however, cannot reach his end. For if the novel is about "man on the
road," then the road, quite literally, can have no terminus. Some critics have
chided Percy for his ambiguous endings (except for The Second Coming, which
was criticized for its apparent closure!), but it is precisely that ambiguity that
points to the openness of possibility and the life-long process of self-naming. Both
autobiography and Percy’s novels, then, struggle with the question o f time, whose
end remains unknown, but which nevertheless seems to demand redemption. That
is to say, both Percy’s writing and autobiography share a common goal o f calling
the writer (and the reader) back to time through the process o f self-naming.
The correspondence between the self-reflexive nature o f autobiography and
Percy’s work is less clear. Instead of making his novels self-reflexive, as Faulkner
does, for example, in Absalom! Absalom!, Percy seems to have used the essay and
the interview to reflect on the nature of writing. He does not develop a theory of
the novel in the act of writing a novel; instead, he uses other occasions of writing
or speaking to think about the form as such. Nevertheless, his narrative style itself
displays an interpenetration of form and content, if you will. Repetition finds

12
embodiment as a theme in Percy’s works even as it is manifested in his writing
style. In this sense, his works can be read as exhibiting a self-reflexivity.
This essay, then, will introduce several new approaches to the appreciation
o f Percy’s works. Chapter One, "Autobiography, Repetition, and Percy," will
place Percy’s works within a theoretical understanding of autobiography as
repetition. Chapters Two, Three, and Four will carry as their main titles,
respectively, "Repetition and Autos," "Repetition and Bios," and "Repetition and

Graphein." But each of these chapter headings will bear subtitles as well, to give
m ore specific focus to the topic at hand: "The Unformulability o f the Self,"
"Surviving Life in a Century of Gnosticism and Death," and "M etaphor and The
Mystery o f Language and Narrative." Finally, Chapter Five, "Autobiography,
Repetition, and Percy," will provide a coda which "repeats" many o f m ajor themes
developed in the work as a whole, but reflects more on Percy the man.
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1.

Ben Forkner and J. Gerald Kennedy, "An Interview with W alker Percy,"
Conversations with Walker Percy, eds. Lewis A. Lawson and Victor A.
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2.

Etymologies taken from Webster’s New Universal Unabridged D ictionary
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979).

3.
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existentialist roots. In fact, because of his own statements in early
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aspect. Thus, to cite all the works which connect Percy with existentialist
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1978); Panthea Reid Broughton, ed., The A rt o f Walker Percy: Stratagems
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Search o f Self: Life, Death and Walker Percy (Cambridge, MA: Cowley
Publications, 1986); Jerome Taylor, Walker Percy’s Heroes: A
Kierkegaardian Analysis (New York: Seabury Press, 1983); Linda Whitney
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Chapter One
Autobiography, Repetition and Percy
When the novelist writes o f a man "coming to himself'
through some such catalyst as catastrophe or ordeal,
he may be offering obscure testimony to a gross
disorder of consciousness and to the need of
recovering oneself as neither angel nor organism but
as a wayfaring creature somewhere between.
—"Notes for a Novel about the End o f the World"
( The Message in the Bottle, 113)

1. Autobiography: A Necessary Attempt at Limiting the Term
One o f the problems any writer confronts in developing an
autobiographical study is the setting of limits to the term itself. T hat is to say,
how does one define autobiography? Is there such a thing as a genre called
autobiography that is characteristically different from other genres? W hat are the
boundaries that set it off from other types of writing?
The OED defines autobiography as "the writing of one’s own history; the
story of one’s life written by himself."1 This seems to be a fair assessment o f the
term; yet what can be considered as one’s "history"? Is it a simple compilation of
the events that occur during the course of one’s lifetime? And if this is so, how
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does one pattern those events, or can there be a pattern at all? Is it true that a
pattern distorts, in some way, the material it encloses? Or is it more truthful to say
that when one writes something in narrative form, a pattern is established or
assumed in the very act of writing itself, and that writing without a pattern carries
no significance beyond individual words? Furthermore, how can one account for
those autobiographies, such as Herbert Read’s "The Innocent Eye," that contain
very little reference to actual events? In short, this definition begs the question of
history and historiography. N or do the waters become less murky when one turns
to a definition of "story." Cannot poetry be considered, in some sense, as the story
o f its writer? And if poetry can be so considered, why not a collection o f essays, a
philosophy, a theology, or a series of novels? If a story implies a pattern, as the

OED suggests, then practically any narrative could be considered autobiography.
The genre, if indeed I can even use that word, cannot be so readily catalogued.
But none of this is new to the study of autobiography. I have already cited
the comments of Olney and Cox who say that autobiography is both more and less
than literature. In Metaphors o f Self, Olney explicitly eschews any generic
approach to the field:
It is not at all my present purpose to try to define a literary
form, or to distinguish and classify all the varieties and types
o f autobiography; indeed, definition o f autobiography as a
literary genre seems to me virtually impossible, because the
definition must either include so much as to be no definition,
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or exclude so much as to deprive us of the most relevant
texts. Either way, definition is not particularly desirable or
significant. (38-9)
But if Olney denies any explicit definition of autobiography, his theory—the
preceding quotation is taken from his chapter entitled "A Theory of
Autobiography"—suggests an implicit one. Autobiography creates a m etaphor of
self for both its writer and reader. It names the self through the process of
metaphorical indirection. Autobiography is that type of writing which creates and
names a m etaphor o f self. Granted, this "definition" itself leaves m uch to be
clarified—something which Olney does throughout the remainder of his book in
his discussions of Eliot, Jung, Montaigne and others; nevertheless, it is a definition
of sorts.
Theorists o f autobiography seem to escape the trap of definition through
an appeal to function. If autobiography cannot be classified generically, then
what it does for both the writer and reader, or for the study of literature in general
for that matter, comes to the fore. Thus, Cox maintains that the study of
autobiography provides for the "recovering of literature’s lost ground," which he
takes to be history. Janet Varner Gunn says that because autobiographers claim
and take hold of the events of their lives, they become "fierce with reality."
Georges G usdorf writes that autobiography is "the symbol, or parable o f a
consciousness in quest of its own truth." And Paul John Eakin argues that
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autobiography functions as a "process of self-discovery and self-creation" which
ultimately points to the fictive structure of the self. Like Olney’s metaphorizing
then, these functions of autobiography define, in some sense, both the act and the
product.2 At the same time, however, they are definitions which refuse to be
definitions. While autobiography encompasses these functions, it is also always
beyond them. As a genre, autobiography would seem to "de-struct," as William V.
Spanos would say, the antinomy I suggest above between explicit and implicit.
For Spanos, "de-struction is n o t . . . a nihilistic activity of thought that [portrays]
its active force by levelling difference. Rather, it is, paradoxically, a positive or . . .
a pro-jective interpretive activity in which thinking ( theoria) is doing-in-the-world

(praxis). "4 In this sense, then, the explicit is the implicit—the work (or the study
o f the work), the doing-in-the-world, is the definition and vice versa. One’s theory
o f autobiography is as much autobiography as is the work or works under
scrutiny. It seems, then, that there can be no single definition of autobiography;
rather, we are left only with the paradoxical and circular view that each instance of
autobiography is its definition, just as each instance of criticism about
autobiography projects a new and (one hopes) fruitful limitation, which is
paradoxically a widening, of whatever boundaries autobiography can be said to
have.5
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In this "limitation" of the term, then, I may have realized nothing more
than Olney’s resistance to definition. Or perhaps I have returned to the view
established in the Introduction of this study, that autobiography is the
"transformation of experience into art," a broad enough definition, to be sure, yet
one which still seems a good guide for an understanding of the term. For such a
transformation involves, as I hope to show, both limitation and possibility. It
involves repetition.

2. Autobiography and Time: Repetition
In Autobiography: Toward a Poetics o f Experience, Janet Varner G unn
looks at the transformation of experience into art with an emphasis on the role o f
time.6 She contends that "traditional" theorists in the field of autobiography
(writers such as G usdorf and Olney) place the self in a privileged position with
regard to itself, and that the "ultimate expression of the selFs privileged position is
the Cartesian cogito" (Gunn 7). The result of such a placement of the self is its
separation from the vicissitudes of time. She writes:
[In traditional autobiographical theory] to avoid the
contamination of time, the privacy of the true self must be
made absolute . . . . Autobiography has therefore to be
understood as a form of "transcendental voyeurism"—as
though the reader were getting a second-hand account of
what the self, watching and overhearing itself, has seen and
heard. (7)
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G unn portrays Olney, Gusdorf and others as promoters of a Cartesian dualism
whose ultimate effect on autobiographical theory
deport[s] autobiography from the country of vital experience
to the desert island of Husserlian reduction or a reified
textual system. At the center of their assumptions about
autobiography is the hidden or ghostly self which is absolute,
ineffable and timeless. Being outside the momentum of
temporality and beyond the reach of language, this self
cannot be said to have a past at all; it never was, it simply is.
(8, her emphasis)
G unn offers a corrective to what she sees as the fatal flaw to such a conception.
Since she sees Olney and G usdorf as removing the self from its involvement with
time, she works from a view of the self "displayed in time":
The fact of the autobiographer’s anchorage in the
temporality (and spatiality) of his or her lived world
constitutes the beginning as well as the telos of
autobiography. N ot as an escape from time, but as a plunge
into it; not as a self s divestment of its world involvement,
but as acknowledgement of temporal experience as a vehicle
of meaning—this is how autobiography displays its bios. (9)
G unn’s vision of autobiography points ultimately to a reversal of what she takes
to be the implicit question traditional theory posits: "Autobiography embodies the
story of Antaeus and not, as so many are ready to assume, Narcissus. Understood
so, the real question of autobiography becomes where do I belong?not, who am
I?" (23).
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This idea of placement offers a fresh critical stance on the field, and I shall
return to it later. Gunn follows through soundly with her thesis, and she offers
compelling readings of texts, especially Walden. Yet I agree with Paul John Eakin
who maintains that her view o f autobiography has more in common with Gusdorf
and Olney than she admits (Eakin 184). Eakin does not offer an analysis of these
similarities; he merely suggests that Gunn would become aware o f them through a
closer reading of Olney. I wish to examine briefly what Eakin has left
unexamined, in anticipation o f my discussion of Kierkegaard’s elusive category of
repetition.
G usdorf argues that m an’s movement away from the mythic structures that
quelled the "terrors of history," the awareness of time itself, forms one of the
"conditions and limits" of autobiography in the first place.7 When an acute
awareness of historical time emerges and time itself becomes problematic, the
individual as individual may be compelled to write his life. The self, then, is not
necessarily a fugitive from time, as Gunn suggests in her reading of Gusdorf;
rather, time impels the writer forward in an attempt at self-definition, a definition,
furthermore, which would have been unnecessary had the myths that provided
stays for the self remained intact. For Gusdorf, the multiple self-portraits of
Rembrandt and Van Gogh bear witness to the "impassioned new disquiet of
modern man" (33), a disquiet brought on by their confrontation with time. The
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autobiographer’s recollection of the past "satisfies a more or less anguished
disquiet o f the mind anxious to recover and redeem lost time in fixing it forever"
(35).
Gunn also seems to overlook Olney’s claim that one reason for the current
interest in autobiography, as I pointed out in the Introduction, emerges from the
very question of time in relation to literary texts. The shift in allegiance in recent
years from the New Criticism, which heralds Stephen Dedalus’s
triad—"wholeness, radiance, harmony"—to what might be called "postmodern"
criticism signals in itself a new appreciation of time and clears the way for the
study o f autobiography, which can never satisfy the criterion of wholeness. The
roots of this shift date to the 1940’s, even as the tenets of New Criticism were being
formulated, but at a time also, as we shall see, when the works of Soren
Kierkegaard were making their way into the English-speaking world.
In what has become a "classic" essay for postmodern theorists, Joseph
Frank shows how "spatial form" comprises the aesthetic of the modern period.8
Following Gotthold Lessing’s distinction between the plastic and the literary arts
in Laokoon, Frank suggests that what evolves in the modern period is the attempt
on the part of literary artists to emulate the plastic arts. They establish an
aesthetic
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based on a space-logic that demands a complete re
orientation in the reader’s attitude towards language. Since
the primary reference of any word-group is to something
inside the poem itself, language in modern poetry is really
reflexive: the meaning-relationship is completed only by the
simultaneous perception in space of word-groups which,
when read consecutively in time, have no comprehensible
relation to each other. (229)
M odern poetry’s—and, incidentally, the novel’s—creation of "images" (what
Pound defined as "that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an
instant of time" [226]) removes the very medium through which the literary arts are
conveyed, namely time. While the plastic arts can be apprehended in an instant of
time, Lessing contends that literature cannot because of its use of words in
sequence (and because sequence implies time). Frank cites Lessing:
If it is true that painting and poetry in their imitations make
use of entirely different means or symbols—the first, namely,
of form and color in space, the second of articulated sounds
in time—if these symbols indisputably require a suitable
relation to the thing symbolized, then it is clear that symbols
arranged in juxtaposition can only express subjects of which
the wholes or parts exist in juxtaposition; while consecutive
symbols can only express subjects of which the wholes or
parts are themselves consecutive. (223)
Lessing’s distinction suffers, as William Spanos has shown, "in its over
simplification. . . . He is clearly wrong in his insistence that a painting or a
sculpture is perceived in an absolute instant of time."9 It is restricted also, as
Frank says, because Lessing developed his argument to attack the pictorial poetry
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and the allegorical painting of his day (223). Nevertheless, as Frank and Spanos
make insistently clear, the "spatial" formalism of modern literature and the
emphasis on the self-enclosed work that the emerging New Critics espoused lead to
both the artist’s and the work’s removal from time. Frank cites Joyce’s A Portrait

o f the Artist as a Young Man as offering the epitome of the New Critical artistic
posture:
the personality of the artist, at first sight a cry or a cadence
and then a fluid and lambent narrative, finally refines itself
out of existence, impersonalizes itself, so to speak . . . the
artist, like the God of creation, remains within or beyond or
above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence,
indifferent, paring his fingernails (233).
It is this indifferent, transcendent, timeless, attitude that Frank sees as emblematic
of the "mythic" stance of modern literature, a stance that severs it from its
fundamental building blocks, words in sequence—time:
past and present are seen spatially, locked in a timeless unity
which, while it may accentuate surface differences, eliminates
any feeling of historical sequence by the very act of
juxtaposition. . . .It is this timeless world of myth, forming
the common content of modern literature, which finds its
appropriate aesthetic expression in spatial form (653).
His appeal to difference and time explains why his article has attained classic
status and has become a sort of rallying point among those who wish to debunk
New Criticism, sometimes without the finesse of Frank himself.
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Be that as it may, Frank’s insights into the "spatial form" of modern
literature serve to foster a needed corrective to the view of poetry and literature as
a "well-wrought urn" or "verbal icon."10 Whereas the modern, as Frank suggests,
confronts the problem of time and then retreats to the timeless world of myth, the
postmodern seeks re-entry into the flux of time itself. Following Frank, William
Spanos bemoans the implications of New Critical thought:
The tendency of the New Criticism to collapse the distinction
between the plastic and the literary arts and thus to argue in
behalf of the aesthetic doctrine of simultaneous perception is
itself an ontological commitment—one analogous to and
probably having its specific source in the obsessive effort of
the modern literary imagination to escape the destructive
impact of time and change, of which a disintegrating cosmic
order has made it acutely and painfully conscious, by way of
achieving the timeless eternity of the aesthetic moment or,
rather, of "spatial form." (Mod Lit Crit 91)
Now I have taken this circumambient route not so much to reveal what I
see as a weakness in G unn’s approach to autobiography in itself—her emphasis on
time seems entirely appropriate and in line with my own thoughts on the subject;
rather, I question what I see as an oversight in her analysis of Olney and Gusdorf.
F or if Olney’s claim about autobiography’s place in the cultural moment is true,
then autobiography is inextricably joined to the question o f time and literature.
Autobiography cannot be thoroughly encompassed by a New Critical approach to
literature because that approach represses the crucial dimensions of time and
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change, the dimensions without which the act o f autobiography would never
occur. Olney does not picture the autobiographer as a fugitive from time; if there
can be any single picture of the autobiographer, and for Olney this is highly
unlikely, even undesirable, then it is a picture of a writer confronting and
grappling with his stance in time, trying to redeem his time.
Let me say, too, by way of parenthesis, that while I have called and will call
upon the aid of William Spanos and his destructive project, I do not thereby
readily assent to all its implications; nor do I claim that Walker Percy would, if he
ever read him. There is a sense in which, as Charles Altieri has shown, Spanos
restricts the difference he champions: "We find a much more varied world than
[Spanos] offers."11 As an example, Altieri offers a much richer definition of
modernism than the one Spanos develops:
Modernism . . . is at least a set of tensions between scientific
ideals of description and anti-scientific values, between
symbolist and immanentist views o f the mind, between
desires for highly articulate formal arrangements and a need
to make expressive arts somehow representative (by
exploring mythic structures, for example), and between a
desire to pose new images of spirit that can proclaim a
nobility for man and a fear o f sentimentality and rhetoric.
(126)
Spanos’s definition, as we have seen, places an emphasis on the former member of
each dyad—symbolist over immanentist, for example: scientific description over
anti-scientific values. His description of modernism, then, becomes as "closed,"

28
according to Altieri, as the enclosure into form he reacts against in the first place.
In any case, I have come across no references to Spanos’s work in my readings of
Percy. W hat interests me about Spanos and his possible relation to the work o f
Percy (and, of course, their relation to autobiography) is his use of Heideggerian
retrieval or repetition, which has its source in Kierkegaard’s category of the same
name. Percy was, of course, a devoted reader of both Heidegger and Kierkegaard.
Although Spanos divests repetition of its religious significance (a step which again
restricts the very possibilities he hails), he nevertheless points to an understanding
o f the term with regard to both its philosophical and literary implications. I hope
to use Spanos, then, as Percy said he used his foster father, William Alexander
Percy: "Surely it is the highest tribute to the best people we know to use them as
best we can, to become, not their disciples, but ourselves."12
I return, then, to the question of time and autobiography, the question that
launched me on this excursion in the first place. (I feel a bit like the narrator at the
beginning of Melville’s behemoth Mardi—"We’re off!" he exclaims, and thereupon
takes the reader on a metaphysical journey unparalleled in American literature.)
Both G usdorf and Olney see the autobiographer’s desire to redeem time as a prime
motive for writing. I have already cited G usdorf s reference to this redemption:
The autobiographer’s recollection of the past "satisfies a more or less anguished
disquiet o f the mind anxious to recover and redeem lost time in fixing it forever."
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Olney makes the same claim, although more emphatically. He writes: "To redeem
the time is one of the autobiographer’s prime motives, perhaps the prime
motive—perhaps, indeed, the only real motive of the autobiographer."13 This
comment comes in the context of T. S. Eliot’s line from Four Quartets "If all time
is eternally present/ All time is unredeemable." Olney shows the sense in which
different understandings of bios can render time either absolutely past or eternally
present:
If bios is the historical course of a life, then at any given
present moment of that life it is necessarily true that all
things have flowed and that nothing remains: "is" has been
transformed into "was" and has thereby been drained o f all
vitality, of all reality, of all life; "what was" no longer
composes a part of ta onta, the present, the sum of things
that are now existing or that are now being. If, on the other
hand, bios is taken as the vital principle or the unique
spark—life as transformed by being lived through this oneof-a-kind medium—then there is nothing but "is": there is no
"was" in the picture and there is clearly no relation between
"is" and "was". ("Some Versions" 239-40)
In either case, time becomes unredeemable. The autobiographer redeems his time
through the interplay o f past and present, which takes place in memory. Although
Olney proposes different versions of redemption (some not involving memory at
all, and some so transforming memory as to make it unrecognizable), he suggests
that the "most complex resolution of the autobiographer’s dilemma" takes place in
memory:
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Time carries us away from all o f our earlier states of being;
memory recalls those earlier states—but it does so only as a
function of present consciousness: we can recall what we
were only from the complex perspective of what we are,
which means that we may very well be recalling something
that we never were at all. In the act o f remembering the past
in the present, the autobiographer imagines into existence
another person, another world, and surely it is not the same,
in any real sense as that past world that does not, under any
circumstances, nor however much we may wish it, now exist.
("Some Versions 241)
It is this complex interplay between past and present in the act of memory that
redeems the time.
Olney’s insistence on the possibility of "recalling something that we never
were at all" or the bringing into existence of "another person, another world"
seems to echo part of what Spanos, following Heidegger, would call the movement
o f retrieval or repetition. (I say "part o f' because the future—"anticipatory
resolution"—also comes into play for Heidegger and Kierkegaard, as I will discuss
below.) This retrieval seems to be a version of redemption, similar to, yet different
from the one Olney suggests. It is a redemption in its most primitive meaning of
"recovering that of which possession had been lost," as N athan Scott puts it.14
F o r if a recovery occurs, there is a sense in which it brings into existence another
person and world, since the condition of loss means an absence or unawareness of
what is lost. Repetition, then, becomes an originary experience—the origin, in the
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case of autobiography, of the person brought into existence through the act of
writing one’s life, in whatever form.15
Spanos approaches the question of retrieval or repetition from the
perspective of a hermeneutics of literary texts, which, in turn, derives from
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle.16 The following note, which includes a footnote
from Being and Time, helps to clarify both Spanos’s and Heidegger’s
understanding of the term:
The translators of Being and Time, M acquarrie and
Robinson, translate " Wiederholeti' as "Repetition" (others,
as "Retrieval") and add in a footnote:
this English word is hardly adequate to express
Heidegger’s meaning. Etymologically, "wiederholen"
means "to fetch again"; in modern German usage,
however, this is expressed by the cognate separable
verb "wieder . . . holen," while "wiederholen" means
simply "to repeat" or "do over again." Heidegger
departs from both these meanings, as he is careful to
point out. For him, "wiederholen" does not mean
either a mere mechanical repetition or an attem pt to
reconstitute the physical past; it means rather an
attempt to go back to the past and retrieve former
possibilities, which are thus "explicitly handed down"
or "transmitted." ("Hermeneutic Circle" 481,
note 9)17
Heidegger writes of repetition with respect to "Dasein," the being that is
there to question its own being, that always already has a vague sense of being,
and thereby re-opens the question of ontology. His entire methodology as it is set
up in the opening sections of Being and Time calls for a repetition or retrieval of
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the question of being. Spanos, however, applies the category to literary criticism.
He shrewdly justifies this shift in emphasis by pointing out that for Heidegger
Dasein confronts the necessity of interpreting its own being, and the act of
interpretation itself, of course, falls into the domain o f literary criticism. Just as
Heidegger de-structs (or de-structures) the western metaphysical tradition—which
has imposed an interpretation from without, from a standpoint beyond or after
the physical (meta-ta-physika), a standpoint devoid o f temporality—to retrieve
new possibilities for Dasein, and hence for the question o f being, so Spanos,
through his application of the Heideggerian method, that is, through, his emphasis
on time, retrieves new possibilities for the act of literature.18 He writes: "I want
to suggest a hermeneutics that remembers or retrieves the occasion—the
time—that engaged and interested [literary activity] and, in so doing, reactivated
the ongoing and interminable explorative process."19 It is so-called "postmodern"
literature, of course, that opens itself best to this hermeneutic activity:
Postmodern literature . . . becomes a kind of writing that is
‘grounded’ in an ungrounded understanding of being, a kind
of ‘de-structive’ writing, as it were, which remains marginal
up to the middle of this century, but which increasingly
thereafter becomes the central preoccupation of dramatists,
poets, and novelists. {Rep 8)
It is important to emphasize, again, that this de-structive m ethod is not, for
Spanos (or for Heidegger), a nihilistic movement, one which wantonly destroys
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without any possibility of renewal. It is a method, rather, that "dis-closes" what
has been "fore-closed" by the metaphysical tradition. Whereas interpretation in
that tradition has worked from an atemporal, closed, circle—a repetition that
ceaselessly and mechanically repeats the same thing—Spanos works from
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle:
To put it positively, the hermeneutic circle is, paradoxically, a
liberating movement, an opening towards being. It is finally,
to use the important term that Heidegger borrows from
Kierkegaard, a "repetition" or "retrieval" ( Wiederholen), a
process of dis-covering and re-membering the primordial
temporality of being and thus of the truth as a-letheia
(unhiddenness), which metaphysical understanding and
interpretation . . ., in closing time off- in coercing temporality
into spatial icon (the circle)-and hardening this closure into
"tradition," covers over and forgets. . . . Retrieval or
repetition, that is, is neither a process of re-cognizing a
(historical) text in the tradition for its own sake; nor is it a
process of re-collecting an absolute or privileged origin (logos
as presence) as agency of judging a text in the tradition. It is
rather a discovering of beginnings in the sense of rendering
the present interpreter . . . a homo viator, of bringing him
into an original, a careful explorative (open) relationship (a
relationship o f "anticipatory resoluteness") with the being of
a text in the tradition. ("Hermeneutic Circle" 462, his
emphasis)
I have quoted Spanos at length because I find this his most concise
statement of the de-structive project which destroys only to open up new
possibilities—the clearest statement of his use of repetition. Nevertheless, the
quotation itself seems to call for some further clarification, something I can only
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half-ironically and indirectly, half-seriously and directly provide by invoking
Kierkegaard, who remains a very slippery character, and whose book, Repetition ,
gives only "hints and guesses,/ Hints followed by guesses" as to what the term
might signify.20 I approach this task fully aware that indirection, as Kierkegaard
knew, is the only genuine way to fathom this elusive category, since it belongs, as
Stephen Crites points out, to the existential sphere, and that once reduced to the
sphere of the aesthetic, it loses its potency. The power, and, of course, the
difficulty of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous aesthetic works result from the
paradoxical attempt to render the existential by means of the aesthetic. As Crites
observes, "these communications in which Kierkegaard set out to evoke the
existential categories in their opposition to the aesthetic were themselves self
consciously aesthetic works."21 Thus, the irony of my treatm ent derives from
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms (existential writers), and the seriousness derives
from his commentators (writers on existentialism).
It is worth emphasizing, following Crites, that in his pseudonymous works,
Kierkegaard does not try so much to disseminate knowledge as "to draw the
reader into a consideration of his personal life" ("Author and Authorship" 39).
This motive behind his works is what makes them "existence communications" (see
"Pseudonymous"). At the same time, however, each work is an aesthetic
fabrication. Kierkegaard presents his readers, then, with a dram a enacted by the
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various pseudonyms he sets on stage: Judge William (a representative o f the
ethical stage) urges the young A (the aesthete of Either/Oi) to choose; Johannes de
Silentio {Fear and Trembling) seeks the Knight of Faith, whose movement he is
unable to imitate in his own life; Constantin Constantius (Repetition ) sets up an
"interesting" experiment of repetition only to have his hopes dashed, while the
young poet (his "nameless correspondent") achieves a repetition without too much
effort. This Kierkegaardian dram a is not intended to bring stasis or rest. Its
primary aim, because it wants its reader to confront his personal life, is to bring
the reader to a point of decision, to action, or as Spanos says above, into a careful
relationship with being, a relationship possible only in time. It is only through
action in time, after all, that repetition is possible (see "Against Christendom").
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works, then, as the title of Crites’s brilliant article
suggests, are both "art" and "act"; they point to the existential by means o f the
aesthetic.

Repetition is cast from the point of view of Constantin Constantius. The
book begins with his "report" after meeting a young poet who has fallen in love,
but who does not love the girl for her own sake, only for the role she plays as his
muse. The poet becomes increasingly depressed, and he seeks something to
assuage his melancholy; his first efforts are unsuccessful. Constantin goes on to
tell o f his own humorous attempts at repetition by returning to Berlin and trying
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to see that everything is the same as it had been on his last trip. This report is then
followed by letters from the poet, who has abandoned his fiancee, and who begins
the movement of repetition, at first deepening his melancholy, through reading the
Book o f Job. The nameless poet achieves a repetition when he learns o f his love’s
engagement to another man. And the work ends with Constantin’s addressing his
reader directly with reflections on the whole affair. Although the poet attains
repetition and Constantin does not, the nature of the movement remains obscure.
The book revolves around its subject without defining it directly.22 One o f the
hints we are given comes at the very beginning of the book, where Constantin
compares repetition to recollection:
Say what you will, this question will play a very im portant
role in modern philosophy, for repetition is a crucial
expression for what "recollection" was to the Greeks. Just as
they taught that all knowing is a recollecting, modern
philosophy will teach that all life is a repetition. . . .
Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in
opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is
repeated backward, where as genuine repetition is recollected
forward. Repetition, therefore, if it is possible, makes a
person happy, whereas recollection makes him unhappy.22
This distinction between recollection and repetition, although insistent and
central (because of Constantin’s "constant" reference to it at the beginning o f his
enigmatic narrative), remains rather cryptic. The situation is partially clarified
when the pseudonymous author, a psychological experimenter, tells the reader,
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after he meets the poet in despair over the love affair, that his problem is one of
recollection: "His mistake was incurable, and his mistake was that he stood at the
end instead of at the beginning, but such a mistake is and remains a person’s
downfall" (Repetition 137).
To say that the poet stands at the end of the relationship suggests that he
has cast himself forward in imagination to a time when he and his love are old and
grey, sitting around the hearth, reading bedtime stories to their grandchildren.
Such a casting forward negates the present (the actual living through) of the affair.
It ends the m atter before it has actually begun: "If anyone can join in conversation
about recollection’s love, [the poet] can. Recollection has the great advantage that
it begins with the loss; the reason it is safe and secure is that it has nothing to lose"

(Repetition 136). The poet, Constantin tells the reader, has cast himself clear out
of his involvement with time. His recollection is not the "recollection forward"
that is repetition, but rather the placing of the self at an advantaged viewpoint
(outside itself) so that it might gain an overall view of the affair (its end) before it
has actually begun. The poet is unhappy, to be sure, but he is secure in his
unhappiness because he has taken no real chances, has made no choices in time.
Thus, he has nothing to lose. It is already lost in the recollection.
Yet one has to be wary of Constantin’s point of view. One of the central
ironies of the book, after all, arises from the fact that while Constantin writes of
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the nature of repetition, he never attains the movement himself. And whereas the
poet cannot explain the "thunderstorm" that happens to him, he is granted a
repetition. Part of the reason for this resides in the pseudonym itself. Since
Constantin, the observer and reporter of the affair, is the "constant" one (note that
constant is repeated twice in his very name), he is himself removed from the flux,
the momentum of time. He has adopted, as Spanos has noted, an observer’s
stance, a metaphysical viewpoint, the constancy of recollection. He projects, then,
his own stance upon the poet. As "reporter," he can only write about the
movement, an essentially aesthetic (recollective) activity, but he is unable to make
the movement himself. The poet, on the other hand, because he really does suffer
(despite Constantin’s preferred interpretation) and because he turns to the Book of
Job (a book about a legitimate exception, as we shall see below), "step by step" and
"educated by life . . . now discovers repetition" (Repetition, Supplement 304). Or,
if we grant Constantin his interpretation and say that the poet really is lost in
recollective despair, with everything that this situation implies, then the poet
nevertheless breaks out of that recollection into the birth of repetition. In either
case, Constantin remains all the more impoverished for his constancy, for his
recollective posture.
Yet repetition remains nonetheless elusive. Further into the work,
Constantin gives us more hints and guesses as to what he means by the term:
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The dialectic o f repetition is easy, for that which is repeated
has been—otherwise it could not be repeated—but the very
fact that it has been makes the repetition into something new.
When the Greeks said that all knowing is recollecting, they
said that all existence, which is, has been; when one says that
life is a repetition, one says: actuality, which has been, now
comes into existence. If one does not have the category of
recollection or of repetition, all life dissolves into an empty,
meaningless noise. Recollection is the pagan view of life,
repetition is the modern; repetition is the interest o f
metaphysics and also the interest upon which metaphysics
comes to grief. {Repetition 149)
Now if "time is the moving image of eternity" as Plato says in the Timaeus,
then one’s existence in time can claim little value outside of the constant effort to
cast off its shackles and so enter the immutable world of forms. One’s existence
becomes the struggle to recollect what one already knows (but what has been
forgotten) because one is himself a moving image of eternity who "has been." But
this recollection demands as its terminus the stasis that is eternity, a return to
originary time. It demands not that one enter with interest his own time, but
rather a disinterested entry into that mythic time (illo tempore), which constitutes
the origin of the cosmos.24 This is, to put it simplistically, the pagan view of a life
o f recollection as Constantin seems to see it, and it is the poet’s stance, in the view
o f the pseudonym, toward his love affair at the beginning o f the book. It is the
"aesthetic" strategy of dealing with time, the stance that begins with loss. It is also
the stance that Frank and Spanos see as emblematic of the literature and criticism
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o f modernism. For as Frank has shown, modernism seeks the stasis of myth, and
myth as N athan Scott writes "is that form in which the imagination undertakes to
grasp the eternal present, the Time which is above and outside of time, the G reat
Time, in which all the concrete times and seasons o f life eternally return to the
same.

ii

25

Repetition is the postmodern view. It is a movement not out of time into
an eternity which has been forgotten, and thus in need of being remembered, but
rather a reduplication of the paradoxical entry of eternity into time (the infinite
into the finite). As such, its primary thrust is not backward, but forward. It is not
the stance o f loss, but of gain.26 One attains himself: one becomes, by means o f a

careful, forward-looking interest which makes decisions in time. It is the
"existential" strategy for dealing with human temporality. Although time is
dreadful for both the aesthete and the existential (in the sense, as Crites puts it,
that it sets forth infinite possibilities, freedom ["Pseudonymous" 2G5ff]), time is not
something from which to flee. It is, rather, the place where dread can beckon one
to himself. Spanos points out that for Kierkegaard and Heidegger, dread is an
objectless condition. It is the feeling of not being at home ( unheimlicheit), which,
in despair and inauthenticity, Dasein seeks to objectify, that is, to convert to fear,
which has an object ("Mod Lit Crit" 87, 102). It is this uncanniness that leads
Dasein to interest, and Spanos emphasizes that term’s double significance: "to be
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between" and "to be a m atter of concern" ("Hermeneutic Circle" 464). Repetition
as the "interest of metaphysics and also the interest upon which metaphysics comes
to grief' suggests, then, that the proper movement of metaphysics is not from a
disinterested stance "beyond the physical," wherein time and space (the individual)
hold no sway, but rather from a concern within it. "To be between," in the
middest, between, for example, the finite and the infinite, is the human condition
o f temporality, what the self already is.27 W ithout such interest, metaphysics
founders because the self becomes not what it is, but, as Crites puts it, a "deficient
polarization of spirit" ("Against Christendom" 68). The self flies either to the
angelic infinite, which too often has been the case in metaphysics, or it sinks itself
in the finite and takes up its home as a beast among beasts. In the movement of
repetition, the individual becomes, then, what he already is through concerned
action in time. Spanos summarizes the movement with respect to the individual in
this way:
In "recollecting forward," repetition relies precisely on the
interest, the intentionality of inter esse, of the unique, the
existential individual as being-in-the-world, for its access into
the meaning of being. It is not an objective mode, a
contemplative act from without aeterno modo. It is, rather,
a "subjective," a Care-ful, mode, in which the singular, or in
Kierkegaard’s preferred term, the exceptional interpreter (as
opposed to a universal observer like Constantius himself) is
guided beyond the present by the intimation of spirit (the
primordial question of being) residing in his "memory." As
such, repetition is both a mnemonic and an anticipatory—i.e.
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a de-structive and ek-static—movement. ("Hermeneutic
Circle" 465).
The "memory" that Spanos here refers to is precisely the "vague" sense of being
that every individual always and already has, according to Heidegger. Repetition,
then, is the movement in which this vague sense of being "stands out" from
destructive chaos yet resists angelic form. It is between the pure form of
recollection ("spatial form") and no form whatsoever.
The difference between repetition and recollection, finally, is a difference
between an entry into the temporality of human existence or a flight from it. In
the following passage, Crites provides a good summary of this fundamental
difference in terms of the aesthetic and existential:
Both the aesthetic strategy and the existential movement
proceed from the impasse created by our peculiarly human
temporality. The aesthetic strategy, however, proceeds by
negating that temporality, the existential movement by
intensifying it and through passion giving it a form that is
itself temporalized. . . . Aesthetic apprehension wrests ideal
possibility out of the actual through recollection. Existential
movement projects a chosen possibility into the real world
through action. ("Pseudonymous" 214)
Crites’s observation that the existential movement of repetition "gives a form that
is itself temporalized" could just as well be read as "giving a temporized form."
F or what repetition allows is a continual recasting of the form that the self shall
inhabit, not in the sense of grasping after one possibility and then another—that

would be the aesthetic stance—but rather in the sense that the possibility that is
chosen (or given) does not close off the self in a definite and mechanical replication
of form, but rather opens the self to endless possibilities within that form itself.
Form , then, is not imposed from above, as in the traditional metaphysical posture;
it is not something which strives for stasis. Rather, it opens from below, if you
will, from a stance between the finite and the infinite, which the self already is.
Repetition, then, returns one to himself in such a way that a birth of the self
occurs: new possibilities are projected because former ones have been disclosed
and former possibilities are disclosed because the future enters with its new,
indeterminate ones.
In repetition, the self becomes the clearest path to the universal. The self,
the "exception" for Kierkegaard, inhabits the universal, not as a slave, but as a co
creator who becomes. Toward the end of Repetition, in a letter addressed to "My
dear Reader," Constantin acknowledges the relation between the exception and
the universal. The "exception" is a category Johannes de Silentio develops in Fear

and Trembling, published the same day as Repetition, with regard to Abraham,
who surpassed the ethical, i.e., universal, injunction against m urder in his
willingness to undergo trial or ordeal by making a religious sacrifice o f Isaac. In

Repetition, the exception is Job, who despite his friends’ claims to the contrary
(made on the basis of universal knowledge), is really not guilty and whose entire
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story can be seen as a test by God. It is by virtue of these exceptions that
repetition is possible for the story’s poet, who is himself an exception (by virtue of
his ordeal with his fiancee), although only a "transitional" one from the aesthetic
through the ethical to the religious: "Such an exception is a poet, who constitutes
the transition to the truly aristocratic exceptions, to the religious exceptions"

{Repetition 228). This short recapitulation of Kierkegaard’s three stages (the
aesthetic/poet, the ethical/aristocratic, and the religious), which, as I have pointed
out above (following Crites), can best be understood as the aesthetic and the
existential, helps clarify the relation between the exception and the universal
without which repetition would be impossible. For true repetition, as the poet
says, is "eternity" (221)—the paradoxical dwelling o f the infinite in the finite, and
thus an essentially religious category. It is, as Crites observes, a reduplication of
the Incarnation: "if the eternal entered time in that past event, we meet it [in
repetition] as the infinite possibility of the future. In the language of recent
theology, the Christ-event is the eschatological event" ("Against Christendom"
81).28
The poet does not make this fuller movement of repetition; rather, his is
merely transitional. Nevertheless, it is a repetition. Through his suffering and his
reading of Job, he makes the initial steps of the religious movement, in the
etymological sense of religion: a re-binding, a re-connecting, a re-joining. His
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time is redeemed. Because Constantin remains on the aesthetic sphere, on the
other hand, he can only create a farce of repetition, his failed attem pt at it through
his return to Berlin. He can never be the exception because he cannot "repeat" his
life. He is, however, capable of expressing the universal. The relation between the
universal and the exceptional, then, a relation whose tension Constantin cannot
bear, is a good expression of repetition, but also a superb statement of the act of
autobiography:
The exception also thinks the universal in that he thinks
himself through; he works for the universal in that he works
himself through; he explains the universal in that he explains
himself. Consequently, the exception explains the universal
and himself, and if one really wants to study the universal,
one only needs to look around for a legitimate exception; he
discloses everything far more clearly than the universal
itself. . . . There are exceptions. If they cannot be explained,
then the universal cannot be explained, either. Generally, the
difficulty is not noticed because one thinks the universal not
with passion but with a comfortable superficiality. The
exception, however, thinks the universal with intense passion.
{Repetition 227f 9
Thus Johannes de Silentio says that he can understand Hegel, whose philosophical
system "is supposed to be difficult to understand," yet he cannot fathom the figure
o f Abraham, who, according to the age, "is a small matter" (F&T32-3). Hegel
treats the universal without passion, with "comfortable superficiality." But
Abraham , as the exceptional, receives the universal after he had surpassed it in his
willingness to sacrifice Isaac.
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In Repetition, this passion is not only the suffering the poet experiences for
the pain he causes his beloved, but also the interest with which he questions his
own existence: "One sticks a finger into the ground to smell what country one is in;
I stick my finger into the world—it has no smell. Where am I? W hat does it mean
to say: the world? . . . Who tricked me into this whole thing and leaves me
standing here? Who am I? How did I get into the world?" (,Repetition 200). This
concern heralds not only the radical dislocation which arrives in our postmodern
world, but also the care with which the autobiographer questions his own time and
place. For the two questions, "Where am I?" and "Who am I?" constitute the
autobiographical dilemma, whether one takes as the prototypical autobiographical
movement the story of Narcissus or the story of Anteaus, as Janet Varner Gunn
suggests (although she sets up a polarity). In either case, it is the writer’s
reckoning with his time, with a sense of loss or deprivation, which leads him o r her
to transform experience into art, with the hope, as the poet notes, that repetition
will occur:
I am myself again. The "self* that someone else would not
pick up off the street I have once again. The split that was in
my being is healed; I am unified again. The anxieties of
sympathy that were sustained and nourished by my pride are
no longer there to disintegrate and disrupt. Is there not,
then, a repetition? Did I not get everything double? Did I
not get myself again and precisely in such a way that I might
have a double sense of its meaning? . . . I am born to myself.
(Repetition 220-1)
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This is the sense in which autobiographers seek to redeem the time, and this is the
sense in which autobiography can be understood as repetition.30
Kierkegaard, of course, wrote much of his philosophy as a response to
what he saw as the universal, speculative, Hegelian system, which is the ultimate
expression of the Cartesian body/mind split. Although he had a great respect for
Hegel, and although he applies the Hegelian dialectic in his own works, he applies
it to the one entity that Hegel left out of his philosophy—the single individual.
F o r Hegel’s is a philosophy o f the universal, the System, and such a system can
encompass everything from above (from the end) without worrying at all about
the existing individual:
It is from this side . . . that objection must be m ade to
modern philosophy; not that it has a mistaken
presupposition, but that it has a comical presupposition,
occasioned by its having forgotten, in a sort of worldhistorical absent-mindedness, what it means to be a human
being. N ot indeed, what it means to be a hum an being in
general; for this is the sort of thing that one might even
induce a speculative philosopher to agree to; but what it
means that you and I and he are human beings, each one for
himself.31
W ithout the single individual, for Kierkegaard, there cannot be faith, and without
faith, there cannot be a single individual. Just as the existing individual cannot be
subsumed by the System, by objective knowledge, neither can faith in Christianity.
F o r Christianity is not so much a m atter of knowledge—it is not a System,
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although the philosophy of the age tries to make it so; rather, it is passionate
inwardness which paradoxically turns one outward. And such passion belongs
strictly to the single individual. It is Abraham, not Hegel, who is the stumbling
block.
W hen the poet attains repetition, then, he moves out of his recollective
(speculative) stance which separates mind and body, thought and existence,
eternity and time, the infinite and the finite. The split is healed. He re-enters
(retrieves/repeats) what he already is. This is not to say that he is a Christian in
the full Kierkegaardian sense of Christianity; it is to say only that he has m ade the
first movement back to himself, a movement which demands repetition in order to
reach the threshold o f faith, for Kierkegaard the highest expression o f
individuality.
Similarly, to say that autobiographers repeat their existence is not to say
that they are all Christians, a ludicrous assertion. Rather, it suggests that the
autobiographical posture is the same as that of repetition. The autobiographer
does not remove himself from himself aeterno modo. Even Augustine and
Newman, who write autobiographies of conversion, and who thus stand at the end
o f their movement rather than the beginning, nevertheless embody the repetitive
posture. Augustine, incidentally, says he writes sub specie aeternitatis (apparently
from the recollective posture) but he certainly exemplifies the repetitive nature of
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autobiography in his reflections on time and memory in Books X and XI. And
although Newman once stated that his doctrinal struggles ended when he entered
the Roman Catholic Church, he also said "to live is to change." The
autobiographer, then, since he is an existing individual at the present time of his
writing, since he is still trying to fathom and redeem his time by means of writing,
cannot know the end of his story. He writes from his middle state {inter esse) in an
attem pt to define himself, to become the single individual for himself and for his
readers. He tries, that is, to retrieve himself, to give a form to himself that will not
close-off the possibilities for existence, will not continue the split(s) of existence,
but rather a form that will close the split only to open possibilities. That form, of
course, is the book which reaches an end that repeats or retrieves a beginning—not
timelessly, but in time.

3. Autobiography, the N ovel, and Percy
Under the entry for Walker Percy in The History o f Southern Literature,
Lewis A. Lawson, perhaps the best of Percy’s students, writes that Percy "has not
removed his name from the physicians’ register" because "he continues to diagnose
and prescribe."12 The first book of criticism written on Percy, in fact, emphasizes
his stance as diagnostician, M artin Luschei’s The Sovereign Wayfarer: Walker

Percy’s Diagnosis o f the Malaise™ And a short sample of some titles Percy gives
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his own essays indicates that he views both the novel’s and the novelist’s role as
diagnostic, as an "instrument for exploration and discovery" (Signposts 219): "The
State of the Novel: Dying Art or New Science?"; "Diagnosing the M odern
Malaise"; "Physician as Novelist." But the novelist is not only a physician; Percy
also likens him to a wounded man "who has a better view of the battle than those
still shooting." Or, better still,
the novelist is less like a prophet than he is like the canary
that coal miners used to take down into the shaft to test the
air. When the canary gets unhappy, utters plaintive cries,
and collapses, it may be time for the miners to surface and
think things over. (MB 101)
Percy’s concern with diagnosis and his figures of speech, o f course,
presuppose a radical disease. His view of himself as writer provides him a chance
to "utter plaintive cries" so that his readers might begin to "think things over" and
thus get a handle on the malady. The cries have to be uttered, for "it is only when
one sees that something is wrong that one can diagnose it, point it out and name it,
toward the end that the patient might at least have hope, and even in the end get
well" (Signposts 196).
But why is there such desperation in the postmodern world? Why is there a
need to "utter plaintive cries"? What is the root of this malaise? Is it a totally new
phenomenon or does it have its origins in an earlier age? Why is the novelist wellsuited to write about it? That is, what is it about the novel that gives it such
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diagnostic potential? And how is all of this related to the question of
autobiography and repetition?
As in the first section of this chapter, it may be useful to begin with a
limiting of terms, especially "postmodern." For if I wish to place Percy in the
company of postmodern writers and theorists, then some clear notion o f the term
should be available. Fortunately, Percy provides his own definition:
To state the m atter as plainly as possible, I would echo a
writer like Guardini who says simply that the m odem world
has ended, the world, that is, of the past two or three
hundred years, which we think of as having been informed by
the optimism of the scientific revolution, rational humanism,
and that Western cultural entity which until this century it
has been more or less accurate to describe as Christendom. I
am not telling you anything you don’t already know when I
say that the optimism of this age began to crumble with the
onset of the catastrophes of the twentieth century. If one had
to set a date of the beginning of the end o f the m odern world,
1914 would be as good as any, because it was then that
Western man, the beneficiary of precisely this scientific
revolution and Christian ethic, began with great skill and
energy to destroy himself. (Signposts 208)
Thus, the postmodern world can be understood only in relation to the m odern one
that preceded it, characterized by the exuberance brought on by rational
humanism and the scientific revolution, the waning of Christendom.
It is entirely germane to my point that the modern period so described also
witnessed the rise of both the novel and autobiography. And this was not only the
age o f the scientific revolution, but also of the American and French Revolutions.
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I have already cited Georges G usdorf s superb essay "Conditions and Limits of
Autobiography" in relation to the question of time. Autobiography arises, it will
be remembered, when the mythic structures that held the terrors of history at bay
broke down. G usdorf reiterates this point when he contends that autobiography
emerged when "the traditional communal life" broke down, and "the individual
qua individual became important" (30). He continues:
At the cost of a cultural revolution humanity must have
emerged from the mythic framework of traditional teachings
and must have entered the perilous domain o f history. The
m an who takes the trouble to tell of himself knows that the
present differs from the past and that it will not be repeated
in the future. (30)
James Cox corroborates G usdorf s comments about revolution. It is "interesting
to note," Cox writes, "that its [the word’s (i.e., "autobiography’s")] appearance
comes just after the age of revolution, when the modern self was being liberated as
well as defined. At the time of the revolutions, Franklin and Rousseau were
writing their memoirs and confessions, respectively." 34 This paradoxical
conjunction o f both liberation and definition provides an excellent recapitulation
o f the previous section of this chapter (autobiography as repetition), for the self is
both defined and liberated in the act of writing one’s life. The perilous journey
through time forms the stuff o f the autobiographer’s story. W ithout a
(revolutionary) awareness of time, Gusdorf and Cox suggest, autobiography
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would find no place in the literary landscape. Autobiography defines and
liberates, to be sure, yet the very necessity for definition, in the wake of liberation,
is what I find rousing about the study of this field. The obsessive need to define
oneself in the modern period points to a dislocation within the very period itself, a
period, as Percy sees it, of overwhelming "optimism." If one is not dislocated, if
one knows his place in the scheme of things, then there would be no need for self
definition. Yet, as G usdorf observes, evident at the time is an "impassioned new
disquiet" (33).
This period also gave birth to that other problematic literary form—the
novel—and it is my contention that the so-called "rise" of the novel also points to
the disquiet, the dislocation of modern man. It is not especially surprising, then,
that the insights of both G usdorf and Cox are remarkably similar to those set
forth by Georg Lukacs in his The Theory o f the Novel, for autobiography, like the
novel, emerged in response to particular (modern) cultural forces.35 Lukacs’
distinction between the epic and novel seems apposite here. The epic represents
the endless repetitions of cyclical history, what Kierkegaard might call the
recollective posture; time is not problematical because immanence and
transcendence are one and the same; travel through time, ostensibly adventurous,
is not really so because the traveller through eternally-recurring (mythic) time
takes no true risks. The novel emerges as a response to the perilous domain of
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linear, unrepeatable, time, wherein immanence and transcendence have been
radically sundered ("the novel is the epic of a world that has been abandoned by
God," [88]); the life of pure immanence or transcendence and the search for a
blending o f the two, while adventurous, also become burdensome (30, 56ff). The
novel, then, as we are often reminded, likewise grapples with the question of time.
F or it was at the beginning of historical awareness, the beginning of the modern,
revolutionary era, that the self proclaimed its independence from traditional and
limited definitions only to find itself displaced and disoriented in time. And it is in
this period that the self seeks a sense of stability by means o f both the novel and
autobiography.
Yet, like attempts at defining the novel and autobiography, attem pts at
defining the liberated self are protean. The novel seems as "opposed," to borrow
W alter Reed’s word, to a comprehensive poetics as does autobiography.36 And
nobody yet has fashioned an objective or comprehensive definition of the self,
although attempts have been made to define it as well as the novel and
autobiography. When the attempts do not evolve from hubris, when they do not
claim an atemporal universality, each seems to enact a repetition or retrieval that
opens possibilities that have been foreclosed in the traditional understanding. Be
that as it may, the point I wish to make is that questions of the novel,
autobiography, and the (modern) self, because of their historical provenance, are
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inextricably united, and each displays its own version of dislocation or
displacement.
I have already mentioned the problems with setting limits to
autobiography. The situation with the novel is much the same. Boundaries are
obscure, even resisted, as the form reaches now in one direction, now in another.
W ith the coming of the novel, we might say that literature, like the modern self,
has been liberated, but in its liberation, it has (like the self) both foundered and
thrived. It seeks a definition that seems always one step beyond its reach. W alter
Reed cogently suggests that the novel is an "outsider" to traditional literary
pursuits: "It is this sense of itself as an ‘outsider’ . . . that I would single out as the
m ost basic feature of the novel as a literary kind. The novel is a deliberate
stranger to literary decorum; it insists on placing itself beyond the pale of literary
tradition" (3). The novel, liberated sometime during the height of renaissance
humanism, cannot find itself defined within the boundaries of a poetics because it
"opposes itself to the view of literature that a poetics implies. N ot only does it
oppose itself to types of literature more traditional than the novel. . . . A novel
characteristically opposes itself to other novels" (7). When the novel makes its
appearance on the literary landscape, it de-structs, as Spanos might say, the
traditional understanding of literature. But, again (perhaps I cannot avoid
repetition in a study of this sort), this destruction is not a negative phenomenon.
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Instead, it opens new possibilities, possibilities that were foreclosed in traditional
literary production. "The novel rose," Reed argues,
first in Spain and then in England, out o f the attem pt to
create a vernacular literature addressed to the middle classes
that neither submitted to the classical ordering of genres nor
acknowledged the superiority o f that ordering by a
traditional cultivation of native and popular modes. (12)
Just as it was necessary for the "individual qua individual" to come to the fore as a
condition for the possibility of autobiography, so, too, in the case o f the novel.
Ian W att, for example, says that it was essential for the ordinary activities of
ordinary individuals to become notable before the novel could claim attention, a
point not significantly different from either Lukacs’ or Reed’s.37 Furtherm ore,
the novel addresses itself to an audience entirely different from that o f traditional
literature—the single, isolated individual. Reed writes:
The audience for these literary fictions is both specific and
uncertain. It is not a community of listeners attending to an
epic "song," or a member of an aristocratic coterie glancing
over poems circulated in manuscript. . . . Rather, it is a
solitary, anonymous figure, scanning a bulk of printed pages,
out of a sense of nothing better to do. (25)
The novel addresses itself to Cervantes’ "idle reader." And if idleness is the devil’s
workshop, as the Puritan adage goes, then the displacement of the self at the very
time the self was being liberated could be considered one aspect of the devil’s
work.
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Leaving for a moment the world o f the eighteenth-century novel and the
beginnings of the modern world, I wish to return to the twentieth-century
postmodern world and the thoughts of Walker Percy. Like Kierkegaard, Percy
has had much to say about the dislocation of the self in the twentieth century.
And like Kierkegaard’s objections to the Hegelian System, Percy utters plaintive
cries about the regnant worldview of our time—modern science. Science, he says,
in words remarkably similar to those of his mentor, can utter truths about almost
every sector of the world; yet, "the sector of the world about which science cannot
utter a single word is nothing less than this: what it is like to be an individual living
in . . . the twentieth century."38 The scientist, like the Hegelian philosopher,
cannot "utter a single word about an individual thing or creature insofar as it is an
individual but only insofar as it resembles other individuals. . . . [Yet], the catch is
that each of us is, always and inescapably, an individual" (211, 212). The difficulty
o f life in the twentieth century, Percy says, derives from a profound
transform ation o f the consciousness of Western man:
The consciousness of Western man, the layman in particular,
has been transformed by a curious misapprehension o f the
scientific method. One is tempted to use the theological term
"idolatry." This misapprehension, which is not the fault of
science, but rather the inevitable consequence of the victory
of the scientific worldview accompanied as it is by all the
dazzling credentials of scientific progress [sic]. It, the
misapprehension, takes the form, I believe, of a radical and
paradoxical loss of sovereignty by the layman and of a
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radical impoverishment of human relations—paradoxical, I
say, because it occurs in the very face of his technological
mastery of the world and his richness as a consumer of the
world’s goods. (210)
This loss o f sovereignty—this impoverishment—echoes G usdorf s "impassioned
disquiet of modern man," and it points to Percy’s view of the novel as diagnostic.
Dislocation and impoverishment occur when the individual chooses to see
himself not as "always and inescapably" an individual, but rather from the point of
view of science, which cannot say one word about the individual qua individual:
"To the degree that we allow ourselves to perceive ourselves as a type of, example
o f instance of, such-and-such a class of Homo sapiens—even the m ost creative
Homo sapiens imaginable—to this same degree do we come short of being
ourselves" (212). There is a "gap," then, in the normative cultural worldview. For
Percy, this gap is best filled by the novelist: "If there is such a gap in the scientific
view o f the world .. . and if the scientist cannot address himself to this reality .. .
[then] the novelist can, and most particularly the novelist" (213). The writing of
novels, therefore, takes its place along the side of science as an endeavor which is
"cognitive, a kind of finding out and knowing and telling" (207). And the novelist
tells of what it is like to be a displaced and dislocated individual in the twentieth
century, even when, especially when, one does not feel himself to be so dislocated.
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But this diagnostic role of the novel is not as new as Percy might lead one
to believe. Let me return once again to the beginnings of the modern era, the era
which, as Percy claims, is largely responsible for our state today, and to the origins
o f the novel. Might not the seeds of the malady Percy tries to diagnose reside
there? It would seem logical that the beginnings of the transform ation o f the
consciousness of Western man dwell in the time of the inception of m odern
science—the time o f the "scientific revolution." In The Origins o f the English

Novel 1600-1740, Michael McKeon cites numerous examples of what might be
called the "idolatrous" exuberance displayed by some proponents of the new
philosophy.39 The enthusiasm went to such extremes, McKeon observes, that
some thought science could offer "solid history" in the place of "romance." As an
example, McKeon cites Joseph Glanville who looks forward to the Royal Society’s
collective and communal efforts to compose histories of nature: "the Histories o f

Nature we have hitherto had, have been but an heap and amassment o f Truth and
Falsehood, vulgar Tales and Romantick Accounts; and ’tis not in the power of
particular unassociated Endeavors to afford us better" (McKeon 68). Ancient
systems or endeavors "unassociated" with the new philosophy are considered
fabulous "romances" while modern ones are heralded as "solid histories." Yet,
McKeon points out that the very language used in extolling the endeavors of the
Royal Society often mimics that o f the romances the Society claims to supersede:
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The enthusiasm o f Glanville and Thomas Sprat leads both to
speak of those "glorious Undertakers" o f the new philosophy
as the new, "illustrious Heroes" of the modern age, greater
than those of epic and romance, "generous Vertuoso’s, who
dwell in an higher Region then other Mortals." This heady
flirtation with the fanciful idealism of romance seems odd
coming from sober empiricists; it expresses the disorienting
experience of historical relativity with respect both to past
dogmas and to future possibilities, which begin now to
appear limitless. (69, my emphasis)
W hat McKeon says, it seems to me, is that science, an endeavor which at first
appears limitless in its application, carries with it the seeds o f its own limitation,
disorientation or dislocation —the (post)modern predicament.
But disorientation is but one of the many instabilities which occurred
during the time of the "rise" o f the novel. McKeon argues that the era exemplifies
two broader "instabilities" which include as a facet the one noted above—
instabilities with regard to "generic categories" ("questions o f truth") and "social
categories" ("questions of virtue") (20). The novel emerges at this time, it gains its
own limited stability, "because of its unrivaled power both to formulate, and to
explain, a set o f problems that are central to early modern experience" (20).
M cKeon goes so far as to say that the new form triumphs as "an explanatory and
problem-solving mode" (21). It tries to answer questions of truth and questions of
virtue, and thus provide some stability, some definition, to the liberated self.
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McICeon’s line of thought, then, is not very different from Percy’s. The
diagnostic model offered by Percy resembles the explanatory and problem-solving
one set forth by McKeon. For diagnosis (to "know through") is but the attem pt to
explain and to solve some problem. The time of the rise of the novel is also a time,
as McKeon would say, of the "categorical instability" of the self. N otions of self
and place in society (questions of truth and virtue) become problematic.
Dislocation ensues. Although this dislocation or instability does not attain the
severity it achieves in the twentieth century, it, like the novel, displays what
M cKeon calls a "pregiveness." It does not "‘persist’ into the realm of the m odern
as an alien intrusion from without" (21). Rather, it is akin to what M arx calls a
"‘simple abstraction’, a deceptively monolithic category that encloses a complex
historical process" (20). Thus, the seeds of the impoverishment of the self, which
Percy cites as the problem of life in the twentieth century, the problem which the
modern novel may diagnose, reside within the era of the origins of the novel itself.
Since, as Percy argues, the scientific method, despite (or because of) the
enthusiasm of its early proponents, cannot utter a single word about an individual
as such, but only about an individual as a specimen, instance or example o f a
general rule, the novel emerges to fill the epistemological gap, to treat the
individual self as individual, lost in the wake of the scientific method. I do not,
however, claim that the "early" novel treats the "existential" predicament of man as
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do modern novels. Rather, because of the "pregiven" status of the novel and o f the
problems it addresses, the problem of self which ripens in the twentieth century
exists inchoately in the eighteenth. The beginning of the modern age is also the
beginning of the postmodern one. In this particular epoch, the liberated self, the
outsider, finds itself in the paradoxical situation of seeking definition in the two
forms that resist definition, forms which arise to treat the individual as individual
rather than as a specimen of the scientific method. These forms—the novel and
autobiography—are themselves outside the traditional literary enterprise.
The novel and autobiography serve similar functions, then, and to say that
Percy’s use o f the novel is autobiographical is to say that he uses it to retrieve or
repeat possibilities of the self which the normative cultural understanding
(immeshed as it is in science) forecloses. It is the individual as individual which
Percy tries to retrieve from the deadening effects of an "idolatrous" worship of
science. His novels "de-struct" the "deficient polarizations o f spirit" (Crites) which
such a worship of science fosters. The self, as Percy sees it, is neither purely
transcendent (the recollective posture of science and art), nor purely immanent (a
consumer of the world’s goods). Neither is it, as he writes in Love in the Ruins, a
"mythical monster," a strange hybrid of the two in the fashion of D octor Jekyll
and Mr. Hyde.40 Instead, the "repeated" self finds itself in the same posture as
Spanos’s genuine interpreter--that is, a homo viator, a wayfarer, pilgrim or

63
castaway whose feelings of uncanniness, not-at-homeness ( unheimlicheit) compels
him to look for signs o f the transcendent in the realm of the immanent, and
thereby to redeem his time. But in Percy’s postmodern world, the road to this
redemption becomes clear, paradoxically, only in the afterm ath of some sort of
violence or situation of ordeal, some "de-struction" o f ordinary contexts. So lost is
the self to itself that it takes such a situation to wrest it from the shackles of
complacency, at-homeness, and to restore it to its wayfaring state. Percy’s
linguistic philosophy and a reading of his first two novels in light o f that
philosophy provide a more practical understanding o f repetition. In the next
chapter, I explore this movement as it relates to Percy’s "semiotic" understanding
of the self.
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the individual. So once I made that extrapolation from Hegel, whom I
cared nothing about, to a whole, scientific, exclusive world view, it became
very relevant" (Con 117).
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(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1987). References will be made
parenthetically in the text.

40.

Taken from the Avon edition of LR, page 360 The entire quotation reads:
"For the world is broken, sundered, busted down the middle, self ripped
from self and man pasted back together as mythical monster, half angel,
half beast, but no man."

Chapter Two
Repetition and Autos:
The Unfomralability of the Self
Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you make
of me! You would play upon me, you would seem to
know my stops, you would pluck out the heart of my
mystery, you would sound me from my lowest note to
the top of my compass; and there is much music,
excellent voice, in this little organ, yet cannot you
make it speak. {Hamlet III, ii)

1. A Sem iotics o f the Self
Percy is a difficult writer to pursue. The study of his works demands
something similar to what William Scheick says about the study o f Jonathan
Edwards. According to Scheick, the student of Edwards requires a "keen
sensitivity to two and a half centuries o f commentary as well as an informed
awareness of at least the five disciplines—theology, philosophy, history, American
studies, and literary criticism—which have generated that commentary."1 Percy’s
works have generated criticism for only about three decades, yet he requires the
same "keen sensitivity" to a broad spectrum of disciplines as does Edwards. Jan
Nordby Gretlund and Karl-Heinz Westarp have edited a book on Percy entitled

Walker Percy: Novelist and Philosopher2 But the designating terms could be
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more numerous: Walker Percy, not only novelist and philosopher, but also
psychiatrist, pathologist, linguist, essayist, naturalist, critic, theologian, historian,
semiotician, southerner, golfer, bird-watcher, and bourbon-drinker.
It is not without reason that Lewis Lawson calls his book Following

Percy.3 The critic finds himself in the uncomfortable position o f always trying to
"catch-up" with Percy but never quite, as Percy himself used to say, "getting aholt"
o f him. His reading and interests seem to have known no bounds, not in the sense
that he had "read everything" (although one is at times tempted to think so), but in
the sense that they are all of a piece.4 He sunders traditional boundaries set up in
professional circles and, from a posture somewhere between professional and
amateur, challenges disciplines to open themselves to new possibilities. He "destructs," that is to say, the closure imposed by "specialization" in "fields o f study"
with the hope of retrieving possibilities that have been foreclosed or overlooked by
such conventional methodologies. To rephrase an example discussed in the last
section of Chapter One, Percy retrieves one of the novel’s earliest functions, yet
repeats that function in such a way as to open new possibilities for the novel taken
generically.
While the case seems fairly evident that Percy views the novel from a
posture of repetition, his study of semiotics offers more fruitful territory for
discussing the centrality of that category in his works. In "The Delta Factor," the
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introductory essay to The Message in the Bottle, Percy reflects on the origins of
the book itself:
It is the meager fruit of twenty years’ off-and-on thinking
about the subject, of coming at it from one direction,
followed by failure and depression and giving up, followed
by making up novels to raise my spirits, followed by a new
try from a different direction or from an old direction but at
a different level, followed by failure, followed by making up
another novel, and so on. {MB 10)
W ritten in the early 1970s, this comment both catalogues and foreshadows Percy’s
continuing interest in semiotics. In 1983, with the publication of Lost in the

Cosmos, after completing Lancelot and The Second Coming, Percy returned to
what he once referred to as his "extra-literary pursuit," semiotics.5 And his final
letter to Shelby Foote indicates that after the publication o f The Thanatos

Syndrome in 1987, Percy had once again returned to his favorite avocation. After
some sobering reflections on his terminal illness and his "search for a cure,"Percy
writes: "Like I say, it’s too damn much trouble, this running around looking for a
cure. I’m content to sit here and try to finish Contra Gentiles, a somewhat sm art
ass collection o f occasional pieces, including one which should interest
you—‘Three New Signs, All More Im portant than and Different from the 59,018
Signs of Charles Sanders Peirce’—you want a copy?"6
Percy’s interest in semiotics, then, spans the thirty-six years o f his writing
career. The cycle—study of language, novel, back to language study—while not
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entirely consistent, nevertheless points to a "methodology o f repetition." W hat
Percy tries to do time and again in his writings on semiotics is to "sketch the
beginnings of a theory of man" for an age that has no such consensus theory (MB
10). He agrees with Alexander Pope that "the proper study o f m an is man"

(MB 10), but he focuses his attention on that unique characteristic o f hum an
beings, their ability to utter words and sentences and have them understood or
misunderstood by another person. Thus, he subtitles The Message in the Bottle,
"How Queer M an Is, How Queer Language Is, and W hat One Has to Do with the
Other."
Percy is not interested so much in the formal aspects of language. Neither
is he concerned primarily with the mechanics of linguistic transactions. Rather, he
struggles to understand sign-users by means of their sign-using activity: "the book
is not about language but about the creatures who use it and what happens when
they do" (MB 11). In itself, this step is a retrieval of a possibility that the tradition
has not explored. As Percy sees it, the two broad traditions that have grappled
with a theory of language—the behavioral and the formal—miss the phenomenon
itself: "American behaviorists kept solid hold on the world of things and
creatures, yet couldn’t fit the symbol into it. German idealists kept the word as
internal form, logos, and let the world get away" (MB 33).
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These traditions, as venerable as they are, can nevertheless be viewed as
"deficient polarizations" of the phenomenon. On the one hand, behaviorists place
m an as an organism in an environment. Like other animals, we have needs that
can be fulfilled by the manipulation of our surroundings—hence, the proliferation
o f countless items and techniques manufactured to help us "adjust." Homeostasis
is the goal. Yet this same tradition cannot account for the very behaviorists who
write down theories and submit articles with the expectation that they will be read
and understood. The stimulus-response model, no m atter how complicated,
cannot account for the meaning that exchanges between a reader and a writer, an
utterer and an interpretant, even if what is written or uttered is misunderstood or
misinterpreted. According to Percy, then, the behaviorist remains outside o f his
own theory.
The formalists or idealists, on the other hand, place m an within the
confines of his own mind, within the cell of himself, radically disconnected from
both the world and others, unable to enter the "ordinary lovely world." While this
tradition offers sound theories regarding the building-blocks of language, such an
abstracted posture nevertheless ends in solipsism. The self is stranded within itself,
cut off from the very meanings its mind generates.
Percy’s methodology o f repetition seeks a third way, not through an
Hegelian, world-historical synthesis of opposites, which, of course, falls into the
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latter polarization, but from an observation of the phenomenon itself: "Instead of
marking [man] down at the outset as besouled creature or responding organism,
why not look at him as he appears, not even as Homo sapiens, because attributing
sapience already begs the question, but as Homo loquens, m an the talker, or

Homo symbolificus, man the symbol-monger?" (MB 17) Percy’s interest in
semiotics turns to the symbol-user himself—a retrieval of a possibility that has
been overlooked in the tradition.
In Lost in the Cosmos, Percy again comes at the issue "from a different
level." The "warning-challenge-announcement-introduction" to the intermezzo
section suggests the retrieval Percy is about to undertake:
[This section] will irritate many professional semioticists by
not being technical enough—and for focusing on one
dimension of semiotics which semioticists, for whatever
reason, are not accustomed to regard as a proper subject of
inquiry, i.e., not texts and other coded sign utterances but the
self which produces texts or hears sign utterances. (L C 85)7
The intermezzo can also be seen as Percy’s synthesis of his thirty years’ interest in
the field, a synopsis of the essays collected in The Message in the Bottle. As such,
it is his clearest statement o f his approach to semiotics—i.e., a semiotics of the self,
hence the title, "A Semiotic Primer of the Self." His own comments point to the
centrality it has with respect to his work as a whole: "Despite its offhand tone, [the
‘Primer’ is] as serious as can be. I have never (sic) and will never do anything
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thing as important. If I am remembered for anything a hundred years from now,
it will probably be for that" (Con 285).
N ot all critics share Percy’s enthusiasm. In The Fiction o f Walker Percy,
John Edward Hardy, for one, writes that he "cannot agree" with Percy’s own
assessment of the piece: "I imagine that Percy would have had difficulty in finding
a publisher even for an essay collection like The Message in the Bottle, not to
speak of Lost in the Cosmos, if he had not established a reputation as a
novelist. . . . His greater talent is for fiction."8 Hardy’s point rings true. Yet, it
may apply more readily to Lost in the Cosmos than to The Message in the Bottle.
While there may have been no cause for a collection of such essays (in Message)
had Percy not been a fiction-writer, it is important to remember that these essays
gained placement in respectable scholarly journals on their own strengths. Thus,
they were recognized as having something important to add to the study of
language and the language-user regardless of Percy’s fiction-writing. Percy’s own
enthusiasm for "A Semiotic Primer of the Self' reflects, I think, his awareness of
the synthesis he had wrought, of his having brought together his many-years’
thoughts on the subject concisely, coherently, and humorously.9 Although I am
in no position to forecast Percy’s reception one hundred years from now, I am
more inclined than Hardy to accept his own excitement about this work.
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The subtitle of the "Primer," while jocular in tone, further points to its
character of synthesis: "A Short History of the Cosmos with Emphasis on the
N ature and Origin of the Self, plus a Semiotic Model for Computing
Impoverishment in the Midst of Plenty, or Why it is Possible to Feel Bad in a
G ood Environment and Good in a Bad Environment" {L C 86). Percy
reintroduces concerns that have been with him from his earliest days of publishing,
but comes at the subject here in terms of a "History o f the Cosmos." And the
latter part o f the title not only echoes the long set of questions that begin "The
Delta Factor," but also suggests one of Percy’s central themes. Why do his
characters feel so bad when they have the best of possible surroundings? Percy’s
attem pt to work out this problem "semiotically" suggests that his fiction and
nonfiction are also of a piece. While both can stand autonomously, they are
nevertheless complementary.10
In the "Primer," Percy retrieves from the tradition of linguistic study the
work of Charles Sanders Peirce. Just as Heidegger turned to the meditations of
Descartes as he struggled to renew the question of being, so Percy turns to Peirce
for help with his semiotics. O f course, Percy uses Peirce throughout his writings
on language, not only at the time of writing Lost in the Cosmos. He was aware all
along that he was building his own thoughts on Peirce’s shoulders. On February
3, 1971, he wrote to Foote about his language philosophy: "I would even say that

79
it is revolutionary: that one hundred years from now it could well be known as the
Peirce-Percy theory of meaning (not Pierce but Peirce and so pronounced PercePercy)" (SHC). Peirce’s presence, however, seems to be stronger in Cosmos
because the "Primer" begins with Peirce’s distinction between dyadic and triadic
interactions.11
F or Percy, the Cosmos has manifested a predominance of dyadic events.
His history, then, begins with an explanation of what they are:
From the beginning and for most of the fifteen billion years
o f the life o f the Cosmos, there was only one kind of event.
It was particles hitting particles, chemical reactions, energy
exchanges, gravity attractions between masses, field forces,
and so on. As different as such events are, they can be
understood as an interaction between two or more entities:
A**B. Even a system as inconceivably vast as the Cosmos
itself can be understood as such an interaction. (XC86-7)
W ith the appearance of organic life "some three and a half billion years ago" {LC
89), interactions both within a single organism and between two or m ore
organisms could still be understood dyadically. Organisms inhabit an
environment, to which they respond in order to maintain an inner balance,
homeostasis. An organism’s response to its environment and to other organisms
can be understood as a signal response, that is to say, dyadic. Since signals
announce their objects, such signal responses might include the response to flee,
the call to mate, or, as in the case of ants and bees, directions toward food. No
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m atter how complex, and no m atter how many variables involved, such
interactions can still be expressed by the formula A**B.
Triadic behavior, on the other hand, did not enter the Cosmos until very
recently, "perhaps less than 100,000 years ago, perhaps more." It is an event
"different in kind from all preceding events in the Cosmos. It cannot be
understood as a dyadic interaction or a complexus of dyadic interactions. . . . It is
that event in which sign A is understood by organism B, not as a signal to flee or
approach, but as ‘meaning’ or referring to another perceived segment o f the
environment" (L C 95-6).
Percy views Helen Keller’s experience at the well-house with Miss Sullivan
as the paradigmatic triadic episode.12 Before the well-house event, Keller
responded to Miss Sullivan’s words (spelled in her hand) as signals. But when
Miss Sullivan put one of Keller’s hands underneath the water flowing out of the
well and in her other hand spelled out w-a-t-e-r, Keller was quite literally bom into
the world of triadic behavior. She realized that the word was somehow connected
to the thing, that it "meant" the cool liquid flowing over her hand. The connection
between the word spelled, the actual thing, and Helen Keller herself form the
angles of an irreducible triangle—hence, triadic behavior, or what Percy calls the
"Delta Factor," the Greek letter itself (A) a symbol for irreducibility. For Percy,
the three relations—between Keller and the word, Keller and the actual water, and

the word and the thing—cannot be explained dyadically.13 This event marks
Keller’s crossing over the threshold of sign-use. No longer do Miss Sullivan’s
words announce something to Keller; no longer are they signals. Instead, she has
entered the realm of the triad—of meaning. Although she is still an organism in
an environment with needs to be fulfilled, Percy emphasizes that her new found
sign-use places her also in a world.
This idea of placement in a world is central to an understanding o f Percy’s
semiotics of self, and I will return to it shortly. For now, however, I wish to
address Percy’s use of "sign." I have already noted that Percy follows Saussure in
his later writings and uses signal and sign (as opposed to sign and symbol in his
earlier writings) for the difference between announcement and conception. Yet
when he begins to discuss triadic behavior and sign-use on page ninety-six of the
"Primer," he seems to put Saussure’s distinction between signillant (signifier) and

signifie (signified) to his own use. For Percy the former is the word itself and the
latter is the referent or thing. But this is not Saussure’s meaning o f the terms. It is
not until page 103 that Percy acknowledges Saussure’s use of the two terms; "The
sign, as Saussure said, is a union o f signifier (the sound-image of a word) and
signified (the concept o f an object, action, quality)." Then he adds in a footnote
that the signifie is neither a percept nor a concept, but something in between, a
"‘concrete concept’ or an ‘abstract percept,’ or what Gerard Manley Hopkins
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called inscape." For Percy, then, the conjunction of the signifier and the signified,
in its paradigmatic form (primordial form), places an object, action, or quality
somewhere between the concrete and the abstract: "What comes to mind when I
hear apple, what in fact the word articulates within itself, is neither an individual
apple [percept] nor a definition of apple [concept], but a quality of appleness . . . "
Despite his somewhat equivocal use of Saussure, Percy places his thought
precisely where he wants it to be. The sign itself exemplifies a state o f being
between {inter esse). From Percy’s own standpoint between the behaviorists (for
whom everything exists in the realm of the concrete), and the idealists or formalists
(for whom the abstract holds priority), the sign exhibits its own inter esse. Thus,
sign-use, in its primordial form, enacts a repetition for sign-users. It places them
in a relation of interest—in the double sense of "being between" and "concerned."
The paradigmatic sign-using event is itself a repetition.14
Every act of naming, the "Primer" continues, involves both a namer and a
receiver of the name. The irreducible triad really involves two triangles—one for
the sign-utterer and one for the sign-receiver: "Every triad of sign-reception
requires another triad of sign-utterance. Whether the sign is a word, a painting, or
a symphony—or Robinson Crusoe writing a journal to himself—a sign
transaction requires a sign-utterer and a sign-receiver" {LC91). Miss Sullivan is
not merely an ancillary participant in Helen Keller’s breakthrough to triadicity.
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F or Percy, she relates as an ietersubjective "co-celebrant" to the being that
primordial sign-use names. A child learning to name things from his parents
stands in the same repetitive posture as Helen Keller. Sign-use is social in
origin.15
As a result of this social nature, Percy offers a fresh view of consciousness.
In its etymological sense, conscious means "to know with." For Percy, this
"knowing with" carries a double reference—to the sign with which we "know" a
thing, and to the other (the namer) with whom we know it. Thus, the Cartesian or
Husserlian formula for consciousness—"I am conscious of this chair"—and the
Sartrean revision of it—"There is consciousness of this chair"—can be further
revised as "This ‘is’ a chair for you and me" (See MB 275-6). For Percy, sign-use
constitutes consciousness. Since
one is always conscious o/som ething as something—its
sign—[then] it is part of the act of consciousness to place
[that something] . . . . The signing process tends to configure
segments of the Cosmos under the auspices of a sign, often
mistakenly. (L C 106)16
A particular interplay of light and shade may "look" like a rabbit, but upon closer
inspection it may turn out to be only the shadow of a bush. Furthermore, entities
denoted by such names as "unicorn" and "the boogerman" may find a place in the

world of the triadic sign-user even though they have no corresponding physical
existence. The sign-user inhabits and designates a world.
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But the Edenic, paradigmatic sign-using event of Helen Keller at the wellhouse or of a child learning to name harbors a two-pronged snake in the grass.
On the one hand, the signifier is "interpenetrated" by the signified to the degree
that a devaluation occurs. No longer does the signifier reveal the signified, but
rather it seals it off. There takes place "a hardening and a closure of the signifier,
so that in the end the signified becomes encased in a simulacrum like a mummy in
a mummy case" (ZCT05). On the other hand, while the act of consciousness
places things in the world by means of signs, there is no sign that can encompass
the sign-user himself:
The fateful flaw of human semiotics is this: that of all the
objects in the entire Cosmos which the sign-user can
apprehend through the conjoining of signifier and signified
(word uttered and thing beheld), there is one which forever
escapes his comprehension—and that is the sign-user himself.
Semiotically, the self is literally unspeakable to itself. . . . The
self has no sign of itself. No signifier applies. All signifiers
apply equally. (ZC107)17
The self, then, cannot be placed in the act of consciousness even though it is
conscious of itself. From the aspect of semiotics, then, the self is dislocated.
W ithout a consensus theory of the kind that informed Europe in the twelfth
century or New England in the sixteenth, the self literally has no place in the
Cosmos. It is unformulable, "lost in the cosmos," forever seeking its place.
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It may be useful to take this unformulability of the self as an analogue of
the "dread that has no object" discussed in Chapter One. The transform ation o f
dread into fear (the objectification of dread) bears a striking resemblance to the
self seeking placement in the world. Placement is the key, but when the
traditional modes of placement—Totemism, Eastern Pantheism, and JudeoChristianity—are declared inadmissible by the postmodern world, the self is left
with only two options—immanence or transcendence.18 In such a world, the self
seeks to quell the dread of nonplacement by objectifying itself. It seeks a sign. In
our post-religious and post-mythic age, the self seeks its sign either by taking its
place as an immanent consumer of the goods that a scientific and technological
culture provides for it—i.e., allowing goods and techniques to give it form—or by
adopting the objective posture of science itself—i.e., transcending the world so as
to make pronouncements about it.
A rt offers another means of transcendence. The difference, however,
between the transcendence of science and that of art is that whereas the scientist
speaks to a relatively small transcendent community of scientists, the artist speaks
"to the world of men who understand him" (L C 119). The artist names the
unnameable and forms the unformulable. For an age in which the self finds no
sign for itself, the artist provides the service of at least naming this predicament:
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If K afka’s Metamorphosis is presently a more accurate
account of the self than Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, it is
the more exhilarating for being so. The naming o f the
predicament of the self by art is its reversal. Hence the
salvific effect o f art. Through art, the predicament o f self
becomes not only speakable but laughable. . . . Kafka and his
friends laughed when he read his stories to them. (L C 121)19
But the transcendence that art provides is more ephemeral than that o f science.
The artist’s placement is more tenuous.
Scientists can remain "in orbit" as long as their community of fellow
Olympians accepts their dicta. They have relatively few problems leaving that
community momentarily and "reentering" the world. The artist participates in
community at the time of creating his art, yet he suffers "spectacular reentries and
flameouts" when he finishes his work and tries to reenter the ordinary world.
These attempts at reentry bear witness to "nothing other than a pathology of the
self in the twentieth century" (TCT21), one of Percy’s ultimate concerns as a
writer.
It seems that I have raised what could be seen as a discrepancy in Percy’s
thought. Is he a closet modernist hiding in the garb of a postmodernist? His
comments about art providing an avenue of transcendence and about its salvific
effect sound similar to the views of that high modernist James Joyce, whose
Stephen Dedalus reveled in "epiphanic moments of transcendence" and who liked
to speak of salvation by art. Is Percy inconsistent?
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If art is a sign that names the unnameable for its age, and if a sign is, as we
have seen, somewhere between the abstraction and generality of a concept and the
concreteness and individuality of a percept, then art cannot wholly exemplify the
type of transcendence Stephen Dedalus speaks of. Abstraction and generality
belong to the category of transcendence, since what they propose is definition or
classification. Concreteness and individuality, on the other hand, fall into the
category of immanence. If art provides a sign for the self in an age wherein the self
has no sign, then the sign itself must partake of both immanence and
transcendence, thus enacting the repetition outlined in Chapter One.
Furthermore, if a poet can "wrench signifier out of context and exhibit it in all its
queerness" (ZC106), thus forestalling the interpenetration of the signifier by the
signified, then art as a sign should resist this same interpenetration and so
withstand the closure into form that Percy might seem to be espousing here by
what could be taken as his tacit modernism, a Joycean, "transcendental" view.
In other words, if the self is unformulable, then the naming o f this
unformulability in a work of art, because the naming is itself a sign, cannot close
the gap between the signifier and the signified. It is the nature of the sign to
"devolve," for the signifier and the signified to interpenetrate. Yet it is the nature
o f art to counteract this interpenetration, to once again establish a distance
between the two elements of the sign. As a sign itself, art endeavors to restore the
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sign to its rightful posture. The sign that art provides subverts the devolution of
the sign by restoring what Samuel Pickering might call "the right distance"
between the signifier and the signified.20 In this space of the naming act itself, the
self finds its transcendence, not as a Joycean abandonment of immanence, nor as a
conflation o f immanence and transcendence, but somewhere between the
two —inter esse. For Percy, art enacts its "reversal" in the space of the naming act
itself. The unformulable self can be restored to its posture o f interest in the act of
naming this same unformulability. Distance and difference are the keys.
In one of his interviews, Percy discusses this very issue of a gap or distance.
Referring, once again, to the Helen Keller episode, he says:
But the two couldn’t be more different; I mean the symbol
water couldn’t be more different—whether spoken or spelled
into her hand—than the liquid flowing over her other hand.
So you can hear her saying it, but there has to be a space,
separation, or difference between the symbol and the thing in
order for the thing to be grasped. (Con 227)
And in this same interview, when asked whether he agreed with Dedalus’s salvific
view of art and language, Percy responded:
No, unfortunately I’m much more pessimistic; I would see
Kierkegaard as a good corrective of that. I could imagine
Kierkegaard seeing—had he lived after Joyce—seeing Joyce
as what he would call a hero of the aesthetic, seeing salvation
through art and language. W hat is that great phrase that
Stephen Dedalus uses in one place: "forge in the smithy of my
soul the uncreated conscience of my race." Kierkegaard
would say that’s the aesthetic sphere. {Con 231)
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There really is no discrepancy in Percy’s thought. W hat might appear as a
relapse into modernist thinking finds its place in postmodernism.21 Like
Kierkegaard, Percy tries to point to the existential by means of the aesthetic.
Thus, his novels do not provide a Joycean "moment of transcendence" as he seems
to suggest toward the end of the "Primer." The form or the name that Percy offers
to the unformulable self cannot place a self that is fundamentally dislocated.
Percy’s comments in the interview and his repeated references to the
unformulability of the self in both the "Primer" and in essays from The Message in

the Bottle suggest that the gap between the signifier and the signified m ust remain
so that the self will not flee the dread of its unformulability and objectify itself.
The only name that can place the self in this age—Homo viator-—places it
paradoxically "nowhere," between the transcendence of art and science and the
immanence of consumerism. From this interesting place, the signless autos
retrieves possibilities in the hope of beginning again in the openness o f repetition,
in the space o f the sign itself. It is no accident that Lost in the Cosmos ends with
the words: "Do you read me? Come back. Repeat. Come back. Come back.
Come back" (256).
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2. The Openness o f the Sign: Binx Bolling
This section and the one which follows provide some needed grounding for
what has been handled up to this point on a highly abstract and analytical level.
Two dimensions of the relation between repetition and the unformulability o f the
self—the openness of the sign and placement in consciousness—lend themselves
especially well to a reading o f Percy’s first two novels: The Moviegoer and The

Last Gentleman.

By now, Binx Bolling must be as familiar to readers of American Literature
as Quentin Compson. While this bemused, ironical, and detached son of the
1950’s South tells his story in a subdued, laconic fashion, he nevertheless
embodies, like the younger Compson scion, the spirit of his age. If Quentin bears
witness to the decline of the rural, aristocratic, and stoic South, then Binx gives
shape to the "malaise" that has struck the suburban, homogenized, consumer
South. If Quentin succumbs to his disorientation, Binx explores his. Percy once
told an interviewer that he viewed Binx as a "Quentin Compson who didn’t
commit suicide" (Con 300). Thus, as Quentin wallows in his "love o f death," Binx
examines the death-in-life of a new age. And as the river closes over Quentin’s
head, Binx looks for signs of a new possibility.
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Yet, like his creator, Binx eludes any facile designation. At once urbane,
charming, and calculating, he senses that something has gone wrong. Even that
knowledge, however, does little to inhibit his various stage impersonations. Time
and again, he tries to objectify his unformulable self. Sometimes, he takes the role
o f a consumer: "I subscribe to Consumer Reports and as a consequence I own a
first-class television set, an all but silent air conditioner and a very long lasting
deodorant. My armpits never stink."22 A t other times, he plays a scientist:
Until recently, I read only "fundamental" books, that is, key
books on key subjects, such as War and Peace, the novel of
novels; A Study o f History, a solution to the problem of
time; Schroedinger’s What is Life?, Einstein’s The Universe
as I See It, and such. During those years, I stood outside the
universe and sought to understand it. (59-60)
W hen he plays neither consumer nor scientist, Binx invokes or emulates the stars
o f the silver screen: "Ah, William Holden, we already need you again. Already
the fabric is wearing thin without you" (14).
Yet Binx knows that such objectification of his dread cannot satisfy his
"search." His ironic tone subverts the closure he would provide himself in such
play-acting and opens him to his own despair. Even the titles o f the books he
reads, set in the context of his scientific, "vertical" search, undercut the possibility
he seeks. How could time be problematical, for example, if one has read a
"solution to the problem of time"? For readers, Binx presents an exfoliation of
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quandaries. How can they grip someone who has no grip on himself? How can
they trust a narrator who ironizes the keen eye with which he sizes up his world?
How can they follow, in short, a lost narrator?23
John Edward Hardy has argued that The Moviegoer suffers as a work of
fiction because "the reader is very often left to labor over gaps that he cannot be
confident the author has recognized as such."24 Patrick Samway, S.J. suggests,
on the other hand, in a structural analysis comparing the novel to a segment that
appeared as a short-story, "Carnival in Gentilly,"25 that "the gaps . . . become
pauses between elements of the code, the moments of silence that m ake music
possible." Sam way further suggests that because The Mo viegoer and "Carnival in
Gentilly" share a "palimpsest" relation, the novel is "about semiotics, about
encoding and decoding signs. "26
Samway offers a sound corrective to Hardy’s frustration about "gaps," and
there can be no doubt that The Moviegoer reflects Percy’s interest in semiotics.
Yet I find it equally valuable to look at Percy’s first novel in light of his concern
with the study of semiotics, "not texts and other coded sign utterances but the self
which produces texts or hears sign utterances" (L C 85). A first-person narrative,

The Moviegoer is ostensibly "produced" by Binx Bolling. In the Epilogue, Binx
makes the only reference to his production of the text when he says "Reticence,
therefore, hardly having a place in a document of this kind, it seems as good a time
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as any to make an end." (208). It may prove useful, then, to take a semiotic look
at the narrator himself.
I have already mentioned Binx’s efforts to find a sign for himself by means
of immanence and transcendence. I have also suggested that he ironizes his own
attempts at such objectification. As a distancing tool, irony duplicates the space
within the sign itself. Since irony creates a space between the ironist and the
ironized, its expression by means of signs parallels the distance between the
signifier and the signified at the very level of the sign. The "gaps" in the text, then,
have a twofold origin. They arise as a result of the nature o f the sign and as a
consequence of Binx’s ironic posture. When Binx speaks o f his life as a perfect
consumer, for example, the ironic tone with which he speaks distances himself
from the closure that such a life implies—i.e., from the belief that the self can be
informed by consumer items. Because his irony includes self-irony, he cannot
close the gap between signifier and signified that such a sign for the self would
offer. By means of irony, then, he paradoxically reinstates the unformulability of
the self. W hat appears as a potential sign for the self is subverted by the narrative
tone. Binx is left signless.
As ironist, Binx is especially adept at sizing up others. It is as though he
cannot avoid seeing the despair of objectifying the self, the despair of

94
everydayness.

27

Eddie Lovell, for instance, represents what Binx would be were

he not an ironist, for Eddie exists solely in the realm o f the immanent:
Yes! Look at him. As he talks, he slaps a folded newspaper
against his pants leg and his eye watches me and at the same
time sweeps the terrain behind me, taking note of the
slightest movement. A green truck turns down Bourbon
Street; the eye sizes it up, flags it down, demands credentials,
waves it on. A businessman turns in at the Maison Blanche
Building; the eye knows him, even knows what he is up to.
And all the while he talks very well. His lips move
muscularly, molding words into pleasing shapes, marshalling
arguments, and during the slight pauses are held poised,
attractively everted in a Charles Boyer pout—while a little
web of saliva gathers in a corner like the clear oil o f a good
machine. Now he jingles the coins deep in his pocket. No
mystery here!—he is as cogent as a bird dog quartering a
field. He understands everything out there and everything
out there is something to be understood.
According to Binx, Eddie exists as an organism in an environment. At once a
"machine" and a "bird dog," he lives in the realm o f signals. One thing announces
another. In his posture of complete immanence, he has annulled the possibility o f
transcendence or distance. Eddie would have no difficulty describing himself, yet
what he would not realize is that his description would more than likely be a
signal. He would announce himself—as businessman, as husband, as
planner—and thereby close any gap regarding his self-identity.
Yet it is Binx’s posture that is interesting here. If Eddie observes and "sizes
up" the terrain, Binx observes the observer. And if Eddie annuls the possibility of
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distance, Binx exists at an infinite remove.28 Eddie may be sunk in the immanent,
but Binx is totally withdrawn from it. Neither displays the dialectic tension of the
self. Rather, each has settled for a "deficient polarization"—one as consumer, the
other as scientist. W ithout Binx’s posture of detachment, of course, the book
would not exist. There has to be distance. The question remains, though, how
much distance?
The temptation to flee the unformulable self is great, and while Binx is
aware of such evasions in Aunt Emily (a Catonist), Uncle Jules (a "canny creole"),
W alter W ade (a social climber), Sam Yerger (a stoic novelist), and Mercer (an old
retainer turned Rosicrucian), he nevertheless cultivates his own evasions. In
admitting his own flight from self, he continually throws into question his
designations o f others. He cannot damn them in moral iniquity because his
predicament is similar to, or worse than, theirs. In fact, as Binx encounters each
character, he is drawn to their own resolution of the predicament. While speaking
with Eddie Lovell, he says "This is how one lives! My exile in Gentilly has been
the worst kind of self-deception" (14). And when he visits with Aunt Emily he
acknowledges that "this is where I belong after all" (21). He is drawn to the very
despair he names.
Binx avoids himself, to be sure, but his evasions are more self-consciously
created. Borrowing terms from Kierkegaard’s "Diapsalmata" in Either/Or; he
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practices what by now are familiar terms to students of Percy: rotations and
repetitions. Binx defines rotation as "the experiencing of the new beyond the
expectation of the experiencing of the new" (126). In rotation the unformulable
self finds temporary relief from the dread of its unformulability by losing itself
(closing itself) in the unexpected experience of the new. Rotation is an aesthetic
category.

29

Repetition, on the other hand, is both an aesthetic and an existential
category. Binx’s rather clumsy definition reads:
A repetition is the re-enactment of past experience toward
the end o f isolating the time segment which has lapsed in
order that it, the lapsed time, can be savored o f itself and
without the usual adulteration of events that clog time like
peanuts in brittle. (68-9)
Even though Binx succeeds where Constantin Constantius fails—Binx says he has
"a successful repetition" (68)—he is nonetheless impoverished. Since Binx tries to
"neutralize" time, to make it "like a yard of smooth peanut brittle" (69), his
definition finds its place in the constancy of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic sphere. In
aesthetic repetition, the unformulable self avoids the issue of its unformulability by
viewing experience in closed, timeless "packages," as segments of lapsed time that
can be savored of themselves, determinately formulated so as to provide the
illusion that the self is also formulable. Such a repetition seeks to calm the "terrors
o f history" by neutralizing them. It is, in effect, the recollective posture.
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But early manuscripts of The Moviegoer suggest that Percy had in mind
existential repetition as well. A nearly illegible autograph note on the twenty-sixth
o f fifty-seven pages of initial notes and outlines reads: "That [the?] repetition is
more than just a savoring of something. It also makes the present possible"
(SHC).30 Aesthetic repetition cannot make the present possible because it seeks
the G rand Moment of myth (in illo tempore)—the romantic IT. It seeks another
time. It is not insignificant that one short-story version of "Confessions o f a
Moviegoer" was subtitled "From the Diary of the Last Romantic." Binx is the last
romantic because he has experienced the futility of seeking IT, some pre-packaged
experience of time. Binx recalls, for example, the melancholy he sank into after
travelling with friends:
It seemed like a fine idea, sleeping in shelters or under the
stars in the cool evergreens, and later hopping freights. In
fact, this was what I was sure I wanted to do. But in no time
at all I became depressed. The times we did have fun, like
sitting around a fire or having a time with some girls, I had
the feeling they were saying to me: "How about this Binx?
This is really it, isn’t it, boy?", that they were practically
looking up from their girls to say this. (34)
In "Confessions of a Moviegoer" itself, the moviegoer has more confidence in the
IT. After coming out of a movie he reflects:
This moment, the moment of the movies, the moment in
which I live, is the Significant Moment. Where we [himself
and actors] differ from other people is that they live in the
moment as if it were like every other moment in their lives, a
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routine affair as if things and people were not any more
worthy o f noticing now than at any other time. The truth is
that now everything is highly charged with meaning;
everything is a Presence or a Power—that ordinary
Brownstone there, that man on the subway: if the
significance is not clear immediately, it soon will be. At any
moment now, IT will begin. (SHC)
The romantic lives, not in the unformulable present, but in the expectation of the
formulated IT. He sets before himself a pre-packaged experience forever beyond
his reach, yet one whose attainment, he believes, would cancel the dread o f his
unformulable self. Living in the expectation that such an experience will set him
free, he awaits the day when fate will deliver it to him.31
Binx, of course, is onto the futility of the romantic. In the final version of
the novel, he eschews the romantic quest, because, among other things, it "killed"
his father.32 And on the bus trip back from Chicago to New Orleans, when he
and K ate encounter a young man reading The Charterhouse o f Parma, he directly
states the romantic’s dilemma: "The poor fellow. He has just begun to suffer from
it, this miserable trick the romantic plays upon himself: of setting just beyond his
reach the very thing he prizes" (189). The depression Binx experiences at times
when he should feel the exhilaration of IT offers a clue to his search for new
possibilities. Despite his self-consciously cultivated evasions, then, Binx holds out
for something more, namely, existential repetition. One especially sly indication of
this attitude occurs, once again, when Binx turns his irony upon himself.33
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He recalls his freshman year of college when "it was extremely im portant to
me to join a good fraternity." In an attempt to convince Binx that he should join
the Deltas, the somewhat grandiose Walter Wade takes him aside, and, although
he says he will not "hand [Binx] the usual crap about this fraternity business," he
does anyway: "When it comes to describing the fellows here, the caliber of the
men, the bond between us, the meaning of this little symbol—he turned back his
lapel to show the [fraternity] pin. . ." Then he dangles the IT in front o f Binx:
I’ll ask you a single question and then we’ll go down. Did
you or did you not feel a unique something when you walked
into this house? I won’t attempt to describe it. If you felt it,
you already know exactly what I mean. If you didn’t— !"
Now Walter stands over me, holding his hat over his heart.
"Did you feel it, Binx?" (30-1)
Caught up in the romanticism of Walter’s rhetoric, Binx cannot avoid joining.
Yet, the rapture of his romantic capitulation ends in irony:
As it turns out, I did not make them a good man at all. I
managed to go to college four years without acquiring a
single honor. When the annual came out, there was nothing
under my picture but the letters AT A—which was appropriate
since I had spent the four years propped on the front porch
of the fraternity house, bemused and dreaming, watching the
sun shine through the Spanish moss, lost in the mystery of
finding myself alive at such a time and place—and next to
A T A my character summary: "Quiet but a sly sense of
humor." (31)
In this passage Percy endows Binx with his own "quiet, sly sense o f humor."
For, despite the banality of the situation and the ironic tone, what is at issue here
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is precisely "the meaning o f this little symbol"— AT A. The delta’s, o f course, depict
Percy’s symbol for the irreducible triad of the sign. And psi provides the initial
letter for "psyche," from which we derive our word for self or soul. Binx’s own
identity, then, is connected to the "meaning of this little symbol," the only entry
underneath his picture. Although Binx did not make a good fraternity man, he
nevertheless embodies the truth about the self for Percy: While the self (T ) cannot
be encompassed by a sign (A), it nevertheless finds itself immured in sign use (ATA)
and so must look to the delta to understand itself. Binx manifests a repetitive
posture as he watches "the sun shine through the Spanish moss, lost in the mystery
of finding [himself] alive at such a time and place." It is important, first, that Binx
"finds himself," and second that he finds himself "alive" and not "dead dead dead,"
as he so often finds others. The subtle self-irony provides the sign that opens the
"mystery of time and place." Binx inhabits this time and place, and he finds the
"right distance" to reveal himself—"lost"—in it. He finds himself, not in the G reat
Moment of myth, but in the ordinary everyday, which is quite different from the
everydayness that precludes the possibility of a search. Thus, Binx is between

(inter esse) the single sign (A) that can never formulate him and the sign use (ATA)
without which he can know nothing at all and which provides the best avenue,
according to Percy, to know oneself. Binx’s ironic naming and the distance that it
creates parallels the gap between the elements of the sign itself, a gap that has to be
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there "in order for the thing to be grasped" (Con 227). While the romantic loses
himself in the closure of his pre-packaged experience, Binx finds himself in the
openness of the sign.
It is Binx’s subtle signification and irony in the narrative itself that prevents
the interpenetration of the signifier by the signified and which leaves him open to
new possibilities. Although he slips out of the "right distance" from time to time in
his ironic posture, he nevertheless manages what Paul A. Bove and Ronald
Schleifer, following Kierkegaard, have called "mastered irony."34 Unlike his
father, who displays an "unmastered" irony and whose eyes "beyond a d o u b t. . .
are ironical" (21) in the picture on Aunt Emily’s mantelpiece, Binx manages the
distance o f his ironic posture. He stands between the fatal romantic irony of his
father and the banal seriousness of Walter Wade. He maintains his repetitive
posture, which is itself another word for "mastered irony."
But even so subtle an expression of existential repetition nevertheless
polarizes into the aesthetic in a work of art, as Percy says it must. It devolves into
something to savor, the merely interesting, as opposed to the interest that
comprises repetition.35 W hat such subtlety demands, however, is a decision on
the part o f the reader. Although Percy says he "would like to think that [Binx] is
an embodiment of a certain pathology of the twentieth century . . . it’s an open
question." The reader must decide whether Binx is himself "a nut" or whether he
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expresses an "authentic mood of the time" (Con 302). Like Kierkegaard, Percy
points to the existential by means of the aesthetic. Such an attem pt is bound to
provide an ambiguous sign. Just as it is impossible to determine whether the
"ambiguous sienna color[ed] Negro" has received ashes on Ash Wednesday, the
last day of the novel’s action (before the epilogue), so too it is impossible to close
the gap in the sign that is the novel. In the openness o f this sign, Percy allows for
the possibility of repetition.

3. The D islocated Self: Language, Place, and Will Barrett
To say that Percy’s characters are dislocated offers nothing new to the body
o f scholarship surrounding his works. And to portray Will Barrett as an example
o f this dislocation is not to say that Percy’s other characters do not suffer the same
fate. Binx Bolling, Tom More, and Lancelot Lamar can all be seen as exiles in
almost every dimension o f their existence. Yet, Will Barrett of The Last

Gentleman is the only character whose story begins and ends outside o f the south.
Although Percy balked at the label "Southern Writer"—"is John Cheever a
'N orthern Writer?’"36—he nevertheless acknowledged that his novels, especially

The Moviegoer, would not work without the backdrop o f the south’s rich
tradition:
W ithout the southern backdrop—Mississippi, Louisiana
(New Orleans)—the novel doesn’t work—it doesn’t work at
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all. Try to imagine Binx Bolling in Butte, M ontana. There
has to be a contrast between this very saturated culture in the
south, on one hand, whether it’s French, Creole, uptown
New Orleans, or Protestant. It’s a very dense society or
culture which you need for Binx to collide with. (Con 301)
F or Percy to remove a character from this fertile ground, then, suggests a degree
of dislocation unequal to that of the other characters. In one of his early
interviews, Percy admits that Barrett is "a good deal sicker" than Binx, but, as with
Binx, "the reader is free to see him as a sick man among healthy businessmen or as
a sane pilgrim in a m ad world" (Con 13). N ot only is Barrett "sicker," his
story—both in The Last Gentleman and The Second Coming—is the only one
written from the third-person point of view, an indication, perhaps, that Percy
needs to distance himself from this addled young man in order to get the story
straight. To further emphasize his dislocation, Percy withholds his name from the
reader for the first ten pages o f the novel. When he does give his name, he presents
the reader with a multiple choice: "[his] name was Williston Bibb Barrett or Will
Barrett or Billy Barrett" (21).37 And to complicate matters even more, the
narrator most often refers to Barrett, not by his name, but as "the engineer."
John Edward Hardy has argued convincingly that the novel’s opening, with
its emphasis on place, is "clearly ironic." Not only is Will a "displaced" southerner
living in New York, but the scene at Central Park, ostensibly constructed to
provide a definite location for the action, nevertheless devolves into "no place . . .
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an anywhere and nowhere."38 This reading gains credibility when we learn some
pages later that a spot in the southeast quadrant of the park has been m arked as
"ground zero," the center of a "series of concentric circles" (44), on a m ap depicting
the explosion of a nerve gas bomb. Barrett, then, is thrice removed from place,
and he seeks a sign that will locate him in the world: "Often nowadays people do
not know what to do and so live out their lives as if they were waiting for some
sign or other. This young man was such a person" (13). With his telescope of "an
unusual design" (11), this nameless, displaced southerner awaits a sign at ground
zero of "no place."39
The telescope is outfitted with a camera so that Barrett might photograph a
peregrine falcon he had seen the day before. It does not return, so Barrett begins
to dismantle the telescope. Yet "being of both a scientific and a superstitious turn
of mind and therefore always on the lookout for chance happenings which lead to
great discoveries, he had to have a last look" (12). W hat he finds proves to be the
chance event he has been waiting for, the sign "as a consequence [of which] the rest
of his life was to be changed" (11), readers are told on the first page of the novel.
The event that changes Barrett’s life is also, of course, the incident that sets
the novel in motion. The passage merits close inspection: "There in the telescope
sat a woman, on a park bench, a white woman dark as a gypsy. She held a
tabloid. Over her shoulder he read: '. . . parley fails’" (12). The woman turns out
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to be Rita Vaught, and we learn that she leaves messages at the park bench for
Kitty Vaught, the second woman Barrett sees through his telescope and with
whom he falls in love.
Since it is the instrument through which Barrett sees his life-changing sign,
the telescope itself merits analysis. We know very little about it at this point o f the
novel, only that it was of "unusual design" and that it could be fitted with a
camera. This latter feature is noteworthy because it doubles its capacity for
observation. The telescope narrows and amplifies the field of vision while the
camera stabilizes and freezes it into a single image. We learn later that when
Barrett purchased the telescope, he had looked upon it as something that would,
like the sign it reveals, change him: "his life depended on it." The telescope also
suits Barrett’s scientific/magical temperament: "[its] lenses did not transmit light
merely. They penetrated into the heart of things" (31). The instrument both
reflects and creates the world in its "brilliant theater o f lenses" (12). In so doing, it
recovers things. When Barrett turns his instrument toward a building, for
example,
it was better than having the bricks there before him. They
gained in value. Every grain and crack and excrescence
became available. Beyond a doubt, he said to himself, this
proves that bricks, as well as other things, are not as
accessible as they used to be. Special measures were needed
to recover them. The telescope recovered them. (32)
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The telescope is Barrett’s instrument for recovering and discovering the world.
Through its lenses, Barrett knows the world.
The character and power of this "unusual" instrument—it is itself the agent
in many of the passages that describe it—suggest that it can be read as an
analogue or a metaphor for the novel itself. Like the subtle expression o f Percy’s
linguistic philosophy in Binx’s AT A, the description o f the telescope suggests
Percy’s views about the diagnostic function of the novel. The telescope, after all, is
a scientific instrument, and, as I tried to show in Chapter One, Percy uses the
novel "scientifically."
Like the telescope, the novel magnifies a section of the world; it wrests it
from its usual context so that it might be seen afresh and named. The novel strives
to recover the world. Later in the story, when Barrett is on the road with Jamie,
Kitty’s sixteen-year-old brother who is dying, he observes a m an on a "fifty-foot
Chris-Craft beat up the windy Intercoastal." He calls Jamie over to see what he
sees in the telescope:
"Look how he pops his jaw and crosses his legs with the crease o f his
britches pulled out of the way."
"Yes," said Jamie, registering and savoring what the engineer
registered and savored. Yes, you and I know something the man in the
Chris-Craft will never know. (130-1, Percy’s emphasis)
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Jamie and Will meet in what they see through the telescope in the same fashion as
reader and writer meet in the reading of a novel. We know more about Will
Barrett than Will knows about himself. The novel establishes an intersubjective
community between reader and writer in its very naming. And since a name is also
a sign, the novel also resists closure or stasis.
It is significant, then, that Barrett’s ostensible use for the telescope, to
photograph the peregrine falcon, fails. Made versatile by the addition of the
camera, the telescope promises not only to magnify the falcon but also to stabilize
it, to close it within the rigid boundaries of a photograph. T hat Barrett does not
capture the falcon on film both foreshadows his coming peregrinations and points
to the limits of the novel itself. Like the falcon, Barrett is himself a sign of
instability. Just as the falcon has "abandoned its natural home in the northern
wilderness and taken up residence on top of the hotel," so Barrett has left the
south and taken up residence in the New York City YMCA. Neither remains,
however. The "peregrine did not return to his perch" (12), and Barrett soon begins
his travels, which end in the "no-place" o f the desert. Just as the telescope
sees—but cannot place—the falcon, so the novel names—but does not
place—Barrett. Both are wanderers, pilgrims without a home, displaced. The
names they are given place them "nowhere."40
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But if the ostensible purpose for Barrett’s using his telescope fails, the
manifest purpose does not. The telescope, again like the novel, serves its
voyeuristic function well. It observes without being observed. It amplifies
unobtrusively.41 At one point, Barrett declares his appreciation of English
detective stories, "especially the sort which . . . depict the hero as perfectly
disguised or perfectly hidden. . . . Englishmen like to see without being seen." The
telescope is the novelist’s tool par excellence. If neither the novel nor the telescope
can place their respective pilgrims from their concealed viewpoints, then both can
at least help to name this same predicament. W hat the telescope does observe, and
what the novel ultimately points to as well, is precisely what Barrett sees when he
takes his one last look: ". . . parley fails."
This rich, polyvalent fragment would deserve little consideration were it not
in a novel by Percy, and at the all-important beginning.42 Parley derives from the
French parler

the ecclesiastical Latin parabolare, both meaning "to speak."

Parabolare, in turn, derives from the Latin parabola, a speech, from which we get
the word parable. In English, parley can be used either as a verb, "to have a
conference or discussion," or as a noun, "a talk or conference for the purpose of
discussing a specific matter."43 Percy is especially sly in his use o f the term, for
the fragment remains so open that it encompasses both the etymological and the
usage definitions.
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Since the word appears as a part of a tabloid headline, it apparently refers
to a meeting or conference. The time of the novel is never precisely set. There is a
mention o f John Kennedy’s death, and one scene refers indirectly to the riots that
occurred at the University of Mississippi after desegregation. So the time would
appear to be the early 1960’s. The fragment, then, could refer to any num ber of
failed parleys that undoubtedly took place during that era: about the mounting
Cold W ar, about the riots themselves, about the escalation of the United States’
involvement in the Vietnam conflict, anything.
Given Percy’s interest in the language phenomenon, however, a more
fruitful reading arises from evidence inside the novel itself and from his comments
in the "Primer" about the devolution of the sign and placement. W hat we learn as

The Last Gentleman progresses is that Will Barrett finds himself in the midst o f a
number of failed parleys, in every sense of the word. Will’s thwarted relationship
with Kitty, their aborted attempts at love-making (a connotative meaning of
parley), Will’s relation to Dr. Gamow (his psychoanalyst), the relationship
between Kitty and Rita Vaught (Kitty’s overseer and general "helper" who
displays ambiguous sexual intentions), between Rita and Sutter Vaught (R ita’s exhusband, a failed doctor turned pornographer), between Will and Sutter, between
Sutter and Val Vaught (a nun who works with the rural Tyree people), between
Will and his father, and even the picaresque adventures of Will with Forney Aiken
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and company, with the ladies on the highway, and with the black bar-owner and
the white policemen in his hometown—all suggest the centrality of t p-1 his tabloid
fragment. These relationships display the failure of speaking. W ords are
bankrupt. The one notable exception to this general collapse is the relationship
between Jamie and Will, whose co-celebration of what is develops in light o f their
complementarity: "Jamie read books of great abstractness . . . . The engineer, on
the other hand, read books of great particularity" (130).
Meanwhile, this breakdown of words has to do with the devolution o f the
sign. When the signified becomes entombed by the signifier and when the
repetitive posture of primordial sign-use is lost, intersubjectivity in consciousness
also wanes. In other words, when speaking fails, love fails. The problem is not
that the characters do not try to speak. On the contrary, words flow freely
between them. It is the peculiar posture from which they speak that concerns
Percy. Since he explores the conditions that accompany the end of the modern
world, he also examines the causes and effects of the breakdown of language. In
the words of the epigram:
. . . We know now that the modern world is coming to an end
. . . at the same time, the unbeliever will emerge from the fogs
of secularism. He will cease to reap benefit from the values
and forces developed by the very Revelation he denies . . .
Loneliness in faith will be terrible. Love will disappear from
the face of the public world, but the more precious will be
that love which flows from one lonely person to another. . .

Ill
the world to come will be filled with animosity and danger,
but it will be a world open and clean.44
The posture that creates the condition for the failure of words, love, and faith
evolves from an imbalance o f immanence and transcendence. For Percy, the
postmodern world bears witness to transcendence or immanence taken separately,
or it evinces some strange hybrid of the two, but it has lost any sense of organic
unity between them. With such a radical disjunction, Percy suggests, it is
inevitable that parleys often fail.
Rita, for example, illustrates one facet of this extensive bankruptcy. Since
she blends immanence and transcendence from a transcendent posture, she
embodies an Hegelian, scientific-humanist attitude. Her "mode of reentry"
consists of a general beneficence which masks an essential isolation. Kitty is onto
her—"I knew exactly how to make her like me!" (96)—although she remains awed
by her:
Rita is a remarkable person . . . . She showed me something I
never dreamed existed. Two things. First, the way she
devoted herself to the Indians. I never saw anything like it.
They adored her. I saw one child’s father try to kneel and
kiss her foot. Then she showed me how a thing can be
beautiful. She kept Shakespeare’s sonnets by her bed. And
she actually read them. Listen to this, she would say, and she
would read it. And I could hear it the way she heard it! Bare
ruin’d choirs, where late the sweet birds sang. Poetry: who’d
have thought it? We went for walks. I listened to her but
then (is this bad?) I began to see how much she was enjoying
teaching me. (96)
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Percy seems to have endowed Rita with a part of his adoptive father’s
character. Although she does not portray the stoical melancholia o f William
Alexander Percy—this facet of his character is given to Will’s father, as I will
discuss below—it is significant that Kitty’s description of her parallels Percy’s own
comments about "Uncle Will." In the introduction to Lanterns on the Levee,
Percy tells of the way Will Percy used to read to him or play music for him. He
began, he says, to see things the way his teacher saw them: "The teacher points
and says Look, the response is Yes, /see."45 He also calls Will Percy "the most
extraordinary man I have ever known" (xviii).
Like Will Percy’s beneficence toward the blacks in the Delta, R ita’s work
with the Indians is indeed generous. It evolves from the stoic’s attitude of noblesse

oblige, something which Walker addresses in "Stoicism in the South." The stoic’s
attitude, Percy argues, essentially isolates him. His "generosity" masks the
sentiment that doing others "an injustice would be to defile the inner fortress
which [is] oneself." One cares for others not because they are individuals but
because not caring for them would wound "the wintry kingdom self."46 The
stoic’s end is a solipsism which seeks to protect the self from the vicissitudes of
history. R ita’s name for the camper in which Jamie and Will
travel—"Ulysses"47—and her comment on that name point to her transcendent
posture: "He was meant to travel beyond the borders of the Western world and
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bring us home" (82). As for Will Percy, so for Rita: intersubjectivity fails, and the
world slips away.48
Sutter exemplifies a different permutation of the insolvency of words. As a
physician, he participates in the transcendent scientific community. He has even
published a paper, an act which confirms his initiation into that sovereign
society.49 The title of the essay points to his own predicament with placement on
the immanent-transcendent continuum: The Incidence o f Post-orgasmic Suicide in

Male University Graduate Students. The paper itself is divided into two sections
with subtitles: "Genital Sexuality as the Sole Surviving Communication Channel
between Transcending-Immanent Subjects," and "The Failure of Coitus as a Mode
o f Reentry into the Sphere o f Immanence from the Sphere of Transcendence" (See

LG 5 8).
Sutter has recognized the radical bifurcation that has occurred in the wake
o f the failure of words, and he exists as its most poignant exemplar. Percy argues
in Lost in the Cosmos that a corollary of such a collapse is the ascendence of sex in
various forms. When signs devolve, when the transcendence that sign-use provides
falters, the only avenues to transcendence become sex and violence. It is notable
that almost every failed parley cited above (pp. 109-10) involves a correlate to sex.
The exceptions, the scene at the hometown bar and Will’s relationship with his
father, which ends in his father’s suicide, find their correlate in violence. Yet, an
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element of sex, too, exists in the story of Mr. Barrett’s suicide. On the night of his
death, he denounces the fact that his "class" had become "the fornicators and
bribers" (258) they once opposed, and he leaves Will confused on the business of
lady and whore (144). In The Second Coming, Percy unites sex and violence more
trenchantly in Barrett’s reflections on his father’s suicide, indicating perhaps a
confirmation of his own theories and a breakthrough to understanding his own
father’s death.50
Sutter becomes a pornographer because he is trapped in the transcendence
of his science. He seeks reentry to the immanent realm by means of what he sees
as the purely immanent, sex. Thus, he manifests a strange hybrid of the
immanent-transcendent dialectic, an angelism-bestialism that Percy will develop
more fully in Love in the Ruins. Yet, Sutter despairs in his Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde existence. When this mode of reentry fails him, he considers violence. He
contemplates suicide.
It is useful to point out again that Percy explores the postmodern
predicament with regard to place. The Last Gentleman evolves not so much as a
jeremiad, although its tone in parts can be seen as cantankerous, but as a search
for possibilities. For Percy, a pilgrim finds his end only at the end of his life. That
some characters reach a dead end suggests either that they have quit their search
for new prospects or that the logical conclusion o f the postures they embrace bears

115
witness to death-in-life. Alienation and homelessness are natural states, not
psychological disorders. Although an adept satirist, Percy does not condemn
characters who try to find a home, not even Lancelot Lamar. Rather, as Louis
Rubin has argued, he writes o f them from the standpoint of having been there
himself:
Walker’s [fiction] is not Jansenist; it is not written from a
position of theological privilege located far above the
struggle, judging the poor deluded sinners and consigning
them to the fire . . . . [He] includes himself among the
sinful.51
The posture that remains m ost open to possibility is that of the pilgrim, one who is
at home in homelessness, such as the addled wayfarer of The Last Gentleman.
Will Barrett not only drifts into one failed parley after another, but finds
himself, quite literally, in the middle of them. Perhaps the first indication o f this
middle state manifests itself with Dr. Gamow’s "ambiguous chair":
[Dr. Gamow] learned a great deal about a patient from the
way he sat in the chair. Some would walk in and sit straight
up, swivel around to face the doctor across the desk like a
client consulting a lawyer. Others would stretch out and
swivel away to face the corner in conventional analytic style.
It was characteristic of the engineer that he sat in the
ambiguous chair ambiguously: leaving it just as it was,
neither up nor down, neither quite facing Dr. Gamow nor
facing away. (32)
Neither new-style client (a la Carl Rogers) nor old-style analysand, Barrett resists
formulation. That he abruptly terminates his analysis suggests the limits o f the

116
psychoanalytic process, about which Percy has written cogently elsewhere.

52

Although he tells himself that he will "engineer the future of [his] life according to
the scientific principles and the self-knowledge [he has] so arduously gained from
five years of analysis" (39), the narrator’s very tone betrays him. The "scientific
principles" of analysis cannot fathom this pilgrim’s alienation.
But the "ambiguous chair" is only one of many examples o f Will’s "being
between." After he declares his love for Kitty and wins the affection of Jamie, he
steps between almost all of the established relationships in the Vaught family.
Rita considers him a rival to the attentions of Kitty and so devises a plan that
would allow him to travel with Jamie. Unknown to Will, R ita’s interests focus on
separating the new lovers. But Pappy (Mr. Vaught) has already proposed a plan
to Will, and so Will finds himself between both Kitty and Rita and between the
wishes of Pappy and Rita. Sutter, who wants to take Jamie to die in the desert of
Santa Fe and who represents something of a father-figure to Will, has no use
either for serving as Will’s guide or for his sister’s (Val’s) desire to see Jamie
baptized. Val, however, has charged Barrett with that very task. Will, then, is
placed between Sutter’s nihilism and Val’s faith.
Will is also caught between the present and his past. Because he is subject
to amnesia, fugues, and deja vus, he is disoriented in time. He often forgets, but
when he does remember, he recalls "the remote past first" (51), often unwittingly.
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Time and again, he experiences unannounced intrusions of the past into his
present consciousness. In a way, Will serves as his own analyst. He doesn’t
necessarily "engineer" his life, but he endeavors to be what Dr. Gamow tried to be
to him: "it was easy to believe t h a t . . . he served his patients best as artificer and
shaper, receiving the raw stuff of their misery and handing it back in a public and
acceptable form" (35). The reference to Wallace Steven’s idea o f shaping and
making complements an earlier reference to Freud:
A German physician once remarked that in the lives of
people who suffer emotional illness he had noticed the
presence of Liicken or gaps. As he studied the history o f a
particular patient he found whole sections missing, like a
book with blank pages. (18)
Although Freud was Austrian, the allusion seems fairly clear.53 The psychiatrist
fills in the gaps, gives shape to the "raw material" that is a person’s life, as Freud
did in his case histories. The psychiatrist, in other words, fashions the story (the

parabola) of the patient. He writes the patient’s life.
The danger of such a role—a reason this parley may fail—resides in the fact
that a patient may lose sovereignty over that same story. While analysis ostensibly
proposes a recovery of patients’ lost sovereignty, the process may result in their
further alienation. When the psychiatrist insists too strongly on filling in blank
pages, on fashioning a well-made story, the story may serve the wishes o f the
analyst himself rather than the needs of the patient. In the case of Dora, for
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example, Freud seems less concerned with Dora as an individual than with D ora
as an instance of his own theories. He masters her story.54
Commentators on Percy’s fiction often note the pleasure he takes in turning
Freud upside down. Percy himself once admitted that this was one of his narrative
strategies.55 T hat Percy writes the story of a character with severe gaps in his
memory suggests his attempt to endow Barrett with his own sovereignty. As his
experience with the "ambiguous chair" implies, Barrett is not made to fit any
theory which places the ideal before the actual. For Percy, such theories are
bankrupt: they lead only to romanticism and despair. Percy struggles against the
bankruptcy of words by telling a story whose words point to their own
inadequacy—Barrett himself is a romantic—yet which nevertheless provide the
only means by which to know anything at all. That Will Barrett quits analysis
even though he still suffers from gaps points to his inchoate sense o f the perils of
the analytic process.
At the same time, however, Will recognizes the necessity of fashioning a
story, and he looks to those who his "radar" tells him know better than he. Sutter
is such a person. Frustrated that Sutter won’t play analyst for him, Will reflects:
"Damnation, if I am such an old story to him, why doesn’t he tell me how the
story comes out?" (178) Sutter, however, recognizes that any attem pt to satisfy
this ubiquitous, although impossible, desire would serve only to alienate Barrett
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further. In his casebook, he carries on a dialogue with Val, whom he imagines
speaking to Will:
Look, Barrett, your trouble is due not to a disorder of your
organism but to the human condition, that you do well to be
afraid and you do well to forget everything which does not
pertain to your salvation. That is to say, your amnesia is not
a symptom. So you say: Here is the piece of news you have
been waiting for, and you tell him. W hat does Barrett do?
He attends in that eager flattering way of his and at the end
of it he might even say yes! But he will receive the news from
his high seat of transcendence as one more item of
psychology, throw it into his immanent meat-grinder, and
wait to see if he feels better. (276)56
Sutter leaves Will to his Liicken, and Barrett is left to piece together the story of
himself as he shuttles between the past and present.
One of the main gaps in Barrett’s story, of course, concerns his father’s
death. Fragments of the incident recur throughout the course of the narrative.
But once Sutter takes Jamie to Santa Fe, leaving Barrett to travel through the
South on his own, he is all the more haunted by deja vus and intrusions of his past.
When he arrives at his hometown, Ithaca, Mississippi, and when he finds himself
before his childhood home, the place of his father’s death, the story demands form
more insistently. Although his father has won a victory over the "bribers and
fornicators," all is not well. The boy and his father stroll outside in the night as
they listen to Brahms:
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As he turned to leave, the youth called out to him. "Wait."
"What?"
"Don’t leave."
"I’m just going to the corner."
But there was a dread about this night, the night of victory.
(Victory is the saddest thing of all, said the father.) The
mellowness of Brahms had gone overripe, the victorious
serenity of the Great Horn Theme was false, oh fake fake.
Underneath all was unwell. (259)
The elder Barrett ultimately states his philosophy of life: "In the last analysis you
are alone" (259). Although Will repeats his plea several times— Wait. D on’t

lea vei—his father nevertheless kills himself. But the story has finally taken shape
in his memory.
Some years later, as he stands at the place of this horrible memory, past
and present merge such that the future seems possible to him. His hand strays to
an old ironhorse hitching post around which an oak tree has grown. As he
reflects, Will briefly adopts a repetitive posture:

Wait. While his fingers explored the juncture of iron and
bark, his eyes narrowed as if he caught a glimmer o f light on
the cold iron skull. Wait. I think he was wrong and that he
was looking in the wrong place. No, not he but the times.
The times were wrong and one looked in the wrong place. It
wasn’t his fault because that was the way he was and the way
the times were, and there was no other place a man could
look. It was the worst of times, a time of fake beauty and
fake victory. Wait. He had missed it! It was not in the
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Brahms that one looked and not in solitariness and not in the
old sad poetry but—he wrung out his ear—but here, under
your nose, here in the very curiousness and drollness and
extraness of the iron and the bark that—he shook his
head—that— (260)
Louis D. Rubin, Jr., has written beautifully on the significance of this
superb passage. W hat Will realizes as his hand explores the "juncture of iron and
bark" is that "his father’s ideal of aristocratic virtue, however nobly motivated,
was actually a romantic escape from the compromised actuality of human life in
time."57 That Brahms is playing in the background only reinforces the elder
B arrett’s isolation. For the music sets up a romantic ideal o f perfection which in
its "massive harmonics pronounce[s] an ultimate resolution superior to merely
hum an difficulties and leaving no further occasion for striving or disruption"
(Rubin 211). The music, Rubin argues, sets up an ideal of perfection which
parallels the supposed ethical perfection of the Southern aristocrat. The victory
over the "rabble" and the music’s own victory are fake because each points to a
static perfection that annuls a "vital relationship with ongoing experience"—
change in time (Rubin 213). The era of the Southern aristocrat has waned, if there
ever was one; and, although Rubin does not make the connection, to try to hold
on to such standards reinforces what Kierkegaard calls the despair to will to be
oneself in despair.
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In a passage that closely parallels the plight of Mr. Barrett, Kierkegaard
writes:
In despair the self wants to enjoy the total satisfaction of
making itself into itself, of developing itself, of being itself; it
wants to have the honor of this poetic, masterly construction,
the way it has understood itself. And yet, in the final
analysis, what it understands by itself is a riddle; in the very
moment when it seems that the self is closest to having the
building completed, it can arbitrarily dissolve the whole thing
into nothing. (69-70)
Mr. Barrett, o f course, dissolves the edifice at the moment of both his and the
music’s victory.
His son, however, is still building his edifice, not a "poetic, masterly
construction," not a "well-made story" which has no gaps. Rather, from his being
between (inter esse) past and present, between the failed parleys o f the Vaught
family and, finally, between Father Boomer and Jamie at the story’s conclusion,
Barrett holds out, however unwittingly, for the possibility that "nowhere" might
provide. That Barrett ultimately "misses," as Percy says, the significance both of
Jamie’s baptism and of his experience in front of his father’s house does not
devalue the signs themselves. For in the telescope that is the novel, the reader sees
and knows something that Barrett himself does not. This parley does not fail.
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Irony, Repetition, and Criticism (Norman: U o f Oklahoma P, 1984): 183216. See also the editors’ introduction, "Writing W ithout Authority and
the Reading of Kierkegaard."

35.

"The Man on the Train," MB 97.

36.

Percy made this comment in a taped interview with Rebecca Presson ("New
Letters on the Air": University of Missouri at Kansas City, November
1989).

37.

The Last Gentleman (New York: Avon Books, 1978). All citations are
taken from this edition and will be given parenthetically in the text. In
"Narrative Triangulation in The Last Gentleman," Simone Vauthier points
out the exfoliation of names given to Will Barrett. See Panthea Reid
Broughton, ed., The A rt o f Walker Percy: Stratagems for Being, (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1979) 69-95.

38.

The Fiction o f Walker Percy, 59. In "Will Barrett Under the Telescope,"
The Southern Literary Journal 20 (1988): 16-41, Lewis Lawson shows
brilliantly that "the very centralness o f the place argues that it is the navel
of the world, the image of Paradise" (22), which does not entirely discount
H ardy’s view. For if Will is subject to "scientific romanticism" as Lawson
displays, then Paradise would be no place on Earth.
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39.

M artin Luschei emphasizes "ground zero" is his Chapter on The Last
Gentleman, "Ground Zero to Santa Fe," in The Sovereign Wayfarer (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1972): 111-168.

40.

As in T. S. Eliot’s Four Quartets, the play on "nowhere"/"now-here" is
intended. To be "now-here" is precisely the autobiographical and repetitive
stance. See Chapter One.

41.

Many critics and reviewers have remarked on the subtle beauty of Percy’s
prose. In a very short untitled review, to cite only one example, James
Dickey writes: "His power of phrase is breathtaking, and is the more so
because it is quiet," American Scholar 37 (1968): 524

42.

Percy toiled over all his works, but especially over the beginnings, as the
manuscripts at the SHC display.

43.

Etymology and definitions taken from Webster’s New World Dictionary,
1984.

44.

The epigram is from Romano Guardini’s The End o f the Modern World.

45.

(Louisiana State UP, 1973) xi.

46.

"Stoicism in the South," Signposts 85.

47.

It is interesting to note that Percy models the journey in The Last
Gentleman on that of The Iliad and The Odyssey. Will’s home, like that of
his classical predecessor, is Ithaca. In a paper delivered at a symposium,
"The Achievement of Walker Percy," sponsored by the University Press of
Mississippi, Lewis Lawson shows how women in The Moviegoer find
parallels in classical literature: "Walker Percy’s Novels: Paradise Lost,
Paradise Regained," delivered April 20, 1991. One wonders if Percy seeks
the same stability that Jeffrey M. Perl argues the Modernists found in their
return to the classics, The Tradition o f the Return (Princeton: Princeton
UP, 1984). William Spanos argues that Perl’s book domesticates the idea
of return, and so finds its source in an atemporal Hegelian dialectic,
Repetitions (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State UP, 1987): 261, note. In
another of his typically brilliant essays, "Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer.
Cinema as Cave," Lewis Lawson connects Plato’s cave allegory with both
Toynbee’s notion of "withdrawal and return" and with moviegoing. Since
Toynbee’s notion is based on a dispassionate Hegelian dialectic, it is similar
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to the idealist ascent of the allegory. In Plato’s story, Lawson writes, "only
the dutiful return [from their view of the ideal] to live among the wallwatchers, and they only to instruct. It is otherwise with the Percy
movement . . . . Unlike Plato’s movement, Percy’s does not culminate with
a communion that can be attained by the mastery of an abstract scheme.
An individual remains a moviegoer, or a wall-watcher, as long as he
distances himself from his ultimate world by the very way in which he looks
at it" (91-2). Lawson would seem to place Percy’s thought in league with
that of Spanos, although the latter would have no dealings with an
"ultimate world."
48.

Critics, of course, have noted Percy’s struggles with his adoptive father and
his attempts to work through them in his fiction. See, for example, Lewis
Lawson’s "Walker Percy’s Southern Stoic," and " The Moviegoer and the
Stoic Heritage" in Following Percy. See also William Rodney Allen’s
book, Walker Percy: A Southern Wayfarer (Jackson, UP o f Mississippi,
1986). Although she is trapped in her transcendent ethical code, and
although she embodies certain characteristics of Will Percy, W alker does
not provide Rita the central role he gives Barrett’s father or Aunt Emily of
The Moviegoer, who are more obvious incarnations o f Will Percy.

49.

The figures of speech are not inappropriate since Percy writes in the
"Primer" that "the scientist is the prince and sovereign of the age" ( L C
116).

50.

These are the older Barrett’s reflections in The Second Coming.
"In the case of love, more is better than less, two twice as good as one, and
most is best of all. And if the aim is the ecstasy of love, two is closer to
infinity than one, especially when the two are twelve-gauge Super-X
number-eight shot. And what samurai self-love of death, let alone the little
death of everyday fuck-you love, can match the double Winchester come of
taking oneself into oneself, the cold-steel extension of oneself into mouth,
yes, for you, for me, for us, the logical and ultimate act o f fuck-you love
fuck-off world, the penetration and union of perfect cold gunmetal into
warm quailing mortal flesh, the coming to end all coming, brain cells which
together faltered and fell short, now flowered and flew apart, flung like
stars around the whole dark world." (New York: Ivy Books, 1980) 136.
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J. Gerald Kennedy has written an excellent article on The Second Coming
which deals with Will’s unfolding memories about his father’s suicide, "The
Semiotics of Memory: Suicide in The Second Coming" Delta (Montpellier,
France), 13 (1981): 103-25.
51.

"Walker Percy: 1916-1990," Southern Literary Journal 23 (1990): 6. One of
Jay Tolson’s primary theses in his biography o f Percy is precisely this point,
that Percy’s fiction embodies the struggles he went through himself. This is
not a startling thesis—all writers transmute their struggles into their
works—but Tolson does well to show its efficacy with regard to Percy.

52.

See Percy’s "The Coming Crisis in Psychiatry," Signposts 251-62.

53.

See Lawson’s "Will Barrett Under the Telescope" 17.

54.

W hat I suggest here is similar to what James Olney has written about the
relationship between freed slaves and their abolitionist editors. In their
zeal, abolitionists often repressed the slaves’ stories; they "mastered" the
telling of their tales. See "’I Was Born’: Slave Narratives, Their Status as
Autobiography and as Literature," in The Slave’s Narrative, Charles Davis
and Henry Louis Gates, eds. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985): 148-75.

55.

John C. Carr, "An Interview with Walker Percy," in Con 68.

56.

Sutter’s comments about news parallel the title essay of The Message in the
Bottle in which Percy develops his distinction between knowledge and
news.

57.

"The Boll Weevil, the Iron Horse, and the End of the Line." In A Gallery o f
Southerners (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1982) 210. Future
citations will be made parenthetically in the text. Linda Whitney Hobson
has also written on this passage: "’Watching, Listening and W aiting’: The
Mode of the Seeker in Walker Percy’s Fiction," The Southern Literary
Journal20 (1988): 43-50.

58.

See The Sickness unto Death, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds),
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980) 67ff.

Chapter Three
Repetition and Bios:
Surviving Life in a Century of
Gnosticism and Death
"When 'socialist m an’ speaks, man
has to be silent."
—Eric Voegelin
"Let me recite what history teaches,
history teaches."
—Gertrude Stein

In the Flora Levy Lecture he delivered in the Spring of 1991, Lewis
Simpson recalled his burgeoning relationship with Walker Percy.1 Built largely
on an exchange of letters in which Simpson solicited contributions for The

Southern Review, their association was, as Simpson characterized it,
"professional." Yet they sometimes exchanged personal notes as well. Percy once
responded to Simpson’s "note of congratulations on his seventieth birthday" with
the following:
I’ve got news for you. It’s not all bad being in your
71st year. So you young fellows can relax.
As a m atter of fact, I feel it’s a gift, a free ride.
Nobody in my family ever lived so long. W hat it [takes] is
Early Times and clean living.
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Simpson himself entered his seventy-first year less than two months later. He
notes, however, that there was more of "generational concord between W alker and
me than the coincidental proximity o f our birthdays." He and Percy shared the
"drama o f a generational sensibility." Based on an early exposure "to the density
o f the modern European literary mind" as it developed after the catastrophe o f the
first world war and the period between the world wars, they both participated in a
"generational cultural dialectic" which held forth the possibility o f either
apocalyptic "doom" or a "recovery of memory and history."
Having experienced this dialectic in their reading, both men express it also
in their writing. In The Dispossessed Garden, for example, Simpson cogently
explores the possibility for the recovery of memory and history in the face of
m odernity.2 And in his works, Percy strives to retain the unity of the dialectic.
F o r him, apocalypse implies recovery. Destruction opens the possibility for
renewal: "The prospect [of the ultimate catastrophe] gets one’s attention . . . . If
the Bomb is going to fall any minute, all things become possible, even love."3
Percy’s comments reiterate what he writes in "The Loss of the Creature."
In this essay, he contends that science and romanticism have so entombed the
"creature" in theory—a pre-packaged IT—that it takes the destruction o f everyday
contexts to recover the actual. Thus, the "savage" in Huxley’s Brave New World
stands in an ideal posture for recovery: "[When he] stumbles across a volume of
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Shakespeare in some vine-grown ruins and squats on a potsherd to read it, [he] is
in a fairer way o f getting at a sonnet than the Harvard sophomore taking English
Poetry II" {MB 56). The ruins allow a recovery o f what everyday contexts too
often foreclose.4
When Percy tells Simpson that he feels his seventy-first year is a "free ride,"
that "nobody in my family ever lived so long," he seems to evince a blend of doom
and recovery, or at least of ruefulness and celebration. On the one hand, he exults
in the very possibility of joking about his age. Yet, his exultation is darkened by a
shadow o f regret. He seems to brood over the very necessity of surviving in this
era, something that many of his progenitors, most notably his father, could not
do. As Jay Tolson’s biography makes clear, Percy had good reason for both
sentiments.5 A scion of the Percy line, he inherited a proclivity toward
melancholia, depression, and suicide. As a son o f the South, he struggled against a
romantic tradition that placed the ideal before the real. Tolson shows how Percy
watched his father try—and ultimately fail—to live up to the Southern code of
honor, loyalty, and nobility. He likewise reveals the despair that characterized his
adoptive father’s assessment of the twentieth century, an evaluation that itself
denied the possibility of change in time.6 Percy celebrates his seventy-first year
because he has overcome both the southern code and his family. He holds to a
view of himself as a "pilgrim in the ruins," a seeker of the possibility of recovery
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amidst the "catastrophe" and "doom" of the twentieth century. He is a survivor of
what he often called this "century of death."7
I have already tried to show how Percy’s characterization of the age holds
true with regard to its exaltation of science. As a result of the misapprehension of
the scientific method,
[creatures] are rendered invisible by a shift of reality from
concrete thing to theory which Whitehead has called the
fallacy of misplaced concreteness. It is the mistaking o f an
idea, a principle, an abstraction, for the real. As a
consequence, the "specimen" is seen as less real than the
theory of the specimen. {MB 58)
This "loss of the creature" characterizes the "malaise" of the age. In The

Moviegoer; Binx Bolling defines malaise in these same terms. It is "the pain of
loss. The world is lost to you, the world and the people in it, and there remains
only you and the world and you no more able to be in the world than Banquo’s
ghost" (106). Part of this loss, another facet o f the dis-ease of the twentieth
century, can be related to the resurgence of gnostic thought, a stepbrother to the
deification of science, and a stance against which Percy’s works, as autobiography,
struggle. F or if autobiography displays the repetitive movement which brings one
into a relation of interest in time, then it moves away from an atemporal and
otherworldly gnostic purity and into the vicissitudes o f history.
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W ith characteristic lucidity, Cleanth Brooks and Lewis Lawson have
already pointed out how gnosticism finds a place in Percy’s fiction, especially in

Lancelot. I hope to show that Percy’s entire corpus, fiction and essays, counters
a gnostic attitude, especially as it manifests itself in the angelism/bestialism of the
W eimar Republic and the Nazi Holocaust. Before I can do this, however, the term
itself demands some stability. For gnosticism, like repetition and autobiography,
defies facile definition. Christopher Lasch, for example, has written that
gnosticism "remains an elusive thing," a "hydra-headed" movement difficult to
define. The scholarly attempt to delimit it, he argues, leads only to a "proliferation
o f definitions" which grows out of a more fundamental "controversy about its
origins."9 In a thorough and illuminating article, Henri-Charles Puech likewise
points to the difficulty of arriving at a stable view of gnosticism, and he
acknowledges that part of its elusiveness results from a confusion about its roots.
Puech shows that although it was long considered solely as a Christian
heresy, gnosticism "came to be understood as a determinate genus, widely
distributed in both space and time, of which heretical Christian Gnosis represented
only a particular species."'0 For Puech, "determinate genus" refers not to a single
expression of gnostic thought; rather, it provides a "category of philosophicoreligious thought" for understanding the multiplicity of expressions or "styles"
which can be subsumed under the name "gnostic" (55). Although broad and
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diverse in its manifestations, gnosticism nevertheless exhibits a common "attitude,"
itself difficult to define:
If it were possible to [define it] in a few words, we should say
that Gnosis (from the Greek word gnosis, "knowledge") is an
absolute knowledge which in itself saves, or that Gnosticism
is the theory that salvation is obtained by knowledge. But
this definition, true and central as it may be, remains
inadequate. (55)
Puech, therefore, approaches an understanding of this attitude through an
exploration of the gnostic’s stance toward time, a strategy that also proves useful
for comprehending Percy’s relation to this enduring mode of thought.
Puech argues that a gnostic view of time remains distinct from that of both
Hellenism and Christianity. For the Greeks, as I discussed in Chapter One, time
was conceived "above all as cyclical or circular, returning perpetually upon itself,
self-enclosed" (39-40). Because of this emphasis on eternal return, the Greeks
developed two sentiments toward time: they either admired the beauty and order
o f the cosmos, in which everything finds it place, or they grew weary of the
"monotonous [and] crushing" repetition (45). This latter view is, o f course, the
sentiment of the Stoa.
But the stress on the eternal return had another effect as well. History
manifested little interest for the Greeks. They were unconcerned with the
particular and singular. It is the immutable world of form, the general or the
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ideal, that concerns them. Although continuity exists between the particular and
the general—the former participates in the latter and thus establishes a relation
between the temporal and the atemporal orders—the particular carries little
significance in itself. Furthermore, because a circle is without beginning, middle,
or end—and because any point on a circle can be taken indifferently as beginning,
middle, or end—the Greeks possess no "central reference point by which to define
and orient a historical past and future" (43). Events in time, then, eternally repeat
a cosmic pattern which itself elicits awe or boredom, two sentiments Kierkegaard
would later pronounce subsumable under his aesthetic category.
If the Greeks placed little value on events in time, then Christianity founds
itself on a unique historical event. Time is not cyclical; rather, it is linear, "finite at
its two extremities, having a beginning and an absolute end" (46). Events in time
do not eternally recur. They are irreversible. As a result, life in time becomes full
of significance. An individual’s passage through time bears the utmost meaning.
The past is gathered up into the present and both point to a fixed end in the future.
The future, in turn, gives direction to the past: "Whether near or far, the
eschatological end orients the past toward the future and binds the two together in
such a way as to make the unilateral direction of time a certainty" (51-2). In other
words, the end gives shape, direction, and meaning to the beginning—the
beginning finds its source in the end—and the end is prefigured in the beginning.
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Unlike the Greek notion of time, the Christian view posits a beginning and end
that are both distinct and united. At opposite poles of the line, the beginning and
the end are wholly separate yet wholly connected by the line itself, which is
history.11 Christians await the end of time to discover meaning, yet, even as they
wait, they draw meaning from the end to determine present action. They stand
between what already fills time, but what has not yet reached the fullness to come.
The parallels between primitive Christianity’s view of time and Kierkegaard’s
category of repetition seem clear. Both acknowledge inter esse as the genuine
hum an placement.
The gnostic attitude toward time is neither historical nor cosmic, neither a
straight line nor a circle. Instead, Puech argues, it is best viewed as a "broken line"
(40). Whereas Hellenism proffers a continuity between the temporal and the
atemporal, and Christianity posits a movement in and toward fullness, gnosticism
proposes a radical bifurcation between the temporal and the atemporal, between
fullness and history. The gnostic view is primarily dualistic. Because time
partakes of the material and visible world, and because this world was created by a
"feeble, narrow-minded if not ignorant" god (59), it has no relation to the invisible
and spiritual domain which is truth.12 The Greek either stands in awe o f time or
grows weary of it, and the Christian waits in eager anticipation, but the gnostic
"condemns, rejects, [and] rebels" (60). Time is, "in the last analysis, a lie" (61).
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Puech notes that in one gnostic system
time was born from the hysterema, a defectus or defectio, a
labes—a deficiency, error, or fault—from the collapse and
dispersion in the void . . . of a reality which had previously
existed one and integral, within the pleroma, [the original
fullness]. (66)
T hat hysterema and labes derive from the same words that describe organs of the
female reproductive system indicates the radical and generative evil that pervades
the sexual act for some gnostics (others were extremely licentious), an act which
only continues our defective, evil life in time.13 The perpetual cycle of a
generation which is a degeneration (a creation which is a fall, or a birth-into-death
and a death-in-life) is recapitulated in even the smallest unit of time. Each
moment "arises only to be engulfed in the next moment, in which all things appear,
disappear, and reappear in a twinkling" (66). Time is hell, the region where one’s
"capacity for seeing and hearing is ‘narrow,’ limited to what is purely actual and
close at hand" (66).
Given such a view of time, its extreme dualism and its preoccupation with
evil, it is no wonder that gnosticism proposes an atemporal salvation. Salvation,
in fact, liberates the gnostic from time. It sets free the "spiritual" or "perfect" man
from the bonds of time. Instead of displaying the fullness of time, salvation
"shatters time" and "destroy[s] the world" (70).14 The gnostic seeks a return to a
lost home, a perfect realm beyond or before the world in which "his substance was
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pure of all mixture or adulteration" (73). Gnosis provides the vehicle for such
liberation.
For the "perfect man" entombed in defective matter, gnosis provides an
"absolute Truth, a total Knowledge, in which all the riddles raised by the existence
o f evil are solved" (73). Through this exhaustive knowledge, the gnostic answers
the triple question: "Who am I and where am I? Whence have I come and why
have I come hither? Whither am I going?" (Theodotus, qtd. by Puech 73-4). W hat
begins as a knowledge for freeing the spiritual self enchained in deficient time ends
in a totalized "mythological" knowledge. Gnosis not only yields the answers to the
individual’s origins and destiny, but it provides an atemporal
knowledge of the whole universe, visible and invisible, o f the
structure and development o f the divine as well as the
physical world. Some of the Gnostics actually call it a total
"science"—in the positive sense of the word— . . . an
exhaustive and purely rational explanation of all things. (75)
Through gnosis, the gnostic enters into an elite group, either "a class o f gnostikoi,
‘knowers,’ or of pneunmtikoi, ‘spiritual men’" (54). He thus surpasses time and
reenters his "primitive, permanent state" in the total and closed "articulated
atemporality" which gnosis supplies (76, 84).15
This "articulated atemporality" provided by the "science" o f gnosis sounds
very similar to Percy’s reflections on "theory." The passage I cited above from
"The Loss of the Creature," for example, corresponds precisely with the totalized,
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atemporal gnosis Puech describes. Like the gnostics, modern western civilization
turns to "positive science" for knowledge of the self and the world. While the
western world heralds the "sacredness and dignity of the individual," its "idolatry"
o f science nevertheless fosters a posture which devalues both the world and the
individual creatures in it. A scientific attitude precludes the possibility o f "seeing"
a single entity because it places theory before it. In a "theorist-consumer" age,
another variant of Percy’s transcendent-immanent dialectic, neither theorist nor
consumer concerns himself with individuals:16
The scientific method is correct as far as it goes, but the
theoretical mindset, which assigns significance to single
things and events only insofar as they are exemplars of
theory or items for consumption, is in fact an inflation of a
method of knowing to a totalitarian worldview and is
unwarranted. (Crisis 18)
The world is quite literally lost in theory. Because it is more tractable than life in
time, theory supplants that life with its own "articulated atemporality." Time is
nullified, and the world is surpassed in the transcendence of the scientific posture.
Furthermore, Percy argues that this "loss of the creature" sets up a radical
dualism between experts and consumers. Experts know and plan, while consumers
need and experience. The consumer’s most exalted moment, itself desperate,
comes when he wholly matches his very self to the expert’s theory:
There is the neurotic who asks nothing more o f his doctor
than that his symptom should prove interesting. W hen all
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else fails, the poor fellow has nothing to offer but his own
neurosis. But even this is sufficient if only the doctor will
show interest when he says, "Last night I had a curious sort
of dream; perhaps it will be significant to one who knows
about such things. It seems I was standing in a sort of
alley—" (I have nothing else to offer you but my own
unhappiness. Please say that it, at least, measures up, that it
is a proper sort of unhappiness.) (MB 56)
Such a posture suggests, paradoxically, that the "true" self o f the consumer has
nothing to do with time and matter. I say paradoxically because, by definition, the
consumer partakes of the world’s goods. But the consumer’s surrender to the
expert suggests that the true self is located somewhere outside the world and time,
i.e., in the theory that the expert holds. Seeing itself as deficient, the material self
of the consumer flees to its "true," theoretical self in the hope o f gaining approval
from the ones who presumably know all about him, the gnostikoi.
This reading of Percy’s essay gains more credibility when placed in the
context of Harold Bloom’s understanding o f gnosis. Bloom likens gnosticism to
an information theory:
M atter and energy are rejected, or at least placed under the
sign of negation. Information becomes the enabler of
salvation; the false Creation-Fall concerned m atter and
energy, but the Pleroma, or Fullness, the original Abyss, is all
information. (30)
Consumers, then, place themselves in the hands of those who have information,
high-priests o f the pleroma. Salvation will be theirs if they can but educate
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themselves, make "informed choices," and so participate in the elite club of
knowers. Percy’s diagram of the "lay reader of Freud" in "A Semiotic Primer of
the Self' closely parallels Bloom’s view of gnosticism (see L C 118). The lay reader
leaves the world to enter Freud’s orbit. But while Freud managed to m aintain a
more or less steady orbit, the lay reader cannot sustain his transcendence and so
suffers from a "decayed orbit." The lay reader makes only a temporary entrance
into the fullness of information; he is obliged to reenter the world. As a supreme
knower, Freud was not so obliged.
It should also be noted that the extreme dualistic posture of the gnostics
reflects the Cartesian dualism that Percy once identified as "responsible for all our
evils" (Con 247). In the Jefferson Lecture of 1989, his final public lecture, Percy
chides the humanistic sciences for ignoring the bifurcation set up in their own
methods. Much of this lecture concerns itself with the chasm between "mind" and
"matter" (Descartes’ res cogitans and res extensa). Percy argues that such a rift "is
not in principle closable—that is, not by the present regnant principles" of the
sciences as they are now practiced (Signposts 274). Percy himself does not make
the connection between Cartesian and gnostic thought, but the parallels seem
nevertheless evident. Mind (the transcendent sphere) is enchained in m atter (the
immanent sphere) from which it either continually struggles to flee or in which it
becomes totally absorbed and thus forgets any possibility of transcendence. The
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"fateful rift," which forms the "San Andreas Fault in the M odern Mind," m irrors
not only the "three-hundred-year-old dualism" that began with Descartes

{Signposts 274), but also the gnostic attitude that has persisted since ancient times
and which now pervades our modern era, thanks, in large part, to Descartes.17
While I will explore the relation between gnosis and Percy’s work in more
detail below, especially with regard to a "method of knowing" which is inflated "to
a totalitarian worldview," I want first to examine briefly some aspects o f the
primitive gnostic attitude that have been transformed in the modern era. F or this
task, I turn to not just to Harold Bloom but to Eric Voegelin as well, both of
whom complement Puech’s lucid reflections.18 It should be noted from the
outset, however, that Voegelin and Bloom adopt different attitudes in their
analyses. Whereas Voegelin regrets and cautions against the pervasive gnosticism
o f modern culture, a stance similar to Percy’s, Bloom neither castigates nor
celebrates it.
A self-proclaimed "Gnostic Jew," Bloom looks for the "irreducibly
religious" element in experience—be it of "‘the divine’ or ‘the transcendental’ or
simply ‘the spiritual’" (28)—and he argues convincingly that, in America, that
element is essentially gnostic.19 Bloom goes on to say that "the most Gnostic
element in the American Religion is an astonishing reversal of ancient gnosticism:
we worship the Demiurge as God. . . . As for the alien God of the Gnostics, he has
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vanished" (32). In primitive gnostic systems, the Demiurge was the creator of the
material world, the "ignoramus" who, far removed from the true, totally other
God, established the cosmos and time. That this lesser god now receives our
veneration signals a movement away from the absolute transcendence o f primitive
gnosticism. The gnostic still flees time and the world, but he flies not so much into
the primordial Abyss of the alien God as into the isolated self: "The American
finds G od in herself or himself, but only after finding the freedom to know G od by
experiencing a total inward solitude" (32). The self thus sealed within itself tries to
escape the contamination of time.20
Voegelin points to another reversal that manifests itself in the modern
gnostic attitude. While he argues that the essential thrust of the m odern gnostic
impulse retains its emphasis on salvation through knowledge, he suggests a new
development in the gnostic’s attitude toward the world. Like Bloom, Voegelin
notes a "recession from transcendence":
Gnostic speculation overcame the uncertainty of faith by
receding from transcendence and endowing man and his
intramundane range of action with the meaning o f eschatological fulfillment. In the measure in which this
immanentization progressed experientially, civilizational
activity became a mystical work of self-salvation. The
spiritual strength o f the soul which in Christianity was
devoted to the sanctification of life could now be diverted
into the more appealing, more tangible, and above all, much
easier creation of the terrestrial paradise. {New Science 129)
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F o r Voegelin, modern manifestations of gnosis do not disentangle one from a
defective world; instead, they are applied to this world in the hopes of correcting it.
Thus, Voegelin does not explore so much the gnostic self as he does the collective
nature of modern gnosticism and its attempt to create a terrestrial paradise. Like
Bloom, Voegelin suggests that western civilization has forgotten the alien G od and
worships the Demiurge. Salvation occurs in a perfected time. However, the evil
that the primitive gnostic saw as inevitably bound to the material world is now
considered remediable through collective civilizational activity in time. Bloom
presents the vital expressions of this transformation, but Voegelin displays the
m orbid ones. For Voegelin, as for Percy, a collective activity based on gnosis
leads to a "totalitarian worldview" which stands as a corrective to the "impurities"
o f life. Attempts to create such a total vision lead to the annihilation of those who
cannot be subsumed by the vision. In the twentieth century, of course, the overt
impulse to create a society based on gnosis found its most obvious manifestation
in Nazi Germany.
Like Voegelin, Percy cautions against such an unrestrained gnosis. Yet,
like Bloom, he contends that it is all we have. But whereas Bloom asks us simply
to "face the fact" that we are gnostics, Percy looks for another possibility.21 He
offers no programmatic anodyne for an escape from our gnostic flight. Programs
are often themselves part of the problem. Instead, he diagnoses and names the
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predicament. It is significant that "diagnose" (from dia, "through, between" and

gignoskein, "to know") itself contains the root form of gnosis.22 The word itself,
then, points to Percy’s (and Bloom’s) contention that one must begin where we
are—in the midst of a gnostic society. However, while Bloom suggests that we
look for salvation through atemporal knowledge, Percy argues that the road to
salvation lies between knowledge and time. The category of "news," as Percy
develops it in the "The Message in the Bottle," displays this state of "being
between," the inter esse of repetition.
In this "parable" about islands and castaways, Percy develops a distinction
between "news" and "knowledge." He defines a "piece o f knowledge" as
"knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, . . . [which means a] knowledge which can be
arrived at anywhere by anyone and at any time" (MB 125). It derives from the
objective-empirical, scientific posture which for Percy, following Kierkegaard, falls
into the aesthetic sphere. Indifferent to time and place, pieces o f knowledge are
subject to verification and confirmation by anyone, on any island: "Water boils at
100 degrees at sea level"; "Being comprises essence and existence." A piece of
news, on the other hand, "expressfes] a contingent and nonrecurring event or state
o f affairs which event or state of affairs is peculiarly relevant to the concrete
predicament of the hearer of the news" (MB 126). Although a type of knowledge,
news "cannot possibly be arrived at by any effort of experimentation or reflection
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or artistic insight" (MB 126). Instead, news is "strictly relevant to the predicament
in which the hearer of the news finds him self (MB 127). News, then, is
determined by the hearer’s posture in time and place.
For persons who adopt the scientific, objective-empirical, posture, news is
irrelevant because they stand outside and above the world as "knower[s] and
teller[s]." They do not recognize themselves as being in a predicament in time and
place. At best, Percy argues, news items heard from this posture "occupy the very
lowest rung of scientific significance: they are particular instances from which
hypotheses and theories are drawn" (MB 128). The posture of the castaway
(another word for homo viatoi), however, manifests the interest which makes
news items relevant. Neither scientist nor complacent consumer, the castaway
hears news because he finds himself in a predicament, somewhere between being
"at home" and homeless:
To be a castaway is to be in a grave predicament and this is
not a happy state of affairs. But it is very much happier than
being a castaway and pretending one is not. This is despair.
The worst of all despairs is to imagine one is at home when
one is really homeless. (MB 144)
The castaway longs, waits, and searches for news that speaks o f this grave
predicament, a message occluded by the culturally dominant postures o f the
scientist and consumer.
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Percy goes on to make a further distinction between "island news" (akin to
knowledge because it is "relevant to the everyday life o f any islander on any island
at any time" [MB 143]) and "news from across the seas," which speaks uniquely to
the castaway by addressing his deepest longings. Like knowledge, island news is in
the sphere of the immanent, but news from across the seas is "in the sphere of
transcendence and is therefore paradoxical" {MB 147). The castaway is "he who
waits for news from across the seas" {MB 146). As news, such a message requires
a message-bearer. It involves an act of communication between one person and
another. But the message and the message-bearer are not to be accepted
uncritically. The castaway accepts the message, first, because he is in a
predicament, and the newsbearer’s words are relevant to it. Secondly, "simply by
the gravity of his message" {MB 147), the newsbearer displays the authority to
speak, and so the castaway should listen to him. Thirdly, the message-bearer must
speak in "perfect sobriety and in good faith" {MB 148).
Although Percy never refers explicitly to gnosticism in this remarkable
essay, his diagnosis of a society and its denizens for whom the relevance of news
has been annulled suggests an implicit critique of the gnostic stance. A society
founded on knowledge cannot hear of or see the very predicament it longs to
anneal. Island news and knowledge sub specie aeternitatis "immanentize" the
eschaton through their promise of salvation. They are forms of what Bloom
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classifies as gnosis—information. Percy does not suggest that the castaway ignore
such information. On the contrary, it is valuable for day-to-day island existence.
But when society and the individual consciousness are such that information seems
the only avenue toward salvation, both fall prey to the tem ptation of self
salvation. On the personal level, such a stance deludes one into believing that he is
"at home," that he knows the "whole story" of himself, something, as we have seen
in the discussion of autobiography, that one can never know. At the level of
history, it fosters a "totalitarian" view which eliminates differences in the name of
purity. The castaway rejects these self-enclosed island salvations and waits for the
news that speaks of his true homelessness.
While Percy’s works—both novels and essays—are a form o f island news
and not news from across the seas, they nevertheless try to reestablish in his
characters and in the reader a posture whereby news from across the seas would
again be relevant. His "diagnosis" of the modern malaise suggests a "treatment"
that stands between knowledge and time. For Percy, as for Kierkegaard, such a
stance finds its truest expression in the "news" of faith, a form of knowledge which
redeems time.

23

Since he sees himself as "without authority" to deliver news from

across the seas, however, he writes his island news so that he might at least name
the ultimate despair of life lived in the purely aesthetic sphere.24
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Percy, then, does not offer yet another call—"Come!"— which would annul
the difficulties of life in time. He does not offer knowledge sub specie aeternitatis,
an "articulated atemporality," which promises salvation. Rather, in a society
where gnosis reigns unrestrained, where
everyone is an apostle of sorts, ringing doorbells and bidding
his neighbor to believe this and do that. In such times, when
everyone is saying "Come!" when radio and television say
nothing else but "Come!" it may be that the best way to say
"Come!" is to remain silent. Sometimes silence itself is a
"Come!" (MB 148)
Percy’s works find their fullest expression in what they do not say. This silence
questions the presumed closure and wholeness of a gnostic culture and allows for
the possibility of repetition. The "gaps" in The Moviegoer and The Last

Gentleman, as I tried to show in the last chapter, provide openings for the
possibility of this "silent speaking." And in that silence which inevitably follows
an end, after characters have made their decisions and after readers have read the
last word, the possibility for a new beginning manifests itself.25
Lewis Lawson’s essay, "Walker Percy’s Silent Character," makes this point
abundantly clear in the context of Lancelot™ Lawson shows how Father John,
ostensibly a mere receptacle for the ranting of Lancelot Lam ar in his prison cell,
actually occupies a central place in the novel by means o f his silence:
The priest has tried to tell Lance something by his silence
throughout their five days together and is telling him once
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again by his decision to minister in Alabama. . . . Father
John has stood there those five days then as a silent
invitation, as a character who could be no more eloquent,
and Lance, knowing what the silence says, has fought to
protect himself by his noise. The next step is up to Lance.
(195)
Lawson could just as well have said that the next step is up to the reader. For
Percy also wants the reader to decide in the silence which follows this ending. Will
the reader accept the self-actualized apocalypse and renewal of Lance—the logical
end o f his radically gnostic vision—or will he choose the silent "Come!" of Father
John? Like Lance, the reader is left in silence.27
Percy’s anti-gnostic stance, then, is less articulated than it is suggested.
Although there is mention of the "peculiar gnosis of trains" in The Moviegoer, and
Tom M ore is described as a victim of "gnostic pride" in Love in the Ruins, these
are, as Cleanth Brooks points out, the sole references to gnosticism in Percy’s
works.28 Percy even commented once that he "hadn’t thought o f gnosticism"
when he wrote Lancelot (Con 211). Yet, as Lawson’s "Gnosis and Time in

Lancelot' reveals, there are direct parallels between this, the darkest of Percy’s
novels, and the analysis of gnostic time provided by Puech. Lance’s "narrow view"
from his cell, for example, only grants truth to "what is at hand," as does the
disjointed time of the black and white videotaped "movies" Lance has made for
material evidence of the crime that involves, in his skewed view, pure
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materiality—his wife’s sexual infidelity. In every turn of the novel, especially in
the climactic explosion of Belle Isle Plantation, Lance tries to "shatter time" by
projecting gnosis for the eradication of sexual evil. He tells Father John: "I had to
know. If Merlin [a movie director] ‘knew’ my wife, I had to know his knowing
her" (L 95). Lance knows the end of his story (and history) because he will himself
bring it about. He wants "the whole picture" (L 103). Father John’s silence
counters his delusions of wholeness.29
In one way or another, all of Percy’s main characters move out of a gnostic
attitude into the openness of repetition. Binx abandons his vertical search—the
scientific search which annuls time—in favor of the horizontal search in time. Will
Barrett, who hopes to engineer his life according to the scientific principles of
psychoanalysis, longs for the news that would speak of his alienation. In the same
novel, Sutter Vaught expresses the licentiousness characteristic of some gnostic
sects. Tom More of Love in the Ruins hopes to cure the "riven self and the riven
world" by means of the ultimate scientific instrument—the lapsometer. At the end
o f the novel, he is "chastened" by Fr. Smith in the confessional, and he returns to a
less grandiose life with Ellen. That book also portrays the radical dualism and
polarity which are consequences of life in a gnostic society. In The Second

Coming, the older Will Barrett contrives a plan that he believes will produce firm
knowledge of the existence of God. Barrett receives an answer, but not in the way
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he had anticipated. And Tom More of The Thanatos Syndrome contends with
doctors, who, in totalitarian fashion, would purify the state of its imperfections.
More, however, remains a true psychiatrist, a "doctor o f the soul," who, instead o f
applying gnostic theory, listens to the individual stories o f his patients. Lancelot,
then, is not the only book in which Percy deals with gnosticism.30
It is interesting to note, however, that whereas Percy’s earlier fiction and
essays counter the doom of a gnostic attitude and offer a recovery "silently," his
later works deal with it more or less explicitly. This movement from silence to
outright portrayal can best be seen, I think, by examining Percy’s complicated
response to the most overt of gnostic societies in this "century of death," Nazi
Germany.
In one of his letters to Shelby Foote, Percy comments on the strengths and
weaknesses of William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice.
I found not so much bad Faulkner as occasionally crappy
cliche: ". . . her graceful undulant walk." He had a lot of
nerve taking on the Holocaust and for this I admire
him
nobody’s been able to handle it, not even the
survivors, maybe especially not the survivors. I suspect that
it can’t be handled, that is, the dead weight and mystery of
the horror can’t be got hold of by esthetic categories—and
when you try, bad things happen, both to the writer and the
subject. . . . The only way you can write about such a thing is
not to write about it. (SHC)
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W ritten in 1979, this letter suggests Percy’s own "silent" handling of the
Holocaust. In his early essays, "The Loss of the Creature" (1958) and "The
Message in the Bottle" (1959), for example, Percy writes about the end result of
unrestrained gnosis by "not writing about it." In one of his last published essays,
however, the one I have already cited from Crisis, he makes an overt connection
between theory and Naziism:
Marx and Stalin, Nietzsche and Hitler were . . . theorists.
When theory is applied, not to m atter or beasts, but to man,
the consequence is that millions of men can be eliminated
without compunction or even much interest. Survivors of
both Hitler’s holocaust and Stalin’s terror reported that their
oppressors were not "horrible" or "diabolical" but seemed, on
the contrary, quite ordinary, even bored by their actions, as if
it were all in a day’s work. ( Crisis 16)
In expository prose, one expects a writer to be overt. Yet, the shift from indirect
and subtle argument to clear refutation seems curious. If the best way to write
about the "dead weight and mystery of the horror" of the Holocaust is not to write
about it, then why does Percy begin writing explicitly about it in his later works,
especially in The Thanatos Syndromdl
In The Moviegoer and The Last Gentleman there are no conspicuous
references to the Holocaust even though the former contains very strong
denunciations of "scientific humanism," especially toward the end. In disgust with
himself and his "dark pilgrimage," Binx reflects on "the very century of merde, the
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great shithouse of scientific humanism where needs are satisfied, everyone becomes
an anyone, a warm and creative person" (199-200).31 And Percy’s second novel
reveals the only options left in a gnostic culture—immanence and
transcendence—but allows the reader to arrive at his own conclusions about such
a bifurcated reality. Percy writes about the Holocaust in these first two novels by
"not writing about it." He implies that, in a culture where "everyone becomes an
anyone," it becomes very easy to treat others like the merde Binx finds around
him. In such a culture, people can be disposed of "without much compunction."
It is not surprising, then, that as a wayfarer and exile, Binx keeps a keen eye on the
Jews: "Ever since Wednesday I have become acutely aware of Jews. There is a clue
here, but of what I cannot say" (76-7). Neither is it surprising that at the moment
he rails against the "century of merde," he also "know[s] less than [he] ever knew
before" (199), a good sign for someone trapped in the gnosis of contemporary
culture.
The dialectic of immanence-transcendence in The Last Gentleman points
both backward and forward. It restates Binx’s wavering between consumer and
scientist, and it anticipates "More’s Syndrome," the chronic "angelism/bestialism"
that besets the characters of Love in the Ruins. Following Pascal (Qui fait l ’ange,

fait la bete) who, in turn, borrows his language from the tradition o f the Great
Chain of Being, Percy suggests that those who would wish to know like the angels
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inevitably produce some form of bestialism. Hitler’s Third Reich followed the
flowering of the arts and sciences during the Weimar Republic.
The first overt reference to the Holocaust in Percy’s fiction occurs in Love

in the Ruins, and it alludes to this very point. Tom More reflects:
Once I was commiserating with a patient, an old man, a
Jewish refugee from the Nazis—he’d got out with his skin
but lost his family to Auschwitz—so I said something
conventional against the Germans. The old fellow bristled
like a Prussian and put me down hard and spoke of the
superiority of German universities, German science, German
music, German philosophy. My God, do you suppose the
German Jews would have gone along with Hitler if he had let
them? (LR 141)
Percy seems to suggest here that angelism/bestialism has struck modern
consciousness so deeply that even a victim of its most horrible manifestation can
miss its significance.
O f course, not all survivors of the German Lagers resemble Percy’s "Jewish
refugee." Primo Levi, for one, recognizes very clearly the gnostic
angelism/bestialism of modern culture, especially as it manifested in the German
quest for purity. In The Periodic Table, for example, Levi (not unlike Percy in
that he was a chemist turned writer) continually refers to the antagonism between
spirit and m atter and in fact makes that theme part of the framework of his
exceptional book. ’2 At one point, reflecting on the boredom of his chosen career,
he writes:
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Chemistry, for me, had stopped being . . . a source [of
certainty]. It led to the heart of Matter, and M atter was our
ally precisely because the Spirit, dear to Fascism, was our
enemy; but, having reached the fourth year of Pure
Chemistry, I could no longer ignore the fact that chemistry
itself, or at least that which we were being administered, did
not answer my questions. (52)
Levi’s identification of fascism as "Spirit" corresponds to Percy’s comments about
theory and a "totalitarian worldview." Just as the spirit of fascism wishes to create

pneumatikoi, spiritual men inflamed and dedicated to its cause, so theory creates
gnostikoi, knowers who become founts of pure information, the theory that keeps
fascism vital. In either case, the impurity of m atter ("intractable matter," as Levi
calls it at one point) is fallaciously transformed by the purity of theory.
Elsewhere in The Periodic Table, Levi considers the different reactions o f
zinc in its pure and impure forms to acid. Acid "gulps it down" when impurities
are present. Yet, zinc "resists the attack" when in its pure form (33). Levi reflects:
One could draw from this two conflicting philosophical
conclusions: the praise of purity, which protects from evil
like a coat of mail; the praise of impurity, which gives rise to
changes, in other words, to life. I discarded the first,
disgustingly moralistic, and I lingered to consider the second,
which I found more congenial. In order for the wheel to
turn, for life to be lived, impurities are needed. . . .
Dissension, diversity, the grain of salt and m ustard are
needed: Fascism does not want them, forbids them; . . . it
wants everybody to be the same. (33-4)
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Fascism strives for a gnostic purity, a condition unstained by time. It wants to
subsume differences into the original singularity of the pleroma. It is significant
that Levi, like Percy, turns to writing in order to combat and reflect on his
immersion in a gnostic culture. In fact, Levi once wrote that his experience of the
Lager and his writing about it gave him a "reason for life."33 Language combats
gnostic purity because it combines elements of m atter and spirit, impurity and
purity. As triadic behavior, it may be the bridge—as Percy suggests time and
again, but most emphatically in the Jefferson Lecture—between the chasm
Descartes created when he posited res extensa and res cogitans. It is no accident
that book burnings occur in totalitarian regimes. The angelism/bestialism in
Percy’s Love in the Ruins, then, points to the same antagonism between spirit and
m atter (purity and impurity) that Levi writes about. The attem pt to create a
society founded on the pure knowledge provided by M ore’s lapsometer can lead to
the bestialism of the German Lagers.
In Lancelot and The Second Coming, references to Hitler and the
Holocaust become more explicit, but they still occupy a secondary place in the
narratives. Lance’s ranting against this "age of interest" in which no one is
responsible for his actions (145) leads him to search for a "single sin," something
conspicuously absent from the twentieth century:
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W hat about Hitler, the gas ovens and so forth? W hat about
them? As everyone knows and says, Hitler was a madman.
And it seems nobody else was responsible. Everyone was
following orders. It is even possible that there was no such
order, that it was all a bureaucratic mistake. (145)
Even so terrible an event as the Holocaust can be explained away in this aesthetic
age. Lance implies that the very possibility of explaining it away itself contributes
to its occurrence. When psychological categories are applied ("Hitler was a
madman"), no one is responsible. The gnostic, to recall Puech, bases his freedom
on gnosis, even "at the risk o f falling into nihilism, anarchism, amoralism, or even
licentious immoralism" (70). Such ethical categories become meaningless,
however, to an age in the grip of such a liberating knowledge. Lance cannot find
sin in Hitler’s atrocities because the age will not allow him to. Thus, he will enact
his own ethical "order" based on a "stern code, a gentleness toward women and an
intolerance o f swinishness, a counsel kept and above all a readiness to act" (167).
Although he tells Father John that his will be an entirely new order—"D on’t
confuse it with anything you’ve heard of before . . . . D on’t confuse it with the
Nazis" (165)—he, like the Nazis, wants to bring about his own apocalypse and
recovery. He destroys time in the name of gnosis in order to bring about the
closure o f history in a self and a society of his own making.34
In The Second Coming, Percy returns to the implicit link between scientific
humanism and the Holocaust. While he circumscribes the issue in The

163

Moviegoer—i.e., he writes about it by "not writing about it"—the link becomes
explicit in The Second Coming. In large part, the novel follows the older Will
Barrett’s attempts to come to terms with and place the memory o f his father’s
death by suicide. Barrett "remembered everything," the narrator tells us (72).
Almost anything serves as a signal which fires his memory: a triangular patch o f
land reminds him of missed opportunities with Ethel Rosenblum, a high-school
classmate and would-be sweetheart, and the sound of stretching barbed wire
announces the hunting trip during which his father first tried to kill himself and
Barrett. In his car, Barrett carries physical reminders of his father—two guns.
One is a Greener, the shotgun with which his father ultimately took his life and
which comes to represent to Barrett his father’s "love of death" (136). The other is
a Luger, a pistol his father had taken from an SS colonel, and which provides
Barrett clues to the unnamed malaise, the "death-in-life" out of which his father
knew no escape but suicide.
The Luger signals a connection between his father’s humanism and the
Holocaust. Recalling the "colonel’s black cap with its Totenkopf insignia and
some pictures" his father had taken along with the Luger, Barrett reflects on his
father’s stories of World W ar II:
Strange that he, my father, often spoke of the Ardennes and
the Rhine and Weimar but never mentioned Buchenwald,
which was only four miles from Weimar and which Patton

took three weeks later, never mentioned that the horrified
Patton paraded fifteen hundred o f Weimar’s best humanistic
Germans right down the middle of Buchenwald to see the
sights. Patton, of all people, no Goethe he who said to the
fifteen hundred not look you sons o f Goethe but look you
sons o f bitches (is not this in fact, Father, where your
humanism ends in the end?). Yet he, my father, never
mentioned t h a t . . . (121)
Even the Faulkneresque rhythms imply what the words themselves m ake explicit.
Humanism is not enough, be it of Barrett’s father or of one of Percy’s "literary
fathers."35 Humanism, in fact, leads to the horrors of the Lagers, for it signals
the "recession from transcendence" and the "immanentization o f the eschaton"
that "collective civilizational activity" enacts. For Percy, it leads to the gnosis
which "shatters time" by means of "articulated atemporality" (theory), a
comprehensive "science" which inflates knowing to a "totalitarian worldview." In
the name of such humanism, millions of people can be killed "without
compunction or even much interest."
W hat occupies a rather small place in The Second Coming, however, moves
to the foreground in Percy’s last novel, The Thanatos Syndrome. Here, the
references to the Holocaust and to Germany are explicit and numerous. Although
Percy returns to his befuddled Anglo-Saxon psychiatrist-protagonist, Tom More,
two other main characters are of obvious German descent: John Van Dorn,
referred to throughout the novel simply as "Van Dorn," and Father Smith, whose
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"Confession" and "Footnote" provide the central anti-gnostic message o f the
novel. Germany seems very much on Percy’s mind as the book unfolds. Percy
himself travelled there in the summer of 1934. But it is the Germany of the
W eimar Republic (1919-33) that finds emphasis in the novel, not that of the
National Socialists. The Nazis and the Holocaust do occupy a significant place,
but they are used mostly as examples. As in The Second Coming, they signal the
end of an unchecked humanism. The bestialism of the Nazi Lagers m arks the end
of W eimar angelism. In the name of atemporal theory which purports to advance
humankind, the Weimar scientists lay the groundwork for the rise of a Hitler. As
Father Smith tells Tom More:
If you are a lover of Mankind in the abstract like W alt
Whitman, who wished the best for Mankind, you will
probably do no harm and might even write good poetry and
give pleasure. . . .
If you are a theorist of Mankind like Rousseau or Skinner,
who believes he understands m an’s brain and in the
solitariness of his study or laboratory writes books on the
subject, you are also probably harmless and might even
contribute to human knowledge. . . .
But if you put the two together, a lover of M ankind and a
theorist o f Mankind, what you’ve got now is Robespierre or
Stalin or Hitler and the Terror, and millions dead for the
good of Mankind. ( T S 129)
It was the Weimar doctors, who, in the name of the betterment of mankind,
allowed the termination of lives "unfit for living." Percy’s acknowledgment of
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Frederic W ertham’s "remarkable book," A Sign for Cain, in the Prologue to The

Thanatos Syndrome only amplifies what Father Smith makes explicit about a
society in the grip of gnostic theory.36
W ertham’s book, subtitled "An Exploration of Human Violence," contends
that one reason for the proliferation of violence in the modern age may be a result
of an improper understanding of it. A proper vision eschews the notion that
violence is fated or that it is purely accidental in nature:
Looked at superficially, it may appear that there is a lot of
inevitability about violence. But the more we concentrate
scientifically on a concrete question in the general stream of
violence, the more we find that pure coincidence, accident,
and chance disappear and causal sequences o f events emerge.
(22)
Every act of violence, then, has a long history of contributing factors. "Social
customs, institutions, theories, and beliefs" all play a role as "violence-fostering
factors" (43-4). The violence unleashed by the Nazis upon the Jews and other socalled "impurities" was not so much a "freak" accident of history as it was a logical
end of modes of thought that had preceded it. Although Hitler provided the
impetus for its enactment, the Holocaust had its roots in the science and research
begun during the Weimar Republic, especially with the publication in 1920 of The

Release o f the Destruction o f Life Devoid o f Value, a proto-euthanasia manual.
W ertham writes:
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The book advocated that the killing of "worthless people" be
released from penalty and legally permitted. It was written
by two prominent scientists, the jurist Karl Binding and the
psychiatrist Alfred Hoche. The concept o f "life devoid of
value" or "life not worth living" was not a Nazi invention, as
is often thought. It derives from this book. (161)37
Once the question of the "value of life" reaches the floor, W ertham argues, a
plethora of "legitimated" violence follows.
In The Thanatos Syndrome, Father Smith refers directly to this book in his
"confession." It was given to him by one of the doctors he m et during his trip to
Germany in the 1930’s, and it created a "heated argument" in the scientific
community he came to know:
(The argument] seemed to be between those who believed in
the elimination of people who were useless, useless to anyone,
to themselves, the state, and those who believed in euthanasia
only for those who suffered from hopeless diseases or defects.
. . .1 must confess to you that I didn’t warm up to those
fellows, distinguished as they were. But I must also confess
that I was not repelled by their theories and practice of
eugenics. (246-7)
Here, Father Smith "confesses" his attraction to the gnostic theory that eliminates
the impure in the name of purity. This confession foreshadows the more emphatic
one he makes at the end of his discourse, that he would have joined his friend who
entered the Schutzstaffel had he been a German and not an American: "I would
have gone to the Junkerschule, sworn the solemn oath of the Teutonic knights at
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Marienberg, and joined the Schutzstaffel. Listen. Do you hear me? I would have

joined him" (248-9, Percy’s emphasis).
The confession of his attraction to the theory of eugenics reflects an
intellectual assent to gnosis, but his desire to enter the SS signals a volitional
assent. In his interview with Jan Nordby Gretlund, Percy, following Gabriel
Marcel, comments on the positive aspects of mass movements:
M arcel. . . had the nerve to say [that] we tend to overlook
something positive about the mass movements. It is easy to
say how wrong they were. It is easy to overlook the positive
things: the great sense of verve and vitality. This I was very
much aware of in Germany in 1934. ( Con 208)
Percy in no way condones the actions of the Nazi regime; he is well aware of the
"dead weight and mystery of the horror" that the Nazis perpetrated on those they
considered unfit for life in the Third Reich. Yet, he also recognizes the appeal o f
mass movements to an age which proclaims the self autonomous. In such an age,
the self becomes ever more isolated and thus longs for a sense of commonality o f
purpose that would relieve it of its loneliness. Like war, mass movements provide
such a common purpose. They provide avenues for the self to feel part of
something beyond itself.
It is noteworthy, then, that Father Smith "confesses" to Tom More. The
word confess derives from the Latin prefix com, "together," and fateri, "to
acknowledge." Father Smith did not ultimately join the SS; rather, together with
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Tom, he acknowledges his attraction to them. He breaks the isolation of the self
in his confession, through his speaking to another person, not through he violence
o f war or through another mass movement. Wertham writes that "communication
is the opposite of violence. Where communication ends, violence begins" (50).
Like St. Augustine, then, Father Smith confesses his sins, and in so doing, he
confesses the life he has chosen over the death of a possibly violent past. When
Tom asks him why he became a priest, Father Smith responds:
"What else?"
"What else what?"
"That’s all."
He shrugs, appearing to lose interest. "In the end one m ust
choose—given the chance."
"Choose what?"
"Life or death. W hat else?" (257)
Father Smith chooses and confesses life over the death o f gnostic certainty.
When he asks Tom, "Do you think we’re any different from the Germans?" he
suggests a parallel between the Nazis and the projects undertaken by Van Dorn
and the other well-meaning scientists in the novel. Such projects based on
"angelic" knowledge have already led to the bestialism of child-molestation at
Belle Ame Academy. But Father Smith suggests that the "qualitarian centers"
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which euthanize people unfit for life and the Blue Boy project which eliminates
social problems through mixing heavy sodium ions with drinking water m ark the
beginnings of a gnosis that will end in the gas chambers— thanatos. At one point
in the novel, Tom More tells his colleagues the reason for Father Smith’s refusal to
support their endeavors: "He thinks you’ll end by killing Jews" (351).
In Percy’s last work o f fiction, then, he launches a frontal attack on the

gnosis of scientific humanism. The question remains, however, why the change in
tactics from indirect to direct confrontation? Why write explicitly about the "dead
weight and mystery of the horror" now, when in 1979 he argued that the best way
to write about it was "not to write about it," to deal with it silently?
It seems to me that three responses could be set forth, each related to the
views of time outlined earlier in the chapter. On the one hand, the change in tactic
reflects a movement similar to the linearity of time as viewed in the Christian
perspective. The Thanatos Syndrome stands at the end as the fulfillment o f what
Percy has been writing about all along. This last novel reflects the "either/or" that
Percy writes about throughout his career, the choice between eros or thanatos, and
the novels along the way find their source in them. Each novel, furthermore,
"repeats" this end in its unique fashion. Percy writes about the same thing all
along but his themes find their ultimate fulfillment in his last work. Another
perspective might be compared to the circularity of the Greek version of time.
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Percy says all he has to say in the beginning, in The Moviegoer, and then repeats
in his other novels what has been established as the "ideal" in that novel. The later
novels are lesser incarnations of this first, primordial one. Still another view could
be likened to the gnostic’s view of time. Percy radically breaks from his earlier
"silent" treatment of the Holocaust and embarks on an overt refutation of the

gnosis that leads to it. In this perspective, The Thanatos Syndrome stands alone
as an "alien" amidst Percy’s other works. This alien character relates to the
confessional quality of the novel, the "acknowledgment together" by author and
character of their attraction to the gnosticism against which they rail. I m ean to
say that Percy breaks with his commitment to "not writing about the Holocaust"
in order to deal with (and ultimately condemn) his own attractions to the vitality
o f German life that he experienced during his trip in 1934.
38

In an interview with Phil McCombs, Percy once admitted that although
his experiences in Germany were nowhere near "so dramatic as Father Smith’s"
(809), he nevertheless transformed them in composing The Thanatos Syndrome.
Like Father Smith, Percy stayed with a family whose son "was dead serious. . . .
[He was] graduating from the Hitler Jugend and going into the Schutzstaffel"
(809). And just as Father Smith was impressed by the young man he befriended,
Percy admits that "this youth was the one who made an impression on me" (809).
There can be little doubt, then, that Percy uses Father Smith as a mouthpiece for
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his own views against the scientific humanism which seeks to engineer society in
the name of "doing good." Furthermore, Percy’s comments to Gretlund indicate
that, like Father Smith, he was profoundly attracted to the verve that pervaded
Germany during Hitler’s rise to power. Jay Tolson cites a comment by Shelby
Foote regarding this trip: "[Walker] was tremendously impressed by what he saw
there. Tremendously impressed."39 Tolson goes on to argue that character and
writer coalesce in the pages of The Thanatos Syndrome, especially in the
reflections on Germany. He suggests that what so impressed the young Percy,
whose "cynicism could verge on nihilism" (115), was the "sense of purpose of the
true-believing Nazi" (118). It is not unreasonable to propose, then, that Father
Smith’s confession is also Walker Percy’s confession. Often preoccupied by
"troubling questions about life’s meaning" (Tolson 113), Percy found himself
deeply impressed and attracted to the resolve "unto death" of the National
Socialists. When Father Smith says that he "would have joined" his friend, Percy
himself seems not too far behind the persona.
If The Thanatos Syndrome is viewed as an "alien," then, its difference
derives from the alien within Percy himself, that "other" who surfaces and finds
expression in the character of Father Smith. In his previous novels, the other
seems to be projected onto the culture at large. In this final one, he quarrels with
himself. While it is no doubt true that his earlier works also evince this quarrel
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with himself, the overt "confessional" quality of The Thanatos Syndrome suggests
that Percy’s inner struggle with gnosticism had at last surfaced. The movement
from indirect to direct confrontation signals a deeper willingness on Percy’s part to
acknowledge together with his reader that he is himself a product of the very
culture he castigates, this "century of death."
His diagnosis of our gnostic culture, then, stands not only between time
and knowledge, but also between (inter esse) the "unwarranted totalitarian view"
and the sense of purpose (concern) that such a view provides. He condemns the
totalitarian view while at the same time standing in awe of its power to give
direction to an otherwise formless life. Percy’s works ultimately reject the selfactualized and self-contained closure of history that a gnostic apocalypse and
recovery would supply, and they point to that repetition which provides a sense of
purpose without positing an absolute knowledge of an end. Apocalypse implies
recovery; an end offers a new beginning. However, neither can be encompassed by
the totalized, articulated atemporality which is theory. In his final works, Percy
breaks his silence only to confess. And the confession of a life, of course, is one of
the sources of modern autobiography.
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narrow confines of a modernist aesthetics. The distinction, as Puech has
shown, must remain, even though there was a tendency during the Patristic
era to conflate Christianity and Hellenism: "With the Church
Fathers—particularly Origen and the Alexandrians—[there was] a more or
less exclusive effort to understand Christianity, man and the world, no
longer according to strictly historical—and if the term is permissible,
horizontal—views but atemporally, according to the hierarchical and
vertical schema of Greek rationalism" (53). Four Quartets draws its
meaning from the fullness of its end—"Not fare well,/ But fare forward,
voyagers"—just as the end is foreshadowed in the beginning. The last
section of "Little Gidding" recapitulates the entire poem in such a way that
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Eliot manifests in the work is not ultimately circular but a spiralling
linearity. As in Christianity, so, too, in the poem. The line that connects
the beginning and the end is history. Both N athan Scott in his The Broken
Center and James Olney in Metaphors o f Selfmake points similar to, but
more thorough and eloquent than my own.
12.

In A History o f Christian Thought, 3 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1970) vol. 1, Justo L. Gonzalez has this to say of gnostic dualism: "Gnostic
speculation sets out from a single eternal principle, from which other
principles or aeons are produced in a declining process, until—usually
through an error of one of the lower aeons—the material world is
produced. Thus appears the derivative dualism" (131).

13.

The Greek hystera means "uterus or womb," but hysteresis means "a
deficiency"; and labes shares the same root, Jabi, which in Latin can mean
both "to slip, to fall," as in labile, and "a lip, or lip-like organ," as in
labium. Although these etymological connections are my own and not
Puech’s, they seem to be implied in Puech’s later comments on sexuality
and the Gnostics. They also find corroboration in Harold Bloom’s lucid
analysis of Ann Lee, the foundress of the Shakers, in The American
Religion: The Emergence o f the Post-Christian Nation (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1992): "Ann Lee began as a desperate, lower-class English wife,
who had gone through four painful births, lost all four infants, joined a
band of Shaking Quakers (in dissent from the main body of Quakers), and
was imprisoned for disturbing the peace in Manchester during the summer
of 1770. With waking eyes, she beheld Adam and Eve in the initial act o f

human sexuality and suddenly understood that lovemaking itself
constituted the Fall from Paradise. By 1774, Ann Lee had removed herself
and her followers to America. She died in 1784, only about forty-eight
years old, leaving her movement as one of the oddest spiritual legacies in
our troubled religious history" (66, my emphasis). The story o f Ann Lee
finds its place in Bloom’s larger contention that, in its roots, the American
Religion is not Christian, but Gnostic, an insight I will draw on as I explore
Eric Voegelin’s contribution to understanding "modern Gnosticism" and its
relation to Percy’s works. Further references to Bloom’s work will be made
parenthetically in the text.
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Bloom calls this "perfect man" and "spiritual man" the "pneumatic self."
Drawing on the work of E. R. Dodds ( The Greeks and the Irrational), he
emphasizes the distinction the Gnostics made between the pneuma or
daemon and the psyche. "Any useful account of Gnosticism needs to
commence with the history of a magic or occult self, "spark" or pneuma as
the Gnostics called it, rather than the soul or psyche" (50-51).

15.

It should be noted that Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1958), likewise calls attention to this "articulated atemporality,"
although he simply calls it "articulated doctrine" (32). Puech’s figure of
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Novelist’s Parting Reflections," Crisis (September 1990): 14-19. This
article is a reprint of a chapter that appears in Living Philosophies: The
Reflections o f Some Eminent Men and Women o f Our Time, ed. Clifton
Fadiman (New York: Doubleday, 1990). References will be made
parenthetically in the text to the article as it appeared in Crisis.

17.

Percy entitled the Jefferson Lecture as follows: "The Fateful Rift: The San
Andreas Fault in the Modern Mind."

18.

For my reflections here, I use two of Voegelin’s works: Science Politics and
Gnosticism (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1968) and The New
Science o f Politics (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1952), the latter of which I
will cite parenthetically in the text.

19.

The pervasive Gnosticism which Bloom sees in America parallels Percy’s
reference to Tocqueville in the Jefferson Lecture: "Could it be true, by the
way, what Tocqueville said of Americans years ago: that Americans are
natural-born Cartesians without having read a word o f Descartes?"

(Signposts 21A)
20.

Mary Deems Howland’s reading of Percy in the light of M arcel’s category
of intersubjectivity underscores his stance against this Gnostic solipsism.

21.

Bloom suggests that current battles surrounding "political correctness" give
evidence to an unwillingness to face up to the ubiquitous Gnosticism in
America: "I shake my head in unhappy wonderment at the politically

correct younger intellectuals, who hope to subvert what they cannot begin
to understand, an obsessed society wholly in the grip of a dom inant
Gnosticism" (49).
The etymology is taken from Webster’s New Universal Unabridged
Dictionary.; 2nd edition.
The epigraphs to "The Message in the Bottle," one from Thomas Aquinas
and the other from Kierkegaard, suggest from the start Percy’s category o f
"news":
"The act of faith consists essentially in knowledge and there we find its
formal or specific perfection." (Aquinas, De Veritate)
"Faith is not a form of knowledge; for all knowledge is either knowledge o f
the eternal, excluding the temporal and the historical as indifferent, or it is
pure historical knowledge. No knowledge can have for its object the
absurdity that the eternal is the historical." (Kierkegaard, Philosophical

Fragments)
Percy comments on this juxtapositioning of epigraphs in an interview with
Jan Nordby Gretlund: "Well, it is a classical dispute between Catholics and
Protestants whether faith is a form of knowledge. I thought it was a very
nice opposition to have Kierkegaard making a clear statement that faith is
not a form of knowledge, it is a leap onto [sic] the absurd. St. Thomas
Aquinas saying in his classical thirteenth-century way that faith is a form of
knowledge. It is different from scientific knowing, but it is a form of
knowledge. I tend to agree with Aquinas there, even though I am more
sympathetic with Kierkegaard. I am on his wavelength, I understand his
phenomenology, his analysis of the existential predicament of m odern man.
Aquinas did not have that, but I think Aquinas was right about faith. It is
not a leap into the absurd, it is an act of faith, which is a form of
knowledge" (Con 204).
Percy’s reference to "writing without authority" relates to Kierkegaard’s
"The Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle," an essay Percy once
described as being "tremendously important" to him (Con 113).
In their editors’ introduction to Kierkegaard and Literature: Irony,
Repetition, and Criticism (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1984), Ronald
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the reader’s attention the necessity of choice" (5). And in response to J.
Gerald Kennedy’s question about the endings of his novels: "But don’t
your novels have to end at that point? In other words, essentially what
you’re interested in is in the wandering and the searching and being in
doubt, but once the character makes his commitment, that’s the time when
you’ve got to hit the road and end the book," Percy answered: "You’ve got
to get out, you have to get out." The silence after you "get out" seems to be
a form of the "meaningful silence" Schleifer and Markley speak of. Pat
Bigelow relates the question of silence and writing to Kierkegaard in
Kierkegaard and the Problem o f Writing (Tallahassee: Florida State UP,
1987).
26.

Following Percy 178-95, to be cited parenthetically in the text.

27.

In his interview with Jan Nordby Gretlund, "Laying the Ghost of Marcus
Aurelius?" Percy suggests that he wants the reader to decide: "What I was
doing was to try to destroy the middle ground. . . . At the end of Lancelot I
was trying to present two radical points of view, neither of which is
accepted by most people, most Americans" ( Con 209, 211). I have already
cited his comments about the decision the reader must make with regard to
the relative sanity of Binx Bolling and Will Barrett.

28.

Brooks 260.

29.

Lawson also shows how Lance’s three-tiered view of sexual history
corresponds to Voegelin’s analysis of similar Gnostic visions o f history,
beginning with Joachim of Fiore and continuing in Hitler’s view of the
Third Reich.

30.

In The Writer as Shaman (Macon, GA: Mercer UP, 1986), Ted R. Spivey
also looks at Percy’s works in light of gnosticism; see especially pp. 117-21.

31.

Percy alluded to this denunciation when he delivered his acceptance speech
for the National Book Award: "The book attempts a modest restatement of
the Judeao-Christian notion that man is more than an organism in an
environment, more than an integrated personality, more even than a
mature and creative individual, as the phrase goes. He is a wayfarer and a
pilgrim" (Signposts 246).
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Trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Schocken Books, 1984). Citations
will be made parenthetically in the text.

33.

Levi makes this comment in The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond
Rosenthal (New York: Summit Books, 1988) 174.

34.

In The Brazen Face o f History: Studies in the Literary Consciousness in
America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1980), Lewis P. Simpson
argues that Lance "incarnates the mystery of history in the finitude of the
se lf and thus enacts a closure of history (see pp. 233-54).

35.

In A Southern Wayfarer (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1986), William
Rodney Allen underscores Faulkner’s role as one of Percy’s literary fathers.
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(New York: The Macmillan company, 1966).
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The book was published in Leipzig.

38.

The Southern Review 24 (1988): 808-24. Citations willbe made
parenthetically in the text.

39.

Pilgrim in the Ruins (See note 5) 115. Further citations will be made
parenthetically in the text.

Chapter Four
Repetition and Grapheiir.
Metaphor and the Mystery of
Language and Narrative

Shakespeare had it easy: he had the language, a new
language busting out all around him, and he didn’t
even have to make up stories; the stories were around
him too. We have to do it all, including the
impossible or all but impossible task: make up a
language as you go along. All you have to do to be a
good novelist is to be like God on the first day.
—W alker Percy to Shelby Foote
October 19, 1973 (SHC)
There’s no such thing as a sovereign and underived
text.
—W alker Percy
"Herman Melville"

In Fiction and Repetition , J. Hillis Miller writes that his book concerns not
so much "what" texts mean but "how" they m ean.1 He explores narrative
patterns, and what he finds is that narratives depend on repetition to generate
meaning:
This book is an exploration of some of the ways [novels]
work to generate meaning or to inhibit the too easy
determination o f a meaning based on the linear sequence of
the story. . . . Any novel is a complex tissue of repetition and
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o f repetitions within repetition, or of repetitions linked in
chain fashion to other repetitions. (2-3)
Miller’s comment sounds similar to some advice Walker Percy got from Caroline
G ordon when he was going through his years of novelistic apprenticeship. Percy
sent his manuscripts of "The Charterhouse" and "The Gramercy Winner" to
Gordon, who obviously read his work very carefully; she responded to his first
novel in about forty pages o f singled-spaced prose. Many of those comments did
not relate specifically to Percy’s work, but dealt generally with novels, the task of
the novelist, and writing. In short, she set forth her "theory" o f the novel and
applied it to Percy’s own work. One item she passed on seems especially pertinent
to the question of repetition and writing. Gordon relates part of a conversation
she had with a rural black preacher who told her about his technique of delivering
sermons: "First I tells’em I’m going to tell’em. Then I tell’em. Then I tell’em I
done told’em" (SHC).
From one perspective, the preacher’s comment would seem to give moral
latitude to the centuries-old problem of sleep and the sermon. It would also
suggest a reason for the sometimes lifeless structure of some works o f literary
criticism, which often follow the Introduction ("I tells’em I’m going to tell’em")Body ("I tell’em")-Conclusion ("I tell’em I done told’em") format. Yet, viewed
differently, the comment can quicken both homiletic and critical practice. For the
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preacher’s words do what they say. The "what" and the "how" interpenetrate. The
repetition of the verb "to tell," for example, is not a repetition without a difference.
The threefold "tell’em" is compressed and encompassed by "tells’em" and
"told’em," which mark the transition from the ideal or the possible to the actual.
And "done told’em" repeats the auxiliary form of "going to tell’em," yet, while the
auxiliaries are obviously different, the progression of sounds from "done" to "told"
and the repetition o f sounds in "going" and "told" ("go" and "to") signals on a
smaller scale precisely what Miller writes about on a larger one. Furthermore, the
self-enfolding and extended rhythms of the first and the last phrases find
counterpoint in the pithy rhythm of the middle sentence, which nevertheless
stresses the same verb. The middle sentence, in turn, is repeated in the first part o f
the third sentence. In his comment, the preacher engages in what has often been
considered the golden rule of all homiletics, and he thus displays his own moral
integrity: he practices what he preaches! Gordon passes on the remark to Percy
because, like Hillis Miller, she sees this repetition as efficacious in writing as well.
In order for repetition to work in writing, though, it has to be seen as more
than a simple restating. It has to be a restating that incorporates identity and
difference, limits and possibilities, the ideal and the actual. It has to be like the
coach horn Constantin Constantius praises in Repetition: "Long live the
stagecoach horn! It is the instrument for me for many reasons, and chiefly because
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one can never be certain of wheedling the same notes from this horn. A coach
horn has infinite possibilities" (175).2 To approach repetition and graphein in the
context of Percy’s own narrative technique, then, I will inevitably have to repeat
myself—with difference.
Chapter One has already dealt with something o f the "how" o f repetition,
autobiography, and Percy’s works. Chapters Two and Three engaged the "what."
Yet, in Percy, the "how" and the "what" cannot be so easily separated. I agree
with John W. Stevenson who has argued that "the distinctive character of [Percy’s]
style is the particular way he uses language and the way this language controls and
discovers its proper form. I suppose I am trying to say that Percy’s art (his craft)
is as much a part of his theme as is the theme itself."3 Thus, I hope to show that
repetition is not only a theme of Percy’s work, but that it informs his narrative
style as well. I have already suggested such a notion when I argued that, like
Kierkegaard, Percy uses the aesthetic to approach the religious. A nother way of
saying this is to say that inter esse finds embodiment in an "interesting" style. That
style, furthermore, is fundamentally autobiographical.
In Chapter One, I refer to James Olney’s assertion that the essential
autobiographical movement takes place in memory, in the interplay o f past and
present. In the context of their present consciousness, autobiographers grasp
together into narrative form their past experience. But this "grasping together" (I
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borrow the concept from Paul Ricoeur4) in memory and narrative is never a
simple recapitulation of past events. The story and the life are never identical.
Rather, a distance, a gap, a difference always exists between the past as it was lived
and the past as it is written. Yet, as different as they are, lived life and written life,
some connection must exist between them, else why bother to write in the first
place. Thus, autobiography repeats the life of its subject (the self) in a way that
joins identity and difference without a simple synthesis of the two. Furthermore,
as the terminal root of the word "autobiography" itself, graphein provides the link
between the autos and bios. It enacts the repetition I have already addressed (the
"what"), while it also engages in its own repetition (the "how"). Thus, some
further thoughts on Percy’s views of the self and life—and their relation to
autobiography in general—will be necessary to examine repetition and writing.
M ost notably, I will return to some aspects of his language theory, especially with
regard to metaphor and naming. In so doing, I, too, hope to link identity and
difference. I hope to sound the coach horn. That is, I hope to practice what I
preach.

1. M etaphor and the Mystery o f Language
Percy’s fascination with language extends to every facet of his life and
work, especially his analysis of "death-in-life." Although the resurgence of gnostic
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thought has much to do with the "Century of Death" I outlined in the last chapter,
the death of language, as Percy sees it, also contributes to the "peculiar malaise" he
analyzes in his works. A central issue of all of his fiction, but more explicitly in

The Thanatos Syndrome, concerns what Father Smith calls "the evacuation o f
signs." "[Words] don’t signify anymore," he tells Tom M ore (121), and he goes on
to make a direct link between the deprivation of signs and the m urder o f the Jews,
for him, the only sign that has not been evacuated. Father Smith implies that
when signs have been deprived, so too has the sign-user. Given such a state, any
level of bestialism becomes possible.
If the entrance into sign-use marks the passage into full humanity and thus
elevates the sign-user from an animal-like existence, as in the case of Helen Keller,
then a loss of the signifying capacity of language divests humans of their unique
humanity. For Percy, Keller’s experience at the well-house is paradigmatic.
Everyone who is able to read these words has crossed the same threshold. I have
already suggested that this primordial naming event is itself a repetition because it
links concept and percept, the ideal and the actual. Somewhere along the way,
however, words lose their signifying potential. They become evacuated. The
signified and the signifier interpenetrate. It is important to note that this potential
devolution rests in the same primordial naming act. Thus, naming possesses a
dual nature. It has a capacity to reveal and conceal or, as Charles Bigger writes, it
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is both a "call by Being and a violence against Being."5 That with which we know
the world is also that which blocks that same knowing.6
In the "Intermezzo" of Lost in the Cosmos, to repeat more ground, Percy
implies that art, as a naming event, also displays this same duality. t)n the one
hand, it resists the interpenetration of the signifler by the signified; it frustrates the
evacuation of signs. On the other hand, it is limited in this same capacity because
of its very use of signs. The epigraphs that head this chapter further indicate the
dual nature of art as naming. According to the first, novelists, like God, create ex

nihilo. When they name, they create in a sense an entirely new world. According
to the second, novelists, like humans, are limited by texts that have gone before
them. They rename or renovate what has been named but forgotten, or they name
something that has been, but which has never been named before. The first
reiterates Percy’s call for the novelist to "sing a new song." The second indicates
the limits of that very endeavor. Yet in its limitation, it also discloses possibility.
For Percy, the social character of naming, the pairing o f namer and hearer
(or writer and reader), opens the possibility for a "co-celebration" of a thing beheld
in common. The name sanctions and frees. The two impossibilities to which
Percy refers in the epigraphs—the impossibility of creating a new language and the
impossibility of creating a sovereign text—join possibility and limitation. They
both invoke hope: the first, that something entirely new will be sung; the second,
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that at least something old will be sung in a new way. This linking of possibility
and limitation forms, I think, the mystery of language and narrative, and it will
guide my remarks in this chapter. For, Gabriel Marcel writes, "I cannot place
myself outside or before [the encounter with mystery]; I am engaged in this
encounter, I depend on it, I am inside it in a certain sense, it envelopes me and it
comprehends me—even if it is not comprehended by me."7 If I substitute the
word "language" for "mystery" in Marcel’s definition, the meaning remains
unchanged. For language is precisely that which "envelopes and comprehends"
the language-user but which itself remains elusive. Perhaps nowhere can this
mystery of language be better revealed (and concealed!) than in an exploration o f
m etaphor and Percy’s works, both fiction and nonfiction. For Percy understands
metaphor, like the novel, as both inventive and derivative, something newly made,
yet something made new, something renovated—something repeated.

In "M etaphor as Mistake" (1958), Percy explores the analogical and
cognitive dimensions of metaphor, and he contends that in m etaphor "something
very big happens in a very small space" {MB 66). That something very big is
nothing less than the ontological potential of language and metaphor, their
capacity to validate and discover being. For Percy claims ultimately that
"metaphor is the true maker of language" {MB 79). Returning once again to his
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favorite example, Helen Keller and the primordial naming act, Percy anticipates
the writings of Paul Ricoeur on metaphor. Although Ricoeur notes that m etaphor
is a "phenomenon of predication, not denomination,"8 on the level of the sentence
and not of the single word, both writers agree that m etaphor "tells us something
new about reality" (Ricoeur 53). It is important to remember that, despite his
repeated use of the Helen Keller phenomenon, Percy understands naming to
extend beyond the level o f isolated words. A symphony, a novel, a short-story, a
poem can all "name" and thus disclose being. They can, as Ricoeur puts it in Time

and Narrative, "refigure" reality.9 I will touch on this aspect of naming in the
second section of this chapter, the mystery of narrative. Suffice it to say now that
although Percy uses "naming" to designate his understanding o f metaphor, he uses
it in a sense different from Ricoeur’s "denomination."
For Percy, the Helen Keller phenomenon offers fertile ground for an
exploration of metaphor because in this "aboriginal naming a c t . . . the most
obscure and the most creative of metaphors" manifests itself: "No modern poem
was ever as obscure as Miss Sullivan’s naming water water tor Helen Keller" (MB
78). The word water has only the "most tenuous analogical similarities" with the
thing itself (MB 79). The aboriginal naming act, which is metaphor, involves a
pairing o f word and thing, object beheld and word uttered. Percy writes: "We can
only conceive being, sidle up to it by laying something else alongside. We
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approach the thing not directly but by pairing, by apposing symbol and thing"

{MB 72).10 By virtue of the space between the word and the thing, language both
validates and obscures; it responds to the call of being and does violence against it.
When a namer utters a name in good faith and authority for a hearer, the thing
beheld in common is both sanctioned and freed: sanctioned because the name
somehow formulates, i.e., gives form to, the being of what is commonly beheld;
freed because that same formulation nevertheless makes a clearing for the thing to
appear in all its strangeness. In its pairing, naming thus becomes a sort of
"reconciliation," as Charles Bigger puts it.11
Yet, this same pairing leads to the deadening of language. W ords no longer
signify. Instead, the distance collapses, and words mummify that which they
originally disclosed. For the person who has long-since crossed the linguistic
threshold, the word water has devolved. Certainly, I do not disclose being to you
when I say water'And point to the clear liquid that flows from a fountain. Signifier
and signified have interpenetrated, and the word has lost its metaphorical potency.
It has become evacuated. Ricoeur writes that "there are no live metaphors in the
dictionary" (52), and by this I take him to mean that if naming does not both
validate and obscure, language is dead.
It is the task of metaphor, then, to reinstate the distance between word and
thing. Like naming, metaphor also employs a pairing, although it is often
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considered a "wrong" coupling. But in the "wrongness" of its pairing, its strange
coupling, m etaphor reopens the queerness and obscurity o f being—its
uncanniness.12 Ricoeur notes that metaphor’s function is
close to what Gilbert Ryle has called a "category mistake." It
is . . . a calculated error, which brings together things that do
not go together and by means of this apparent
misundersanding [sic] it causes a new, hitherto unnoticed,
relation of meaning to spring up between the terms that
previous systems of classification had ignored or not allowed.
(52)
Thus, in "M etaphor as Mistake," Percy agrees with Gabriel Marcel who says that
when "I ask what something is, I am more satisfied to be given a name even if the
name means nothing to me (especially if?), than to be given a scientific
classification" (MB 72). M etaphor circumvents the abstract and general
classifications that theory and science depend on, categories that make individual
entities a "case o f' or an "instance o f' a general, discarnate rule. In this function
of metaphor, the relation between gnosticism, death-in-life, and language becomes
most clear. For if language merely provides a means of conveying discarnate,
theoretical categories, then it bypasses lived time in favor of an immediate
perception o f the atemporal abstract. Theory, then, becomes more real than the
concrete, and a "loss of the creature" ensues.13
Ricoeur argues that in its wrongness, metaphor not only circumvents
previous systems of classification, but it depends on a "literal interpretation [an
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interpretation based on prevalent systems of classification] which self-destructs in
a significant contradiction" (50). This notion of circumventing and destroying
normal classification not only fits in with the "apocalyptic" theme of Percy’s
fiction and his avowed writing habits (an exercise in despair and recovery), but it
also relates to a comment he once made to a French interviewer:
Recently I have read a book, you must read it: Zen and the
A rt o f Motorcycle Maintenance by Robert Pirsig. I had been
put off by the title a long time, but then I started reading it,
and it certainly set me thinking. There are books, you know,
even if you do not admire them, they give impetus to your
mind. In that book the hero makes Aristotle and his logic
responsible for all our evils—I personally make Descartes
responsible—and has a nervous breakdown, which he
overcomes by running and maintaining a motor-bike
(Con 247).
One wonders if it is both Aristotle’s logic and his "classifications" that provided
the "impetus" to Percy’s mind in the reading of Pirsig’s book. If it is both, then
Ricoeur’s comments about metaphor and classification would seem all the more
apposite.
For Percy, Gerard Manley Hopkins creates metaphors that self-destruct
best, and so are thereby most able to capture the peculiar inscape o f things.
Lightning is not simply a flash of light in the sky, but
a straight stroke, broad like a stroke with chalk and liquid, as
if the blade of an oar just stripped open a ribbon seat in
smooth water and it caught the light, (quoted in MB 78)
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Hopkins was surely the kind of poet Percy had in mind when he wrote that a poet
can "wrench signifier out of context and exhibit it in all its queerness" (Z.C106).
But m etaphor does not merely rename what has already been named and
subsequently ossified, as in the case of "lightning." It also institutes something
altogether new. It names what has been "secretly apprehended" (inscape) but
hitherto unknown, because unnamed. Metaphor, then, both renovates and
invents. In either case, it establishes in the reader or hearer "a unique joy which
m arks m an’s ordainment to being and the knowing of it" {MB 71). It repeats the
primordial naming act, and thus opens a new world and a new way of knowing the
"old" world. It creates a new language.
Percy’s thoughts on metaphor and language find a parallel in the writing of
Paul John Eakin on autobiography. In a seminal chapter o f his Fictions in

Autobiography: Studies in the A rt o f Self-Invention, Eakin outlines
the relative positions of self and language in the order of
being. . . . When an "I" speaks, and especially in
autobiographical discourse, is its language in effect an
original speech, a self-validating testimony to the uniqueness
of the self? Or is such speech always fatally derivative?14
Eakin shows how questions o f the relation between self and writing have polarized
into "a self-before-language or a language-before-self set of positions" (191).
Instead o f adopting one pole or the other, Eakin looks for a third way, a position I
characterize as "self-in-language."
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Borrowing insights from a wide spectrum of linguistic philosophers,
developmental psychologists, literary theorists, and autobiographers—some of
whom were Percy’s own favorites, notably Susanne Langer and Helen Keller—
Eakin argues that "the origin of the self as the reflexive center of human
subjectivity is inextricably bound up with the activity o f language" (198). He
posits a model, based on three moments, for "the history of self-definition" of an
individual (219). The first moment involves the acquisition of language, whereby
the self becomes aware of itself; the second concerns what some have termed the
"I-am-me" experience, in which the self undergoes a doubling of selfconsciousness, i.e., a "self-conscious experience of self-consciousness" (218); and
the third, if it ever comes, is the autobiographical act, which
like the first m o me n t . . . is a coming together of self and
language; [and] like the second . . . is characterized by a
double reflexiveness. . . . The text of an autobiography is
likely to recapitulate the second moment as a content, while
the making of the text re-enacts the first moment as a
structure. (219)
Put in terms I have developed throughout this chapter, Eakin seems to say
that the act o f autobiography repeats both the acquisition o f language (as the
"how" of the text) and the experience of self as self (as the "what" of the text).
Autobiography creates a new language which both comprehends and constitutes
the self even as its content is derived from a self already experienced as a self
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determined and immeshed in language. Thus, autobiography evinces what Hillis
Miller says about novels being "a complex tissue o f repetition and of repetitions
within repetition." In Percy’s terms, autobiography evinces the "consciousness
raised to the second power" which he understands true Kierkegaardian repetition
to be {MB 96). Autobiography attempts to name the self—i.e., to sanction and
free it—in the self-consciousness of language. It repeats the aboriginal naming act,
and thus it provides, as Olney’s classic work suggests, a "metaphor of self."15
It may be useful to examine Eakin’s analysis o f Helen Keller’s experience at
the well-house to show further the convergence (and divergence) of his and
Percy’s thought and to show what I see as Percy’s contribution to the
understanding of autobiography as metaphorical repetition.16 Eakin reveals how
Helen Keller’s experience is similar to the autobiographical act in three respects:
it is an act of memory ("suddenly I f e l t . . . a thrill of
returning thought"); it is an act of language in which
experience is transformed into symbol ("she spelled into the
other [hand] the word water. . . . my whole attention fixed
upon the motion of her fingers"); and it is a constitution of
self ("that living word awakened my soul"). (212-13)
Eakin goes on to say that her experience taught her that "the self has a name," and
that it is the task of autobiography "to state ‘what we have learned we are’" (213).
In this sense, then, autobiography would be both invention and derivation:
invention because it constitutes the self; derivation because it depends on the what
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the self "has learned," but hitherto left unnamed. Is it possible to say that
autobiography, like Percy’s metaphor, tries to capture the "inscape" of the self s
experience of self, to capture the secretly apprehended but hitherto unnamed
selfhood of the self, its "unformulated presence" (MB 69)? If so, this task,
according to Percy, both discloses and does violence to whatever being the self
may have.
Eakin often worries about, but cannot resolve, the challenge Jacques
Derrida poses to the relation of self and language. For Derrida and his followers,
writing can never manifest the self-presence, "the meeting point of the physical and
the intelligible," that we accept as the norm in speech.17 Thus, autobiography can
never make present a self which is never self-present. Like Eakin, I cannot claim
to resolve the metaphysical question of self and language, but I can repeat some
aspects of Percy’s thought on the question. In Chapter Two, I made much of "the
unformulability of the self," that the self, as Percy claims, names everything under
the sun except itself. The self has no sign of itself. In the case o f Binx Bolling, I
argued that although the self cannot find a single sign for itself, its only avenue
toward self-discovery nevertheless rests in sign use, that is, language. Thus, as a
pairing o f word and thing, the aboriginal naming act is bound to be frustrated
when it turns toward the self, because the self is "no-thing." No single word can
encompass it. On the other hand, metaphor, as a pairing of one named thing with
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another ("flesh is grass"), an activity as I have tried to show that repeats both the
aboriginal naming act and the acquisition of language, can provide an avenue to
the self. In its queer, "wrong" pairing, metaphor can repeat the queerness o f the
self which has "fallen" into language. The self is a stranger and, with the help of
m etaphor’s indirection, it can constitute and disclose its own strangeness. One is
reminded of the subtitle of Percy’s The Message in the Bottle. "How Queer Man
is, How Queer Language is, and W hat One has to do with the Other." In this
sense, Binx Bolling’s experience of people as "dead dead dead" can be likened to
dead metaphor. According to Binx, too many people "go gently into" a good
dictionary. They accept some theoretical formulation of the self based on the
tenets and classifications of scientific humanism, which would deny their
queerness. They accept themselves as cases or instances of this or that abstraction.
This notion of strangeness, furthermore, provides an avenue for extending
Eakin’s lucid analysis of Helen Keller’s experience. To the threefold similarity he
cites between her experience and autobiography, I would add Keller’s last
sentence: "It would have been difficult to find a happier child than I was as I lay
in my crib at the close of that eventful day and lived over the joys it had brought
me, and for the first time longed for a new day to come." Here, Keller repeats
("lived over") the events of the day, not only in her crib, but also in the act of
writing her text and in the text itself. The repetition adds a new dimension to her
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existence: for the first time in her life, she has a future. She "longed for a new day
to come." She longs, in essence, for the opportunity to repeat events, new and old;
that is, she has entered into "anticipatory resoluteness." But the longing, like the
"repentance and sorrow" she experienced at the breaking of her doll, indicates the
very queerness, the strangeness of her newfound existence as a human. One
neither longs nor feels strange if one is "at home." Only homo viator longs.
Keller’s entry into language, then, also marks her entry into the restlessness o f her
own unformulability, an inter esse which is a happiness, to be sure, but a happy
longing. Her entry into language and the language that she employs to tell o f that
event (the text) are self-reflexive. I mean to say that her entry into language
becomes the m etaphor for herself, a story in which the "how" and the "what"
interpenetrate to disclose a self now happy and strange but never quite itself.18
One of the places the "how" and the "what" overlap for Percy comes in the
account o f the "blue-dollar hawk." He first uses the story in "M etaphor as
Mistake" as one of the opening examples of the sort o f "misnaming" that can result
in an "authentic poetic experience" (MB 65). Portions of the story reappear years
later as part of the older Will Barrett’s "memory trip" in The Second Coming. As
in any true repetition, the two versions display both similarities and differences.
Undoubtedly, some of the differences result from the demands of the particular
rhetorical situations. An essay on the ontology of m etaphor requires a clearer
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demonstration of a thesis than does a section of a novel. Yet the very differences
are themselves posited on a prior acknowledgment of similarity. Thus, the way
Percy employs the story in the novel suggests that he repeats his previous work to
reveal something about Barrett, something about the novel as a whole, and
something about his narrative technique in general.
In "M etaphor as Mistake," the account goes as follows:
I remember hunting as a boy in south Alabama with my
father and brother and a Negro guide. A t the edge of some
woods we saw a wonderful bird. He flew as swift and
straight as an arrow, then all of a sudden folded his wings
and dropped like a stone into the woods. I asked what the
bird was. The guide said it was a blue-dollar hawk. Later
my father told me the Negroes had got it wrong: It was really
a blue darter hawk. I can still remember my disappointment
at the correction. W hat was so impressive about the bird was
its dazzling speed and the effect of alternation of its wings, as
if it were flying by a kind of oaring motion. {MB 64)
I want to examine two aspects of this personal account. First, it rings true.
As Percy writes, "everyone has a blue-dollar hawk in his childhood" {MB 69). One
o f my own, for example, must have been rather common for a child growing up at
the time because I have heard others recount something similar to it. Louisiana
had renewed its interest in its French roots through various grammar-school
programs. Yet, being part of a middle-class, suburban (i.e. ahistorical) family, I
really had little idea of what "French roots" meant. Thus, when I heard my
parents and siblings speak of job possibilities and perquisites that certain
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companies provided for their employees and/or customers, I mistook "Fringe
Benefits" for "French Benefits." For the longest time, I tried to understand just
what sort of benefits were being provided. When I learned the correct form, I
shrugged at my own denseness, and I felt a bit chastened and disappointed that the
"real" term was so straightforward. But I haven’t forgotten the attem pt to connect
what little I knew of the business world with what little I knew of the French. I
conjured a fascinating array of the exotic, the sexual, and the culturally elite. The
name, "French Benefits," said much more than its descriptive counterpart. But
then, I was only a boy.
At the time he first saw the hawk, Percy was a boy, too. This is the second
aspect of the account I want to examine: while Percy is free with the first person
pronoun in the account o f the hunting trip with his father, the person to whom he
refers when he cites the example in the rest of the essay is not the "I" of the present
writer, now reflecting on the ontology of metaphor by means o f an experience he
had as a child, but "the boy" who had the experience (see especially M B 71). Like
Henry Adams, Percy eschews the use of the first person pronoun for the third
person. I do not want to make too much of this shift in shifters. Certainly, it is
due in part to the fact that the example supports the thesis Percy pursues in the
piece. In such a "scientific" essay, he removes himself from the writing so that the
general idea may be more easily apprehended by the reader. Yet, could one not
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say that, in his retrieval of the memory, Percy also retrieves and then distances
himself from the disappointment he originally experienced at his father’s
correction? Furthermore, could we not say that, even here, Percy rejects his
father’s foreclosing of the possibility of being?19
In the account as he writes it, it is "I" who "can still remember the
disappointment." Yet, everywhere else in the piece, it is "the boy’s delight," "the
boy can’t help but be disappointed," "the boy’s preference," and so on (MB 71).
Thus, the philosopher of language now sitting at his desk in Covington, Louisiana,
seems to forget the "I" of his account and to posit someone quite other ("the boy")
who experienced the wonder and disappointment of the name and its subsequent
correction. This strange shift between "I" and "the boy" opens a distance that can
be viewed as a repetition of the strange distance in m etaphor which, of course,
forms part of the content, the "what," of the essay. However obscure and
distanced, then, the essay is not only about the mistake upon which m etaphor
inevitably depends, it also enacts that same mistake by distancing the writer from
"the boy," and then both from the father, who proved so disappointing. In the
language of the text, Percy repeats the argument of the text itself: language and
m etaphor mediate experience by means of distance and indirection . The writer
can never relive the experience as it was lived by the boy; he can only write it. In
the writing, Percy seems to evince something of Keller’s discovery of longing, for
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he, too, seems to long for a time before his disappointment. Like Keller, he senses
an unformulability that nevertheless calls for formulation in language. The
writing, however wrong, remains the only avenue through which the experience
might be both renovated and created. It provides Percy with a link between his

autos and bios. "Metaphor as Mistake" thus becomes part of the mistaken
m etaphor by which the "I" o f the writer reconciles himself with "the boy" of the
experience. In this essay, Percy not only adds to his reader’s understanding o f the
relation between metaphor and the queerness of language and being, but he
reveals his own concealment in metaphor (his own strangeness) as well. He
discloses himself as "enveloped" and "comprehended" in the mystery of language.

2. M etaphor and th e Mystery o f Narrative
If it is true that Percy turned from writing essays to writing novels because
he wanted to emulate the French, who "see nothing wrong with writing novels that
address what they consider the deepest philosophical issues" (Con 183), then his
use o f the blue-dollar hawk account in The Second Coining would seem to confirm
his self-stated purpose. Whereas the account in "Metaphor as Mistake" serves as
an example that supports a philosophical thesis, in the novel it becomes an episode
which finds its place in a larger configuration. But in the type of novels that Percy
writes, the account should nevertheless serve something of its original
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philosophical purpose. I want to explore Percy’s fictional repetition of this
account to see what light it can shed on his "repetitive" narrative technique as a
whole, especially with regard to plot and metaphor.
In some o f his early essays and interviews Percy often made comments
which suggest a lack of concern with plots: "I’m not primarily concerned with
plotting a story" (Con 24); "by following a predestined plan with outline, like some
writers, I could foresee the action and likely it wouldn’t go veering off on another
path. But I can’t work like that" (Con 8). To Shelby Foote, who often tried to
goad Percy into working from an outline—Foote himself seemed obsessed with
plotting—Percy once wrote: "The French really kill me—it’s all form. Come to
think of it, you would like them better than I do" (SHC). And later, he wrote:
The French are idealogues, i.e. madmen, and yet without
them we’d sink into a torpor. The mind-body split, locked-in
ghost in a machine on one side, structure and world on the
other, me with the former, you with the latter, like I used to
make ghostly spiritual (but flyable) Lockheed Vegas and you
used to make solid structural admirable perfect unflyable P51s. (SHC)
And toward the end of "From Facts to Fiction" (1966), a piece about "how it came
to pass that a physician turned writer and became a novelist" {Signposts 186),
Percy refers to John Barth’s comment that the age of the nineteenth-century novel
has passed:
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I agree. When I sat down to write The Moviegoer, I was very
much aware of discarding the conventional notions o f a plot
and a set of characters, discarded because the traditional
concept of plot-and-character reflects a view of reality which
has been called into question. (Signposts 190)20
Despite these disavowals of structure and plot (and what seems to be a
backhanded swipe at Foote’s work), Percy, like any writer, nevertheless has to plot
his novels. His stories have to be "followable."21 Since the "traditional concept
o f plot-and-character reflects a view of reality that has been called into question,"
it seems likely that Percy turned once again to his philosophical mentor, who
called much into question, to derive and create his narrative technique. In

Repetition, Constantin suggests that "repetition is a crucial expression for what
‘recollection’ was to the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowing is a
recollecting, modern philosophy will teach that all life is a repetition" (131). If
Kierkegaard is right, then it would seem likely that narrative, the primary means
by which we know life, would also evince repetition. I have already cited Hillis
Miller’s and Caroline G ordon’s references to narrative repetition. In "Narrative
Time," Paul Ricoeur has also written on the subject, and his thought helps to
clarify the type of plotting that Percy turns to in the wake of the collapse of the
"traditional" novel.
In this essay that seems to serve as a short recapitulation o f his threevolume opus, Time and Narrative, Ricoeur suggests that
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every narrative combines two dimensions in various
proportions, one chronological and the other
nonchronological. The first may be called the episodic
dimension, which characterizes the story as made out of
events. The second is the configurational dimension,
according to which the plot construes significant wholes out
of scattered events. . . . I understand [the configurational act]
to be the act of the plot, as eliciting a pattern from a
succession.
Despite their relationship of polarity with respect to chronology, both episode and
configuration evince temporality. The episodic dimension "tends toward the linear
representation of time." The succession and progression of episodes reflects the
"irreversible order of time common to human and physical events" (178-9). The
configurational dimension, however, "is more deeply temporal than the time of
merely episodic narratives" (179). Ricoeur suggests that configuration imposes
Kermode’s "sense of an ending." When a story becomes well known
retelling takes the place of telling. . . . Then following the
story is less im portant than apprehending the well-known
end as implied in the beginning and the well-known episodes
as leading to this end. (179)
Time is not nullified "by the teleological structure of the judgment which grasps
together the events under the heading o f ‘the end.’" Rather, this grasping
together in configuration involves a deepening of time; it involves repetition: "By
reading the end in the beginning and the beginning in the end, we learn also to
read time itself backward. . . . In this way, a plot establishes human action not
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only within time . . . but within memory" (180). Furthermore, memory is not on
the level of episodic time. Rather,
it is the spiral movement that, through anecdotes and
episodes, brings us back to the almost motionless
constellation of potentialities that the narrative retrieves.
The end of the story is what equates the present with the
past, the actual with the potential. The hero zswho he was.
(186)
This narrative repetition possesses a forward movement as well; it discloses "the
complete retrieval in resoluteness o f .. . inherited potentialities" (186). Spanos’
view of repetition as both a mnemonic and projective activity converges with
Ricoeur’s. I’m not sure, however, that Spanos would appreciate the company.22
It seems to me that all of Percy’s novels display the type of narrative
repetition that Ricoeur writes of. The Moviegoer, for example, begins with a
"spiraling" and layering of memory. The first three paragraphs take the reader
from the present of Binx’s receiving a note from his aunt to the memory o f his
brother’s death to the memory of going to a movie with Linda. Then Binx gives a
description o f his life in Gentilly. We are not brought back to the present until
page eight. In those same pages, Binx introduces us to ideas of certification, the
search, science, consumerism, and stoicism, all of which will find further
elaboration and repetition as the novel progresses.
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Furthermore, the beginning and end both concern death, as does a good
deal o f the "middle," although death of a different sort. Scott’s death is recounted
in the beginning as a memory, and the epilogue recounts the story o f Binx’s and
K ate’s visit with Lonnie the day before his death. This account is also out o f
sequence with the present of the epilogue. After Scott dies, Aunt Emily enjoins
Binx to "act like a soldier" {MG 2), thus inviting him to become a "southern
stoic."

But Binx embraces a Christian view of death when Lonnie dies. One of

Lonnie’s brothers asks Binx: "When Our Lord raises up [sic] on the last day, will
Lonnie still be in a wheelchair or will he be like us?" "He’ll be like you," Binx
responds {MG2\Q). Thus, while the two accounts repeat one another and provide
a frame for the action of the novel, they do not establish a relationship of
circularity and closure. Rather, their relation manifests the "retrieval o f inherited
potentialities" from the narrative itself. Binx tells us at one point that he is at
home neither in his aunt’s stoicism nor his mother’s Catholicism. At the end,
however, he recapitulates (and capitulates to) both of these "potentialities"—he
goes to medical school as his aunt had wished, and he affirms a Christian view of
death, and life. Thus, he is who he was, both the same and other. The end repeats
the beginning, and to read this novel from the end foregrounds the wanderings
Binx undergoes throughout the book. Just as Binx retrieves the "inherited
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potentialities" from the two sides of his family, the narrative retrieves its own
possibilities into a configuration of pilgrimage.
Thus, the narrative repetition in The Moviegoer takes place on an even
larger scale. In "Physician as Novelist" (1989), which is itself a repetition of "From
Facts to Fiction," Percy reflects on his first novel:
The novel, almost by accident, became a narrative of the
search, the quest. And so the novel, again almost by
accident—or was it accident?—landed squarely in the oldest
tradition of Western letters: the pilgrim’s search outside
himself, rather than the guru’s search within. All this
happened to the novelist and his character without the
slightest consciousness of a debt to St. Augustine or Dante.
Indeed, the character creates within himself and within the
confines of a single weekend in New Orleans a microcosm of
the spiritual history of the West, from the Roman patrician
reading his Greek philosophers to the thirteenth-century
pilgrim who leaves home and takes to the road. (Signposts
193)
The narrative inherits potentialities, then, not only from its own progression but
from the tradition of Western letters as a whole. The Moviegoer retrieves those
possibilities and, like metaphor which both retrieves and creates, which posits
something derivative and original, the novel renders them anew so that reader and
writer (hearer and namer) may come together in a new/old m etaphor for
themselves. In its own derivation and originality, The Moviegoer sings a new song
about something very old—the status of humans as neither angels nor beasts,
neither theorists nor consumers, but as wayfaring pilgrims.
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The same sort of narrative repetition takes place in The Second Coming,
especially in Chapter III, where the story of the blue-dollar hawk recurs. The very
recurrence in itself suggests the sort of retrieval Ricoeur writes of. Yet, as I hope
to show, the retrieval of this particular episode in the larger configuration o f this
particular novel proves especially fruitful.

The Second Coming, like The Thanatos Syndrome, is something o f a
paradox in the Percy corpus. For one thing, it seems that Percy never anticipated
writing another story about Will Barrett. On February 8, 1977, he wrote to Foote:
"The only thing I’m sure of is that I can’t do what you suggested, write a noveltype novel, the doings of Will Barrett after he leaves Santa Fe" (SHC). And to
several interviewers after the book’s publication, Percy admitted that he was not
aware that he was retelling the story of Will Barrett until he was a hundred or so
pages into the novel (see Con 183, 188, 194, 229). Yet, this work, it seems, more
than any other of Percy’s, not only returns to the earlier protagonist, but also
presents itself as a "novel-type" novel. W hat I mean to say is that, while the work
does not manifest an abandonment of his earlier view about the world o f the
traditional novel having passed away, it is nevertheless his most obviously
structured and plotted work. The alternation o f points of view from Will to Allie
in the chapters of the first part and their coming together in Part Two manifest an
unusual degree of structure for Percy. Furthermore, the "criss-cross" pattern of
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the book—Will’s "used up language" and Allie’s fresh language, Will’s memory
and Allie’s amnesia, Will’s "sickness in health" and Allie’s "health in
sickness"—likewise points to Percy’s concern with plot in this work. Moreover,
the criss-cross structure itself demands a retrieval of the "plot" at the beginning of
each new chapter, at least in Part One, since it alternates between the points of
view of the two main characters.
After the book’s publication, Percy was fond of telling interviewers that

The Second Coming was "the first unalienated novel since Tolstoy" (see Con 190,
235), and this would seem to place it in the tradition of the "classical" novel. In a
way, then, the book’s structure suggests the retrieval of the inherited potentialities
o f the traditional "novel-type" novel even as it works against such a generic
conception of the novel. One would be hard-pressed to find characters such as
Will and Allie in any traditional novel unless one bypasses Tolstoy to enter the
world of W alter and Tristram Shandy. Nevertheless, the book does present a
"sense o f an ending" and resolution very much different from Percy’s previous
works.
Now if one reads The Second Coming backwards, as Ricoeur suggests,
from the perspective of its "ending," then one could return to almost any chapter
to find the end repeated and embedded in the beginning. Yet, Chapter III, it
seems to me, repeats more of Percy’s philosophical concerns and points both
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backward and forward in the novel to the themes and imagery that are themselves
repeated. In Chapter III, Miller’s "complex tissue" of "repetition and repetitions
within repetition" begins to manifest itself. The opening words of the chapter, for
example—"undoubtedly something was happening to him" (40)—repeat the vague
"something" that haunts the opening lines of the novel: "The first sign that
something had gone wrong manifested itself while he was playing golf. Or rather
it was the first time he admitted to himself that something might be wrong" (3). As
the first chapter and the novel as a whole progress, the unusual "something,"
instead o f gaining a simple clarification, becomes both clearer and more obscure.
The definitions that presumably delimit this "something" offer only further
possibilities. Is the something related to Will’s chemistry or is it part of the
"farcical" lives he and his fellows seem to be living? Is it depression, or is it a
normal response to a deranged world? The narrative raises but never responds
directly to these questions.
The imagery of spraying or dispersion works in a similar fashion. The sand
trap into which Will falls on the opening page is repeated in the "spraying sand" of
Ed Cupp’s "skulled" sand shot in Chapter III (62). Both, however, are
recapitulated in the locker-room bar, which is "dominated by a photomural of
Jack Nicklaus blasting out of a sand trap" (11). The photomural, in turn, is itself
repeated enough—significantly, in the penultimate sentence of Chapter III—to
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suggest its relation to Will’s memory of his father’s suicide. At the end of Chapter
III, the narrator tells us that Will’s "entire life lay before him, beginning, middle,
and end, as plain as the mural of Jack Nicklaus blasting out o f the sand trap" (72).
But this information comes only after Will has begun to reconstruct (as one does
when one views a mural) the hunting trip in Thomasville with his father, the "most
im portant event of his life" (3). Just as the locker-room bar is dominated by the
mural of Nicklaus, Will’s life is dominated by the memory of this hunting trip and
his father’s death.
In the account of the hunting trip, the imagery of spraying recurs in the
description o f the father’s gunshot that was meant to kill the boy: "The boy saw
the muzzle burst and flame spurting from the gun like a picture of a Civil W ar
soldier shooting" (51). Later, as his father denies the true intent of his shot, he tells
his son through D ’Lo (the maid): "I had no idea that savage [the shotgun] had a
pattern that wide" (54). The "pattern" not only suggests the pattern of the book,
but also patterns Will’s description of the suicide. It has, in a sense, become so
wide as to pattern Will’s cosmos: "brain cells which together faltered and fell
short, now flowered and flew apart, flung like stars around the whole dark
world" (136).
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It is while Will lay in the sand trap, too, that "a strange bird flew past" (3).
The bird is not mentioned again until page forty-three, but there it is described in
terms very similar to those in "Metaphor as Mistake":
Earlier he had seen a bird, undoubtedly some kind o f a hawk,
fly across the fairway straight as an arrow and with
astonishing swiftness, across a ridge covered by scarlet and
gold trees, then fold its wings and drop like a stone into the
woods. It reminded him of something but before he could
think what it was, sparks flew forward at the com er of his
eye. He decided with interest that something was happening
to him, perhaps a breakdown, perhaps a stroke. (43)
Here, "straight as an arrow," "swift," and "drop like a stone into the woods" all
repeat the depiction of the hawk in Percy’s essay. But the description in the novel
joins the elusive "something" with which the book and the chapter begin, a
"something," moreover, that not only disperses Will’s thought, but also is itself
announced by "sparks," yet another image of "spraying." Repetition discloses
repetitions within repetition.
It is interesting to note, too, that the similes Percy employs to describe the
hawk’s flight in both the essay and the novel are cliches. They are the sorts of
comparisons that no longer reveal, but rather entomb. They are, in a sense, dead
metaphors. A case could be made for Percy’s use of such dried up language in the
essay. The main point of the blue-dollar hawk account, is, after all, to show that
the sort of misnaming that happened to the young Percy is itself metaphor. Thus,
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the similes used in describing the bird’s flight are subservient, if you will, to the
main type of misnaming that "blue-dollar hawk" manifests. An attem pt to depict
the bird’s flight through vivid metaphor might have detracted from the point o f
the essay. Can the same be said for the account in the novel?
The second mention of the hawk occurs just after Will sinks a putt, an
"eagle" putt. Something fowl is going on here! Despite the "something" that is
happening to him, Will still muses on and enacts the "small rites" of golf: "He was
o f two minds, playing golf and at the same time wondering with no more than a
m oderate curiosity what was happening to him" (43-4). The hawk, however,
was not of two minds. Single-mindedly it darted through the
mountain air and dove into the woods. Its change of
direction from level flight to drop was fabled. That is, it
made him think of times when people told him fabulous
things and he believed them. Perhaps a Negro had told him
once that this kind of hawk is the only bird in the world that
can—can what? He remembered. He remembered
everything today. The hawk, the Negro said, could fly full
speed and straight into the hole of a hollow tree and brake to
a stop inside. He, the Negro, had seen one do it. It was
possible to believe that the hawk could do just such a singleminded thing. (44)
The single-mindedness of the hawk retrieves elements of the account of the
cat in Chapter I. The cat is "a hundred percent cat, no more no less"—i.e., o f one
mind—but people are often only "two percent themselves"—i.e., dispersed (15).
And Will’s double-mindedness repeals the effect of the play on personal pronouns
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in Allie’s "Instructions from Myself to Myself' (24), in which she writes these sorts
o f sentences: "It took me (you? us?) all my life to make the discovery. Why so
long? And then I (you, we) had to go crazy to do it" (36). Will’s being of two
minds also sets the stage for his meeting with Allie, his double, which takes place
toward the end of the third chapter.
But the single-minded hawk and the double-minded Will also retrieve a
m ajor aspect o f Percy’s thought on language. Because of language, Percy argues,
we experience a "semiotic fall," a consciousness o f ourselves as knowers who can
name and know everything in the world through the mediation of signs,
everything, that is, except ourselves. With no name for the self, we are semiotically
adrift, never quite ourselves. Since cats and hawks do not have language, they
have not experienced the "fall" and thus are always one hundred percent
themselves. That the single-minded hawk is also "fabled" furthers the complexity
o f the novel’s tissue.
From the Latin fabula, "a narrative, story," and fari, "to speak," "fabled"
implies the hawk’s "storied" or "spoken" existence. Although labelled "wonderful"
in Percy’s essay, the hawk is nowhere called "fabled." It becomes so only in the
story about Will Barrett and in the story he reconstructs in his memory. Barrett’s
memory, in fact, can be seen as both the subject and the agent of much of The

Second Coming. Like Augustine, who, as Stephen Crites points out, tries to

216
"collect" his "dispersed" memories into a coherent form, Barrett struggles against
the dispersion of himself as a son of his "dispersed" father.24 He tries to "grasp
together" a story that will "make sense" of both himself and his father. At one
time, "fabled" suggests, this task was not so difficult. Barrett lived in a storied
world: "when people told him fabulous things . . . he believed them." Now,
however, the only stories he hears are jokes, and what he hears is "not the joke, but
the plan and progress of the joke," its structure (59).

25

Barrett’s fabulous world

has been shattered and, fittingly enough, it was shattered during his father’s
attem pt to repeat a "fabled" hunt (48).
But the fabled hawk and the fabled hunt do not imply the same thing. For
the boy, "fabled" suggests a vivid metaphor, a time when language was not dead,
when stories quickened the sense of the world. It repeats, in short, the repetition
that is enacted in the aboriginal naming act. That is to say, it discloses the
possibility of being. But in the "fabled" of the father’s hunt, one senses the
entombment of language. Like Constantin Constantius’s failed attem pt to repeat
his trip to Berlin in Repetition, the father cannot repeat the legendary hunting trip:

This hunt had gone badly. The Negro guide was no good.
The dog had been trained badly. The lawsuit was not going
well. They, the man and the boy, had spent a bad sleepless
night in an old hotel (the same hotel where the man had
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spent the night before the great Thomasville hunt). The hotel
was not at all as the man had remembered it. (48)
Here, "fabled" suggests the devolution of language, its capacity to do violence to
being. Instead of opening possibilities, "fabled" in the father’s case shuts
possibility off, expressed quite literally in the father’s attem pt to kill both his son
and himself. Unable to reckon with—unable to "story"—change in time, the
father dispenses with language and memory in his cataclysmic self-dispersion. The
"how" and the "what" intermesh. The novel both retrieves its own "inherited
potentialities" and becomes the story of Barrett’s struggle against his own heritage.
One could even say that the rest of the book concerns Barrett’s search for a type of
dispersion that paradoxically unifies. The sexual nature of the father’s suicide—
"the penetration and union of perfect cold gunmetal into warm quailing mortal
flesh, the coming to end all coming" (136)—finds counter-expression in the
"comings" (sexual and otherwise) that bring Allie and Will together in their
difference.
It is interesting to note that at the time of the hawk’s third mention in the
chapter, Barrett’s attitude toward the vague "something" that opens the novel has
shifted. At first, the "something" seemed so dominant that "it occurred to him that
he might shoot himself' (4). Yet, as I have already cited, when the hawk is
mentioned a second time, the "something" holds only "a moderate curiosity" (44).
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By the time the narrative returns to the hawk, there is only a "mild stirring of
curiosity. . . . A little something or other was happening, but no more than that"
(64). This shift seems to indicate Barrett’s preliminary movement outside himself
and the first hint of his future possibility, for immediately following the
description of the diminution of the "something," we are told that "one day he
heard a footstep. Someone was coming" (64). At this point, of course, the
"someone" is ambivalent. It could be the spectre of his father, who lures Barrett
toward self-annihilation and thanatos. Or, it could be the call of erosr. in the very
next section of the chapter, as he hunts for his errant golf balls in the woods, Will
meets Allie for the first time.
The third mention of the hawk occurs just before their coming together. At
the same time he heard the footstep, he
saw the bird. A small cloud passed over the sun, the
darkness settling so quickly it left the greens glowing. A
hawk flew over, a dagger-winged falcon, its flight swift and
single-minded and straight over the easy ambling golfers.
When it reached the woods it folded its wings as abruptly as
if it had been shot and fell like a stone. (64)26
The "cloud" retrieves the one he noticed as he lay in the sand bunker on the novel’s
first page. There, it is one that "went towering thousands of feet into the air" and
that looked like the cloud "over Hiroshima" (4). Just as the nondescript
"something" has diminished, so have the proportions of the cloud. The rest of the
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hawk’s description is by now familiar: swift, straight, single-minded, fell like a
stone. The distinguishing feature of this reference rests in the fact that the hawk is
given a name. It is a dagger-winged falcon.
Artistic license surely allows Percy to change the names that appear in
"M etaphor as Mistake"—"blue-dollar hawk" and "blue-darter hawk." But the
character o f the name here seems more akin to the disappointing "description" the
father gives the boy than it does to the more vivid and truer "name" the guide
gives. "Dagger-winged," like "blue-darter," suggests a class o f bird, not its
"inscape." If Will is awakening to the possibility of a future, if "someone is
coming," and if the hawk is "fabled," then why would it be given a descriptive
designation and not a name?
The important thing to remember here, it seems to me, is that Will is on a
precipice. As the ambivalent use of "fabled" suggests, he is both on the verge o f a
nascent reawakening and caught up in the death-dealings of his father. Since I am
reading the book backwards, however, since I am retrieving the inherited
potentialities from the end, then what seems to be a description can be seen instead
as a reawakening into language. Like Paul John Eakin’s tripartite analysis of
Helen Keller’s entry into language, "dagger-winged" signifies Will’s nascent
autobiographical act. First, it is an act of memory. Will remembers everything,
the narrator says, and the name itself is part of this remembering. From this

220
perspective, "dagger-winged" becomes a name on a par with "water." Second, it is
an act o f language; experience is transformed into symbol. The hawk, before
unnamed, is somehow formulated and set free under the auspices of "dagger
winged." In the retrieval of this name from his memory, Will manifests the resolve
to go on naming. This he does, not only in naming the before unnameable, as in
the many "names of death" (246-48), but in his continued renaming, his
reconstructing the "fable" of the hunting trip with his father. Third, it is a
constitution of self. Will’s naming and renaming brings about "the second
coming" of self with Allie. And finally, if I add the dimension of the future to
Eakin’s triad, then the resolve to name further comes about by the grace of the
"someone coming" to him. Having passed through the death of his father, Will
now experiences the gain o f repetition. "Dagger-winged falcon," then, like The

Second Coming, is both something new and something derived. The hawk repeats
the story as told in Percy’s essay, but it introduces a new name. And the novel
repeats itself so that it might grasp together the dispersed selves of Will and
Allie—and the reader—into a new fable.

Percy was once asked in an interview if he was worried about repeating
himself in The Second Coming. He responded:
It’s been said that all novelists write the same novel over and
over again. And since the kind of fiction I write is an
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exploration to begin with, all I can hope to do is push the
boundaries back. I’m convinced that in The Second Coming
there’s a definite advance. (Con 183-84)
Percy is right. There has been an advance; but it is an advance within a return. He
returns not only to his own work, but also to the tradition of letters in America.
Reflecting on the work of Herman Melville, Percy once gave passing praise to the
structuralists’s concept of intertextuality (Signposts 200). M oby Dick, Percy
writes, "was not only dedicated to Hawthorne, it was written at him" (200). He
goes on to point out the paradoxical way Melville characterized his experience
after writing his masterpiece. At once, Melville felt "broiled in hellfire" and
"spotless as a lamb." Percy notes that the paradox might be understood by what
Melville described as the "ineffable sociability" he felt: "Surely this is the key to
the paradox—the ineffable sociability in writing. Intertextuality, if you please. As
lonely as is the craft of writing, it is the most social of vocations" (200).
At whom did Percy write his works? With whom did he feel these ineffable
sociabilities? The answer perhaps rests in the concept of repetition. Since his
fiction is explorative in nature, Percy not only names something new for his
reader, but also writes constantly at himself; he repeats himself. He pushes the
boundaries back, while remaining within limitation nonetheless. W hat he says of
Melville’s work is equally true of his own: "As the narrative unfolds, one becomes
aware that in its very telling, something else is being told, a ghostly narrative of
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great import told by a ghostly self, perhaps one’s own shadow self' (201). The

Second Coming repeats the story o f Will Barrett, but it also repeats the account of
the blue-dollar hawk, however transformed. That account, in turn, repeats the
constitution of the self in metaphor, which as repetition repeats the mystery of
language and narrative.
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Notes to Chapter Four
1.

(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1982) 3. Further references will be made
parenthetically in the text.

2.

It interesting to note that in his adulation of the coach horn, Constantin
ostensibly wants to prove the impossibility of repetition. Yet, here again,
Kierkegaard masters his irony. For the very difference in similarity (the
instrument is the same instrument no m atter how often one "wheedles"
different notes from it) is precisely what repetition is all about.

3.

"Walker Percy: The Novelist as Poet," Southern Review 17 (1981): 165.

4.

See Ricoeur’s "Time and Narrative" Critical Inquiry 7(1980): 169-90.

5.

"Walker Percy and the Resonance of the Word," Southern Quarterly 18
(1980): 47.

6.

Following Percy’s lead in the Intermezzo section of Lost in the Cosmos,
Lewis Lawson writes that the entry into language is a "fall." See "The
Cross and the Delta: Walker Percy’s Anthropology," in Jan Nordby
Gretlund and Karl-Heinz Westarp, eds., Walker Percy: Novelist and
Philosopher (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1991) 3-12.

7.

The Philosophy o f Existentialism (New York: The Citadel Press, 1956) 22.

8.

Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus o f Meaning (Fort
W orth, Texas: Texas Christian UP, 1976) 50. Future citations will be made
parenthetically in the text.

9.

3 vols. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1984, 1986, 1988). Here, I refer to
Ricoeur’s tripartite development of "figuration, configuration, and
refiguration."

10.

"Symbol" here refers to "sign." In this essay, Percy used the vocabulary of
Cassirer and Langer instead of Saussure.

11.

"Resonance of the Word" 47.

12.

In his perceptive article which I have already cited, Charles Bigger
emphasizes the fact that Percy’s stress on the name serves precisely this
purpose—to reinstate the strangeness of being.
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13.

Here, Percy’s thought would seem to converge with that of Jacques
Derrida, especially Derrida’s critique of the traditional view of language as
making present some prior transcendent and Platonic "idea." O f course,
there are serious differences as well. Whereas Percy wants to maintain a
connection between identity and difference, transcendence and immanence,
and incarnation (understood here as a simultaneous, "always already"
indwelling of transcendence and immanence), Derrida heralds difference
and would seem to cut off the possibility of transcendence.

14.

(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985) 181-2. The chapter I have in mind is
Chapter Four: "Self-Invention in Autobiography: The M oment of
Language." Further citations will be made parenthetically in the text.

15.

Metaphors o f Self: The Meaning ofAutobiography (Princeton: Princeton
UP, 1972).

16.

It may also be useful for readers to look again at Keller’s description of this
moment. I have quoted the entire passage in note 14 of Chapter Two.

17.

This passage comes from Jonathan Culler (quoted in Eakin 224), "Jacques
Derrida" in John Sturrock’s Structuralism and Since: From Levi-Strauss to
Derrida (New York: Oxford UP, 1981) 169-70.

18.

In the forward to Henry Kisor’s remarkable autobiography, What’s That
Pig Outdoors? A Memoir o f Deafness (New York: Penguin Books, 1990),
Percy calls Kisor’s work "a moving account from a novel perspective o f the
universal experience, which most of us take for granted, of the human
breakthrough into language" (viii). Certainly, this same phenomenon is
what so captivates him about Helen Keller’s The Story o f M y Life. Thus,
just as he reads Keller’s Life as a metaphor of the acquisition of language,
that is what strikes him about Kisor’s work.

19.

I am, of course, following William Rodney Allen’s reading of Percy’s work,
though not his nonfiction, in light of the "father." See Walker Percy: A
Southern Wayfarer (Jackson, UP o f Mississippi, 1986).

20.

Percy refers to Barth’s comment in an interview with Carlton Cremeens in
1968 (see Con 24-25). There, he seems to contradict his earlier statement in
"From Facts to Fiction": "John Barth said it was no longer possible to
write nineteenth-century novels, a novel which has the usual characters
where the characters interact, where there is a story line, a development of

225
plot, a resolution—a classical novel. I’m not sure I agree with him." Percy
qualifies this statement by saying that he would agree with Barth to the
extent that the view of the world which the "classical" novel reflects has
now passed away.
21.

I borrow the term from Paul Ricoeur’s "Narrative Time." See note number
4 above. I will make further citations to this article parenthetically in the
text.

22.

Ricoeur’s comments in this article are anticipated (and strangely
corroborated), especially with regard to memory, in Stephen Crites’ "The
Narrative Quality of Experience," which originally appeared in the Journal
o f the American Academy o f Religion 34 (September 1971): 291-311, and
which is reprinted in Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones, eds., Why
Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1989) 65-88.

23.

See Lewis Lawson’s "Walker Percy’s Southern Stoic," in Following Percy:
Essays on Walker Percy’s Work (Troy, New York: The W hitston
Publishing Company, 1988)41-63.

24.

"The Narrative Quality of Experience" 74.

25.

It is noteworthy that Jimmy Rogers, the joke-teller in this scene, is
described as being "all plans and schemes and deals" (59). The idea o f
plans is repeated in Chapter IV, when the narrator recounts Allie’s
struggles against the "plans" of her mother, her father, and Dr. D uk (8994). She decides to make her own plans: "What if /m a k e plans for me"
(96). This resolve to act on her own carries over into her renovation o f the
greenhouse and stove. The idea of plans, furthermore, finds a place in the
later chapters of the book when Leslie makes plans for Will and Will and
Allie make plans for themselves.

26.

Some parallels between the account of the hawk and that of the peregrine
falcon in The Last Gentleman suggest an even more complex tissue of
repetition—i.e., woods/park, gun/telescope, "something'V'sign."

Chapter Five
Coda: Autobiography, Repetition
and Percy
I am having the uncomfortable feeling o f having at last been
stuck in my slot—as a "Christian Existentialist." I hear sighs
of relief all over: now that they know what I am, they don’t
have to worry about me.
—Walker Percy to Shelby Foote
January 29, 1979 (SHC)

Speaking at a memorial service in honor of Walker Percy at St. Ignatius
Church in New York City, Robert Giroux commented:
We come here today to honor the memory and the work of
Walker Percy, a superb novelist, a distinguished m an of
letters, a witty and searching critic, a great American. If I
resist the adjective Southern, I am only following Dr. Percy’s
example.1
Toward the end of his eulogy, however, Giroux dramatically sums up Percy’s life
and work with two words which seem to emphasize the very Southernness he
earlier resisted: "[Percy] was truly a man for all seasons, whose life and work
exemplified that pair of concepts all too rare today—probity and honor." Despite
the fact that the South has never been the sole proprietor of these virtues, Giroux
nevertheless seems to link the two, the region and the qualities. He had earlier
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referred to Colonel John Pelham’s appearance in Percy’s witty, "The Last Phil
Donahue Show" in Lost in the Cosmos.2 There, Giroux characterizes Pelham as
"a Confederate officer, representing probity and honor." Thus, while he refrains
from the label in his opening remarks, he nevertheless seems to place Percy
squarely in the South in his closing ones.
Giroux’s wavering signals something students o f Percy often encounter:
the difficulty they have in placing him. This difficulty, furthermore, seems to be
related to the category of repetition. If it is true that repetition as inter esse finds a
prominent place in Percy’s works, then it may not be surprising that Percy himself
resisted labels. Labels foreclose possibility; they demand an adherence, one might
say, to a prescribed proscription. That is, they place the abstract before the
concrete. They make of the self a neat, rounded-off package. Percy not only
resisted the label "Southern," he also resisted "professional," "philosopher," and
"linguistician." He did so, moreover, despite his having spent almost forty years of
his life thinking and writing about the unique phenomenon of language.
In Chapter Two, I suggested that such a resistance might indicate what I
called Percy’s methodology of repetition. Not only did Percy return time and
again to his "extra-literary" pursuit, but the posture of the nonprofessional, "being
between," allowed him a fresh view of what "professional specializations" can too
often foreclose in jargon and theoretical apparatus. Percy, thus, took the posture
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o f the genuine researcher, not the technician. As he writes in "The Loss o f the
Creature":
The technician . . . [is] always offended by the genuine
research man because the latter is usually a little vague and
always humble before the thing; he doesn’t have much use
for the equipment or the jargon. Whereas the technician is
never vague and never humble before the thing; he holds the
thing disposed of by the principle, the formula, the textbook
outline, and he thinks a great deal o f equipment and jargon.
(MB 61)
Such a researcher is not entirely different from Binx Bolling, who although not
disposed to the "pure research" of science as his Aunt Emily seems to think,
nevertheless goes out into the world and "doesn’t miss a trick." Such a researcher
is, in short, a homo viator.
"Research" itself derives from the Middle French recercher which means
"to travel through, survey." Both words, thus, indicate a posture of wandering or
wayfaring. As I tried to show in Chapters One and Two, homo viator is a label
that both limits and opens possibility. The same could be said for research. As an
exploration, its posture is similar to that of homo viator—i.e., it places one "no
place." When all is said and done, there is always more to be said and done.
There will always be those who go back to retrieve the inherited possibilities of the
researcher’s work. One’s place never really solidifies; one is always displaced.
Like homo viator, then, research is a label that resists labelling.
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Despite his status as a researcher, Percy nevertheless used his own sort of
tools, notably essays and novels. And the "thing" he explores in both his fiction
and nonfiction is really "no-thing"—i.e., the self which places itself in the world in
and through language. W ithout the breakthrough into language, Percy argues, the
self has no world. Already, the sort of reflexivity I mentioned in the last chapter
reveals itself. For Percy uses language to get at the self that is always and already
immeshed in a world of language. The medium which is his tool is also the
medium whose relation to the self and world he explores. Because the self and
language are inextricably joined, one can step back from neither.
Yet, because of language, the self develops a self-consciousness o f itself.
And what it experiences is a sense of its own displacement in language. The self
cannot place itse/Zas it places other things and so it wanders, in search o f a place
that would quell the anxiety o f its fundamental displacement. Percy’s writing
bears the indelible imprint of a self-consciously wandering self. It speaks of his
own self and life, however transformed either may be in the final product. In his
writing, as I suggest at the end of the last chapter, Percy repeats himself. Even an
ostensibly "scientific" essay such as "Metaphor as Mistake" traces the attenuated
links of a self who is both different and same—the "I" of the present writer, and
the "boy" around whose experience the writer frames part of his argument.
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Repetition, thus, becomes necessary. Percy tries time and again in both the
novels and the essays to come at his displacement in a new way. In a
Faulkneresque comment to Linda Whitney Hobson, Percy said that his work up
to that point (1981) had been a failure:
I think I’ve failed in these five novels and in The Message in
the Bottle, but I’ve got a good idea for the next one. You
know, I’ll tell you a secret: I think the only thing that keeps
the novelist going (and I’m sure that any other novelist
would admit this) is that you are going to do the really big
one.
Unlike Faulkner, Percy does not say that his works are "splendid failures."
Rather, the impression he creates is that he forgets his previous failures to go after
the "big one." Whether Percy ever wrote the big one (the great novel) is not for me
to say. Readers must decide for themselves. Instead, the phrase itself intrigues
me. If it is taken not solely as a compound noun—i.e., the masterwork—but as a
noun modified by an adjective—i.e., the big ONE—then Percy’s comment suggests
a search for the unity of repetition.
In this regard, his works begin with himself as a denizen of the postmodern
world who experiences himself as displaced in language, and they return to himself
as somehow unified, however tentatively—else why continue to go after the big
one?—in the difference of writing. In his writing, Percy repeats his life and his self
in the hope of creating the unity of self, life, and writing, which is autobiography.
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But just as autos, bios, and graphein are different elements of one word, so the
self, life, and writing of Percy do not find a simple unity. The self and the life are
both different from and the same as the writing which portrays them. Yet, as I
suggested in the last chapter, they find a reconciliation in the difference of
metaphor. Percy’s works begin and end as "autobiography," which, like "novel,"
is also a label that resists labelling.
Using the works of three critics in James Olney’s collection,

Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical? Joseph Fichtelberg categorizes
three approaches to the problem of the relation between self, life, and writing:
"Olney’s unity, Renza’s difference, and Sprinker’s multiplicity are the three
possible responses to the problem of the subject in autobiography."4 Does the self
find unity in the telling of its story? Does it forever differ from the story told? Or
does it endlessly multiply itself (and eventually evaporate) in the telling? I have
tried to show that in reading Percy’s work as autobiographical repetition, "Yes"
seems to be the answer to all three. I do not mean to be overly paradoxical here.
W hat I suggest is that my reading of Percy’s works in light of autobiography has
been an attempt to de-struct the necessity of seeing autobiography as falling within
the exclusive limits of one or the other school. All three "trouble with," as Olney
puts it, "the self and consciousness and knowledge of it."5 And Percy’s works
trouble with these same issues. His research brought him face to face with the
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predicament of the postmodern attitude, and although I have read his works in a
postmodern light, Percy himself seemed to have retreated from fully embracing its
tenets. Thus, his transformation of experience into art calls forth at once all three
views of the relation between self, life, and writing. Percy’s place remains elusive.
In the errant label that autobiography provides, he seeks a place for the self whose
only place is provided by the travelling of research. His research returns him—and
the reader—to the label "homo viator."
In her talk at the memorial service in New York City, Eudora Welty spoke
about Percy’s novels as an exercise in defamiliarization:
On first reading a novel by Walker Percy, we might rather
soon ask ourselves, Where are we? Where in the world is he
taking us? . . . W hat was until a moment ago a familiar time
and place (even, perhaps, "Southern") is signalling "Danger!"

Where is Walker Percy taking us?
We are still at home. But home lies before us in a different
light, and its face is turned toward a new perspective, but it’s
still where we live. Only we may have altered.
Percy takes us somewhere that seems familiar yet is really strange. In so doing, he
ends his exploration in the place it began. He returns us to ourselves so that we
know ourselves to be both at home and not at home, at the place of exploration,
the no-place of the self whose life is a wandering in the strangeness of language
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and writing. The unity of Percy’s self, life, and writing derives from the strange
unity o f repetition and the limited possibility of autobiography.
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Notes to Chapter Five
1.

Walker Percy: J916-1990 (New York: Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 1991).
There are no page numbers in this booklet. Besides Giroux, other speakers
included Shelby Foote, Stanley Kauflfmann, Patrick Samway, S.J., Mary
Lee Settle, Wilfrid Sheed, and Eudora Welty. I will make further references
to this booklet by citing the particular speaker.

2.

In his talk, Giroux mistakenly calls him "Palmer."

3.

(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980).

4.

Fichtelberg makes this comment in his The Complex Image: Faith and
Method in American Autobiography (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P,
1989) 4. Fichtelburg also points to repetition—"obsessive rewriting"— as
providing a key to understanding autobiography. Yet whereas he uses
Nietzsche as his guide, I have followed Kierkegaard and Percy. The articles
Fichtelburg refers to are Olney’s "Some Versions of Memory/Some
Versions of Bios"; Louis Renza’s "The Veto of the Imagination: A Theory
of Autobiography"; and Michael Sprinker’s "Fictions of the Self: The End
of Autobiography."

5.

"Autobiography and the Cultural Moment," in Autobiography: Essays
Theoretical and Critical, 23.
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